scripts: unify luks in text/prompts/messages to LUKS

Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
This commit is contained in:
Thierry Laurion 2023-10-23 11:52:44 -04:00
parent 2697a6ad1f
commit 88d00dfcb2
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: E7B4A71658E36A93
4 changed files with 7 additions and 7 deletions

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@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ for dev in "$@"; do
die "$dev: Unable to read LUKS header"
done
DEBUG "Hashing luks headers into /tmp/luksDump.txt"
sha256sum /tmp/lukshdr-* >/tmp/luksDump.txt || die "Unable to hash luks headers"
DEBUG "Hashing LUKS headers into /tmp/luksDump.txt"
sha256sum /tmp/lukshdr-* >/tmp/luksDump.txt || die "Unable to hash LUKS headers"
DEBUG "Removing /tmp/lukshdr-*"
rm /tmp/lukshdr-*

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@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ DEBUG "Sealing TOTP with boot state of PCR4 (Going to recovery shell extends PCR
tpmr calcfuturepcr 4 >> "$pcrf"
# pcr 5 (kernel modules loaded) is not measured at sealing/unsealing of totp
DEBUG "Sealing TOTP neglecting PCR5 involvement (Dynamically loaded kernel modules are not firmware integrity attestation related)"
# pcr 6 (drive luks header) is not measured at sealing/unsealing of totp
# pcr 6 (drive LUKS header) is not measured at sealing/unsealing of totp
DEBUG "Sealing TOTP without PCR6 involvement (LUKS header consistency is not firmware integrity attestation related)"
# pcr 7 is containing measurements of user injected stuff in cbfs
tpmr pcrread -a 7 "$pcrf"

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@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ replay_pcr() {
# PCR-5, depending on which modules are loaded for given board:
# tpmr calcfuturepcr 5 module0.ko module1.ko module2.ko | xxd -p
# PCR-6 and PCR-7: similar to 5, but with different files passed
# (6: luks header, 7: user related cbfs files loaded from cbfs-init)
# (6: LUKS header, 7: user related cbfs files loaded from cbfs-init)
}
tpm2_extend() {

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@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ test_luks_current_disk_recovery_key_passphrase()
shred -n 10 -z -u /tmp/luks_current_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase 2>/dev/null
#unsetting luks_current_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase so we prompt for it again Disk Recovery Key passphrase prompt on next round
unset luks_current_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase
#remove "known good" selected luks container so that next pass asks again user to select luks container.
#remove "known good" selected LUKS container so that next pass asks again user to select LUKS container.
#maybe the container was not the right one
detect_boot_device
mount -o remount,rw /boot
@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ luks_reencrypt() {
shred -n 10 -z -u /tmp/luks_current_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase 2>/dev/null
#unsetting luks_current_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase so we prompt for it again Disk Recovery Key passphrase prompt on next round
unset luks_current_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase
#remove "known good" selected luks container so that next pass asks again user to select luks container.
#remove "known good" selected LUKS container so that next pass asks again user to select LUKS container.
#maybe the container was not the right one
detect_boot_device
mount -o remount,rw /boot
@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ luks_change_passphrase()
"The LUKS Disk Recovery Key passphrase was provided to you by the OEM over\n secure communication channel.\n\nIf you previously changed it and do not remember it,\n you will have to reinstall OS from a USB drive.\nTo do so, put OS ISO file and it's signature file on root of USB drive,\n And select Boot from USB\n\nHit Enter to continue." 30 60
unset luks_current_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase
unset luks_new_Disk_Recovery_Key_passphrase
#remove "known good" selected luks container so that next pass asks again user to select LUKS container.
#remove "known good" selected LUKS container so that next pass asks again user to select LUKS container.
#maybe the container was not the right one
detect_boot_device
mount -o remount,rw /boot