DESIGN: budget + quota reality (flat-rate now, $200/mo after 09-22; flash-stretch routing)

DESIGN.md

@@ -122,3 +122,90 @@ GLM fleet is wide; use it deliberately.
   with per-tier budget caps (LiteLLM vkeys already enforce spend).
 - Telemetry: every REPORT logs model used + tokens + cost via LiteLLM
   spend APIs, so routing decisions are auditable and tunable.
+
+## Key proxy: placeholders only, material never leaves the vault (Charles, 2026-08-28 evening)
+- PROBLEM with existing gateways: they HOLD real keys in a webui/api and
+  serve placeholders. We invert that: key material lives ONLY in Bitwarden
+  (Secrets Manager) + HashiCorp Vault. A Go proxy (MOPAC/tools/keyproxy or
+  bitwarden-go evolution) resolves placeholder -> real at the wire, holds
+  material in memory only (fetch-on-demand, short TTL, never persisted,
+  never in any admin UI; there is no admin surface — config only).
+- FRONTEND: consumers (harness, CLIs, containers) receive placeholder keys
+  (mpk_... opaque refs). If one leaks, it's a placeholder: revoke/re-map in
+  vault, zero upstream exposure. Defense in depth.
+- BACKEND connectors: Bitwarden Secrets Manager REST (machine accounts;
+  AVOID the official SDK — source-available license conflicts with AGPL;
+  plain REST via stdlib keeps AGPLv3 clean) + HashiCorp Vault KV v2 +
+  AppRole (official Go api pkg is MPL-2.0, AGPL-compatible, vendor it).
+  License: AGPLv3; MIT fallback only if a conflict still arises.
+- ADOPT crush's exposure-minimization protocol everywhere (per
+  docs/PORTING-NOTES-crush.md + house practice): keys via os.environ/VAR
+  indirection in configs (never literals), 0600 on secret files, redaction
+  of key material in all logs/output, canonical-source regeneration
+  (crush.json -> providers.json pattern), never exec env files inside
+  scripting languages, session scrubbing.
+- Also feeds: study-secrets TASK (KNELSecretsManager notes) in flight.
+  LiteLLM stays a sanctioned service exception (its z.ai key can later be
+  injected at container start from the vault; not tonight).
+
+## Tooling = standalone public FLOSS repos, loosely coupled (Charles, 2026-08-28 evening)
+- Dedicated CLIs/services each get their OWN public Gitea repo under the
+  UKRRS org (org for ALL LLM work; AGPLv3), composable by anyone:
+  ukrrs/mopac-keyproxy (created, seeded), later mopac-redmine-cli,
+  mopac-discourse-cli, mopac-bitwarden-go, ... ukrrs/MOPAC (transferred
+  2026-08-28) is the harness core. MOPAC references them; it does not
+  contain them.
+- LOOSE COUPLING RULES (FLOSS without support burden): config-driven —
+  no org-specific hosts/paths/defaults baked into code; contracts are
+  exec + JSON in/out (Unix plumbing); each tool standalone-usable by a
+  human; TSYS-specific policy/policy repos (agent-stack) live OUTSIDE the
+  tools. We build for our needs first; genericness comes from clean
+  contracts, not from supporting foreign requirements.
+
+## ALL dev work in Docker (Charles, 2026-08-28 evening) — BIG RULE
+- No dev toolchains on the host: compiling, vetting, testing, hacking all
+  happen inside containers (e.g. digest-pinned golang:1.26 builder with the
+  repo bind-mounted, `go build/vet/test` inside, artifacts out via the
+  mount). Host runs containers + screens; nothing else.
+- docker pull of anything needed is PRE-AUTHORIZED, no asking.
+- Exception cleanup: the harness-skeleton turn installed go1.26.7 to
+  host ~/.local before this rule landed — remove it (follow-up TASK) once
+  that turn completes; all future builds go through the builder container.
+- Rationale: reproducible, supply-chain-clean (CMMC posture), host stays
+  pristine; same pattern as the LSP stack (digest-pinned containers).
+
+## Events are V1 scope: webhook receiver now (Charles, 2026-08-28 evening)
+- NOT deferred. `mopac events` (Go HTTP receiver, in ukrrs/MOPAC) ships with
+  the first build. The interaction layer (Redmine/Discourse/Gitea) must be
+  able to PUNCH the harness: when Charles replies on Discourse, updates a
+  Redmine ticket, or approves a Gitea PR, the harness knows and acts.
+- Trigger -> action semantics (dedup + replay, at-least-once):
+  Redmine issue update/note on an active stack's issue -> dispatch/redirect
+  turn for that stack; Discourse post reply in a stack's category/topic ->
+  context update + response turn; Gitea PR approved/merged -> next pipeline
+  step (build/test/deploy per repo config).
+- Signatures: Gitea HMAC-SHA256 secret header; Discourse webhook secret
+  header; Redmine shared-secret header (verify, reject unsigned). Normalize
+  to internal event record -> Redmine issue (SoR) -> conductor picks up.
+- Runs containerized (dev-in-docker rule), port published on host LAN;
+  Cloudron apps get the webhook URL configured per-app.
+
+## Hermes killed; OpenWebUI is the interactive front door (Charles, 2026-08-28 evening)
+- Hermes was Node — removed (dashboard/gateway/searxng, 2026-08-28 ~19:10).
+  No Node middleware anywhere in MOPAC's path.
+- OWUI (Cloudron + SSO) becomes the ONLY interactive surface: MOPAC serves
+  an OpenAI-compatible /v1/chat/completions endpoint (Go stdlib HTTP, in
+  this repo, e.g. `mopac serve`). OWUI adds it as a connection; each stack/
+  vertical registers as a "model". OWUI admin UI + Cloudron SSO = RBAC we
+  do not build. Keys minted per OWUI connection (LiteLLM vkeys pattern).
+- Event path unchanged: Redmine/Discourse/Gitea webhooks -> `mopac events`
+  (Go T1 receiver). OWUI chat and webhooks are two doors into the same loop.
+
+## Budget + quota reality (Charles, 2026-08-28 evening)
+- Until 2026-09-22: legacy z.ai coding plan = FLAT RATE. Real budget = plan
+  quota, not USD. Smaller/flash models stretch quota ~3x. Routing policy:
+  grind/study/summarize -> flash tier (glm-5.3-flash now live on proxy,
+  13 models); flagship (glm-5.3/5.2) only when the work needs it. Maximize
+  usage of what we already pay for.
+- After 2026-09-22: org-wide AI cap $200/mo across all 8 stacks:
+  2x $80 z.ai max plans + $40 OpenRouter. Design all budgets/vkeys to fit.