cbfs-init: remove temp files, measure direct cbfs output, extend PCR with proper introspection tracing
flash.sh: do not die but go to recovery if flashrom fails, cosmetic fix for warning given to user
kexec-insert-key: extend PCR with proper introspection tracing
kexec-select-boot: extend PCR with proper introspection tracing
kexec-measure-luks: extend PCR with proper introspection tracing
tpmr: Add missing TRACE_FUNC, fix comments, extend give hash that was extended to tpm call in DEBUG, fix TPM startsession unsuppressed output still present
ash_functions: extend PCR with proper introspection tracing
insmod: DEBUG info more pertinent, extend PCR with proper introspection tracing
Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
Exception: scripts sourcing/calls within etc/ash_functions continues to use old TRACE functions until we switch to bash completely getting rid of ash.
This would mean getting rid of legacy boards (flash + legacy boards which do not have enough space for bash in flash boards) once and for all.
Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
Prompt for TPM owner password internally within tpm2_counter_create.
Add tpm1_counter_create to prompt for password internally. Wipe the
cache in either if the operation fails, in case the password was
incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
gui-init: make sure that reseal_tpm_disk_decryption_key happens only on successful TOTP/HOTP sealing, reusing cached TPM Owner password
Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
Changes:
- As per master: when TOTP cannot unseal TOTP, user is prompted to either reset or regenerate TOTP
- Now, when either is done and a previous TPM Disk Unlock Key was setuped, the user is guided into:
- Regenerating checksums and signing them
- Regenerating TPM disk Unlock Key and resealing TPM disk Unlock Key with passphrase into TPM
- LUKS header being modified, user is asked to resign kexec.sig one last time prior of being able to default boot
- When no previous Disk Unlock Key was setuped, the user is guided into:
- The above, plus
- Detection of LUKS containers,suggesting only relevant partitions
- Addition of TRACE and DEBUG statements to troubleshoot actual vs expected behavior while coding
- Were missing under TPM Disk Unlock Key setup codepaths
- Fixes for #645 : We now check if only one slots exists and we do not use it if its slot1.
- Also shows in DEBUG traces now
Unrelated staged changes
- ash_functions: warn and die now contains proper spacing and eye attaction
- all warn and die calls modified if containing warnings and too much punctuation
- unify usage of term TPM Disk Unlock Key and Disk Recovery Key
Restricted Boot mode only allows booting from signed files, whether that
is signed kernels in /boot or signed ISOs on mounted USB disks. This
disables booting from abitrary USB disks as well as the forced "unsafe"
boot mode. This also disables the recovery console so you can't bypass
this mode simply by running kexec manually.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Multiple traps overwrite each other. While no tpmr functions have more
than one trap right now, it is fragile, and the quoting is complex due
to double expansion. Use at_exit to add exit handlers that accumulate
and do not require special quoting.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
We just set the TPM owner password, so there's no need to make the user
enter it again. Eliminates some failure modes if the user mistypes it
or enters the wrong password.
Allow optionally passing in the TPM owner password in tpmr seal,
check_tpm_counter(), seal-totp, and generate_totp_htop(). The user is
still prompted if the password is needed but was not provided, so
existing uses in other contexts continue to work unchanged.
Prompt for the password in reset_tpm() and pass it down to each of the
above.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Heads doesn't use the endorsement hierarchy, but we shouldn't leave it
with an empty password following a tpm2 clear.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Don't hash password used to seal an object. This limits the password
to 32-characters but avoids obfuscating the usage of the password. The
32-character limit is considered acceptable because password limits are
lower already (GPG token limits to 25 chars). We may allow >32 char
passwords in the future by hashing only if the password is >32 chars.
Always pass passwords as hex to tpm2-tools to avoid possible ambiguity
if the password begins with a control prefix like 'hex:' or 'file:'.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Set consistent dictionary lockout parameters suited to Heads. Disable
lockout reset by setting a random password.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
gui-init: do not consume two unseal attempt to unseal both totp and hotp + cosmetic changes (slow down TPM DA lockout)
kexec-seal-key: Add DEBUG statement for PCR precalc
seal-totp: add DEBUG statements regarding skipping of PCR5 and PCR6 involvement into TOTP/HOTP sealing ops
seal-hotpkey: Add DEBUG statements related to reuse of TOTP sealed secret
tpmr: add DO_WITH_DEBUG calls to output pcrread and extend calls
tpmr: typo correction stating TRACE calls for tpm2 where it was for tpm1
tpmr: add DO_WITH_DEBUG calls for calcfuturepcr
functions: Cosmetic fix on pause_recovery asking user to press Enter to go to recovery shell on host console when board defines CONFIG_BOOT_RECOVERY_SERIAL
Not so related but part of output review and corrections:
kexec-insert-key: cosmetic changes prepending "+++" to disk related changes
kexec-save-default: cosmetic changes prepending "+++" to disk related changes
config/coreboot-qemu-tpm*.config: add ccache support for faster coreboot rebuild times
We already have HMAC sessions for encryption and decryption, there's no
need to create an ad-hoc session in tpm2_unseal.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
tpm2-tools is able to log pcap files of TPM2 commands, which can be
inspected with wireshark. Add CONFIG_TPM2_CAPTURE_PCAP to capture
these from the tpmr wrapper, and enable for qemu TPM2 boards.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
TPM2 must be prepared for shutdown, or it may track an auth failure for
dictionary attack prevention (per the spec, to prevent an attack by
attempting to authenticate and then powering off the TPM before it can
update the nonvolatile counter).
Add tpmr shutdown to prepare for shutdown (no-op on TPM1). Invoke it
from poweroff and reboot.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Provide tpmr commands pcrread, pcrsize, calcfuturepcr, and seal for
both TPM1 and TPM2.
Combine seal logic for TPM1/TPM2 in seal-totp, kexec-seal-key. This is
essentially the TPM2 logic now that tpmr provides the same wrapped
commands for both TPM1 and TPM2.
Remove algorithm prefix from PCR list in tpmr unseal for consistency
with tpmr seal.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
tpmr extend with -ic (extend with literal data) was adding a newline,
use echo -n so it only includes the data given in the hash.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Provide mask_param() function to uniformly mask secret parameters,
while still indicating whether they are empty.
Extend DO_WITH_DEBUG to allow masking a password parameter by position,
using mask_param(). Move from ash_functions to functions (isn't used
by ash scripts).
Mask password parameters in kexec-unseal-key and tpmr seal. Use
mask_param() on existing masked params in tpmr.
Trim more troubleshooting output from tpm2_extend() in tpmr.
Clarify tpmr kexec_finalize echo; it's the TPM's platform heirarchy,
users might not know what this was referring to.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Provide an HMAC session to tpm2 when unsealing with an auth policy.
The HMAC session is used for transport encryption.
This allows transport encryption to work when unsealing.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Remove dump of all PCRs from tpm2_extend, it was causing other errors
to roll off the screen before they could be inspected, and it's no
longer needed now that TPM2 is working.
Silence nonsense errors from unseal if TPM2 hasn't been reset. tpm2 -S
with a file that doesn't exist would complain that the parameter format
was not understood (looks like a script error), when the actual problem
was that the file doesn't exist yet. We can't try to unseal anyway
without a primary handle, so just exit unsuccessfully in that case.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
The size parameter is actually the size of the sealed secret to TPM1,
not the unsealed data size. TPM2 does not observe the sealed secret,
so just ignore that parameter.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Provide tpmr unseal to unseal a file with TPM1 or TPM2. For TPM1, it
wraps tpm nv_readvalue and tpm unsealfile. For TPM2, it wraps tpm2
unseal.
kexec-unseal-key, seal-hotpkey, unseal-hotp, and unseal-totp no longer
need to differentiate TPM1/TPM2.
Fixes spurious shred errors on TPM2 that only apply to TPM1 (temporary
sealed secret file and shred are now internal to tpmr).
Fixes TPM1 disk unlock key unsealing due to logic errors relating to
exit status of tpmr unseal or tpm unsealfile (now always uses status of
tpmr unseal).
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
TPM2 locks the platform heirarchy, flushes transient objects, and
flushes sessions. (This now cleans up sessions created during
startsession that previously were not cleaned up, although the OS might
flush all sessions as well.)
TPM1 currently does not do anything, but the command is accepted so
kexec-boot does not need to differentiate TPM1/2.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
TPM2 is only required to support password lengths up to its longest
hash size (32 chars for sha256). Pass the sha256 of the password
instead of the actual password so the password can be arbitrarily long.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Set flags 'fixedtpm|fixedparent|adminwithpolicy'. Plain password auth
is no longer allowed. For objects sealed with a password, the password
is part of the auth policy, so both PCRs and password must be satisfied
to unseal.
Tested by manually attempting to unseal disk unlock key with password:
tpm2 unseal -c 0x81000003 -p "<password>"
This now correctly returns an error indicating this auth method is not
allowed.
Relative to the documented default flags for tpm2_create:
* sign, decrypt: Not applicable to a sealed object, tpm2_create
automatically removed these from the defaults.
* fixedtpm, fixedparent: Kept
* sensitivedataorigin: Not applicable an object where the sensitive
data is not generated by the TPM.
* userwithauth: Removed this, "user" actions must satisfy auth policy.
* adminwithpolicy: Added this, "admin" actions must satisfy auth
policy.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Trace parameters to seal/unseal and some key tpm2 invocations. Trace
invocation of tpmr seal/unseal for disk unlock key.
Add DO_WITH_DEBUG() to trace a command and parameters, then execute it.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
When sealing/unsealing with a password, use a policy including both the
specified PCRs and the object password. Fixes sealing and unsealing
disk unlock key.
tpm2 seems to have a bug in parameter decryption when using a policy
session and password in this way, disable encryption in the policy
session as a workaround.
Flags still need to be set on the sealed object correctly, as the
password is normally allowed on its own as an alternative to policy
auth.
Add -Q to some tpm2 invocations to silence diagnostics on stdout.
Pass filename for unsealed secret rather than capturing from stdout
for robustness against tpm2 diagnostics on stdout.
Fix unseal result check in kexec-unseal-key.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
