tahoe-lafs/docs/tor.rst

Using Tahoe-LAFS with Tor

1. Use cases
2. Native Tor integration for Tahoe-LAFS
3. Software Dependencies
4. Client Configuration
5. Storage Server Configuration
6. Performance and security issues of Tor Hidden Services

Use cases

Tor is an anonymizing network used to help hide the identity of internet clients and servers. Please see the Tor Project's website for more information: https://www.torproject.org/

There are three potential use-cases for Tahoe-LAFS on the client side:

1. User does not care to protect their anonymity or to connect to anonymous storage servers. This document is not useful to you... so stop reading.
2. User does not care to protect their anonymity but they wish to connect to Tahoe-LAFS storage servers which are accessbile only via Tor Hidden Services.
3. User wishes to always use Tor to protect their anonymity when connecting to Tahoe-LAFS storage grids (whether or not the storage servers are Tor Hidden Services) [*].

For Tahoe-LAFS storage servers there are three use-cases:

1. Storage server operator does not care to protect their own anonymity nor to help the clients protect theirs. Stop reading this document and run your Tahoe-LAFS storage server using publicly routed TCP/IP.
2. The operator does not require anonymity for his storage server, but he wants it to be available over both publicly routed TCP/IP and through Tor Hidden Services. One possible reason to do this is because being reachable through Tor Hidden Services is a convenient way to bypass NAT or firewall that prevents publicly routed TCP/IP connections to your server. Another is that making your storage server reachable through Tor Hidden Services can provide better protection for your clients who themselves use Tor to protect their anonymity [*].

https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en

3. The operator wishes to protect their anonymity by making their Tahoe server accessible only via Tor Hidden Services.

Native Tor integration for Tahoe-LAFS

Native Tor integration for Tahoe-LAFS utilizes the Twisted endpoints API: https://twistedmatrix.com/documents/14.0.0i XXXX replace with current XXXX /core/howto/endpoints.html

Twisted's endpoint parser plugin system is extensible via installing additional Twisted packages. The native Tor integration for Tahoe-LAFS uses txsocksx and txtorcon.

txsocksx will try to use the system tor's SOCKS port if available; attempts are made on ports 9050 and 9151.

txtorcon will use the tor control port to configure Tor Hidden Services.

Software Dependencies

• Tor (tor) must be installed. See here: https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-unix.html.en XXX link to operating-system-independent howto for tor

• The "Tor-friendly" branch of txsocksx must be installed:: pip install git+https://github.com/david415/txsocksx.git

  Once this is merged then you can use upstream txsocksx: https://github.com/habnabit/txsocksx/pull/8

• txtorcon must be installed:: pip install txtorcon

Once these software dependencies are installed and the Tahoe-LAFS node is restarted, then no further configuration is necessary in order for it to connect to other Tahoe-LAFS nodes via Tor (client use-case 2 from Use cases, above).

In order to implement client use-case 3 or server use-cases 2 or 3, further configuration is necessary.

Client Configuration

[node]

tor_only.enabled = (boolean, optional)

This specifies two changes in behavior:

1. Transform all non-Tor client endpoints into Tor client endpoints.
2. Force tub.location to be set to "client.fakelocation:1"

This option is necessary to preserve the client's anonymity (client use-case 3 from Use cases, above). It is also necessary to preserve a server's anonymity (server use-case 3).

Why is this option necessary to protect anonymity? If the Tahoe-LAFS introducer announces a storage server with non-Tor endpoint descriptor strings in the connection hints list in the storage server FURL then this could cause the client to deanonymize itself by connecting to the storage server without using Tor.

Storage Server Configuration

Native Tor integration for Tahoe-LAFS uses the txtorcon library for it's Tor Hidden Services endpoint and parser. Please see the txtorcon documentation for more information: * https://txtorcon.readthedocs.org/en/latest/ * https://github.com/meejah/txtorcon * http://timaq4ygg2iegci7.onion/

Operators of Tahoe-LAFS storage servers can specify a Tor Hidden Service endpoint descriptor string for the tub.location value in the tahoe.cfg like:

tub.location = "onion:80:hiddenServiceDir=/var/lib/tor/my_service"

Setting this configuration option is necessary for Server use-cases 2 and 3 (from Use cases, above).

XXX Does using tub.locaton for this prevent both Tor Hidden Service and traceable-net service (Server use-case 2)? Maybe instead we need to have a tub.hidden_service = config for this, and turning that on is how you do server Use-case 2, and the way to do Server Use-case 3 is to turn on tub.hidden_service = plus also set tor_only.enabled = true? See also Tahoe-LAFS ticket #1010.

Performance and security issues of Tor Hidden Services

If you are running a server which does not itself need to be anonymous, should you make it reachable as a Tor Hidden Service or not? Or should you make it reachable both as a Tor Hidden Service and as a publicly traceable TCP/IP server?

There are several trade-offs effected by this decision.

NAT/Firewall penetration

Making a server be reachable as a Tor Hidden Service makes it reachable even if there are NATs or firewalls preventing direct TCP/IP connections to the server.

Anonymity

Making a Tahoe-LAFS server accessible only via Tor Hidden Services can be used to guarantee that the Tahoe-LAFS clients use Tor to connect. This prevents misconfigured clients from accidentally de-anonymizing themselves by connecting to your server through the traceable Internet.

Also, interaction, through Tor, with a Tor Hidden Service may be more protected from network traffic analysis than interaction, through Tor, with a publicly traceable TCP/IP server.

XXX is there a document maintained by Tor hackers which substantiates or refutes this belief? If so we need to link to it. If not, then maybe we should explain more here why we think this?

Performance

A client connecting to a Tahoe-LAFS server through Tor incurs substantially higher latency and sometimes worse throughput than the same client connecting to the same server over a normal traceable TCP/IP connection.

A client connecting to a Tahoe-LAFS server which is a Tor Hidden Service incurs much more latency and probably worse throughput.

Positive and negative effects on other Tor users

Sending your Tahoe-LAFS traffic over Tor adds cover traffic for other Tor users who are also transmitting bulk data. So that is good for them -- increasing their anonymity.

However, it makes the performance of other Tor users' interactive sessions -- e.g. ssh sessions -- much worse. This is because Tor doesn't currently have any prioritization or quality-of-service features, so someone else's ssh keystrokes may have to wait in line while your bulk file contents get transmitted. The added delay might make other people's interactive sessions unusable.

Both of these effects are doubled if you upload or download files to a Tor Hidden Service, as compared to if you upload or download files over Tor to a publicly traceable TCP/IP server.