- Changed from qemu:///session to qemu:///system so VMs appear in virt-manager - Store disk and ISO in /tmp (user-writable, no sudo needed) - User is in libvirt group so can access system libvirt without sudo - Updated test to expect system URI This fixes the regression where VMs were not visible in virt-manager. 💘 Generated with Crush Assisted-by: GLM-4.7 via Crush <crush@charm.land>
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KNEL-Football Secure OS - Executive Summary
Audit Date: 2026-02-20 Auditor: External Security Auditor Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Project Overview
KNEL-Football is a hardened Debian 13 Linux distribution designed as a secure remote terminal for accessing tier0 infrastructure via WireGuard VPN. The project implements a two-factor security model requiring both physical possession of the device and access to a privileged workstation.
Audit Scope
- Security architecture review
- Encryption configuration validation
- Build system and supply chain analysis
- SDLC compliance verification
- Code quality assessment
- Firewall and network security review
Risk Assessment
Overall Risk Level: MEDIUM
| Severity | Count | Key Areas |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | 0 | - |
| High | 2 | Secure Boot keys, Firewall output |
| Medium | 4 | Docker privileged, USB automount, KDF config, Supply chain |
| Low | 3 | Test gaps, Documentation, Input validation |
| Info | 1 | Package management |
Critical Findings Requiring Immediate Attention
1. Secure Boot Key Management (HIGH)
Keys generated at build time without HSM or secure storage. An attacker with build system access could extract private keys and sign malicious bootloaders.
Impact: Complete chain of trust compromise Effort: Medium (requires key management infrastructure)
2. Firewall Output Chain Blocks Essential Services (HIGH)
Default DROP policy on OUTPUT chain prevents DNS resolution, NTP synchronization, and system updates.
Impact: System cannot function properly (DNS, time sync, updates) Effort: Low (add explicit allow rules)
Positive Security Observations
- Strong SDLC Enforcement - Pre-commit hooks enforce TDD, linting, and coverage
- Comprehensive Encryption - LUKS2 with AES-256-XTS-512, passphrase validation
- Defense in Depth - Multiple layers: FDE, firewall, audit, FIM, hardening
- No SSH Server - Correctly implements client-only SSH per requirements
- Clean Code Quality - All scripts pass shellcheck with zero warnings
- Host FDE Enforcement - Build system refuses to run without host encryption
Recommendations Priority
Must Fix Before Release
- Fix firewall OUTPUT chain to allow DNS/NTP/updates
- Disable USB automount (conflicts with security model)
- Verify Argon2id KDF is actually used in LUKS
Short-term (30 days)
- Implement Secure Boot key management with HSM or air-gapped storage
- Pin Docker package versions for reproducible builds
- Add functional integration tests for encryption
Long-term (90 days)
- Implement SLSA/SBOM for supply chain security
- Add USB authorization with usbguard
- Build environment attestation
Compliance Status
| Standard | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 SC-8 | ✅ Pass | WireGuard encryption |
| NIST SP 800-53 SC-12 | ⚠️ Issue | Key management needs work |
| NIST SP 800-53 AC-19 | ⚠️ Issue | USB automount |
| NIST SP 800-111 | ✅ Pass | LUKS2 encryption |
| CIS Benchmark 6.x | ✅ Pass | Comprehensive audit logging |
| FedRAMP SC-7 | ⚠️ Issue | Firewall output policy |
Audit Artifacts
docs/audit/2026-02-20/findings.md- Detailed findings (10 findings)docs/audit/2026-02-20/SUMMARY.md- This document
Conclusion
KNEL-Football demonstrates mature security architecture with strong foundations. The project is suitable for production with remediation of the two HIGH findings. The SDLC practices are exemplary and should be maintained.
Recommendation: Address firewall and Secure Boot key issues before release. The remaining findings can be addressed post-release with documented timelines.
Signed: External Security Auditor Date: 2026-02-20