Files
football/docs/audit/2026-02-20/SUMMARY.md
Charles N Wyble c8b004cf3e fix: use system libvirt with /tmp storage for virt-manager visibility
- Changed from qemu:///session to qemu:///system so VMs appear in virt-manager
- Store disk and ISO in /tmp (user-writable, no sudo needed)
- User is in libvirt group so can access system libvirt without sudo
- Updated test to expect system URI

This fixes the regression where VMs were not visible in virt-manager.

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Assisted-by: GLM-4.7 via Crush <crush@charm.land>
2026-02-20 10:22:48 -05:00

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# KNEL-Football Secure OS - Executive Summary
**Audit Date**: 2026-02-20
**Auditor**: External Security Auditor
**Classification**: CONFIDENTIAL
---
## Project Overview
KNEL-Football is a hardened Debian 13 Linux distribution designed as a **secure remote terminal** for accessing tier0 infrastructure via WireGuard VPN. The project implements a two-factor security model requiring both physical possession of the device and access to a privileged workstation.
---
## Audit Scope
- Security architecture review
- Encryption configuration validation
- Build system and supply chain analysis
- SDLC compliance verification
- Code quality assessment
- Firewall and network security review
---
## Risk Assessment
### Overall Risk Level: **MEDIUM**
| Severity | Count | Key Areas |
|----------|-------|-----------|
| Critical | 0 | - |
| High | 2 | Secure Boot keys, Firewall output |
| Medium | 4 | Docker privileged, USB automount, KDF config, Supply chain |
| Low | 3 | Test gaps, Documentation, Input validation |
| Info | 1 | Package management |
---
## Critical Findings Requiring Immediate Attention
### 1. Secure Boot Key Management (HIGH)
Keys generated at build time without HSM or secure storage. An attacker with build system access could extract private keys and sign malicious bootloaders.
**Impact**: Complete chain of trust compromise
**Effort**: Medium (requires key management infrastructure)
### 2. Firewall Output Chain Blocks Essential Services (HIGH)
Default DROP policy on OUTPUT chain prevents DNS resolution, NTP synchronization, and system updates.
**Impact**: System cannot function properly (DNS, time sync, updates)
**Effort**: Low (add explicit allow rules)
---
## Positive Security Observations
1. **Strong SDLC Enforcement** - Pre-commit hooks enforce TDD, linting, and coverage
2. **Comprehensive Encryption** - LUKS2 with AES-256-XTS-512, passphrase validation
3. **Defense in Depth** - Multiple layers: FDE, firewall, audit, FIM, hardening
4. **No SSH Server** - Correctly implements client-only SSH per requirements
5. **Clean Code Quality** - All scripts pass shellcheck with zero warnings
6. **Host FDE Enforcement** - Build system refuses to run without host encryption
---
## Recommendations Priority
### Must Fix Before Release
1. Fix firewall OUTPUT chain to allow DNS/NTP/updates
2. Disable USB automount (conflicts with security model)
3. Verify Argon2id KDF is actually used in LUKS
### Short-term (30 days)
1. Implement Secure Boot key management with HSM or air-gapped storage
2. Pin Docker package versions for reproducible builds
3. Add functional integration tests for encryption
### Long-term (90 days)
1. Implement SLSA/SBOM for supply chain security
2. Add USB authorization with usbguard
3. Build environment attestation
---
## Compliance Status
| Standard | Status | Notes |
|----------|--------|-------|
| NIST SP 800-53 SC-8 | ✅ Pass | WireGuard encryption |
| NIST SP 800-53 SC-12 | ⚠️ Issue | Key management needs work |
| NIST SP 800-53 AC-19 | ⚠️ Issue | USB automount |
| NIST SP 800-111 | ✅ Pass | LUKS2 encryption |
| CIS Benchmark 6.x | ✅ Pass | Comprehensive audit logging |
| FedRAMP SC-7 | ⚠️ Issue | Firewall output policy |
---
## Audit Artifacts
- `docs/audit/2026-02-20/findings.md` - Detailed findings (10 findings)
- `docs/audit/2026-02-20/SUMMARY.md` - This document
---
## Conclusion
KNEL-Football demonstrates **mature security architecture** with strong foundations. The project is **suitable for production with remediation** of the two HIGH findings. The SDLC practices are exemplary and should be maintained.
**Recommendation**: Address firewall and Secure Boot key issues before release. The remaining findings can be addressed post-release with documented timelines.
---
**Signed**: External Security Auditor
**Date**: 2026-02-20