docs(audit): update FINDING-002 to informational (by design)
Firewall OUTPUT DROP policy confirmed as intentional for immutable system security model: - Zero traffic leakage (no DNS poisoning, NTP spoofing, C2 exfil) - Immutable system with no in-place updates - WireGuard endpoint loaded via USB disk - Time synchronized from host/hypervisor Updated risk summary: 1 HIGH (Secure Boot), 4 MEDIUM, 3 LOW, 2 INFO Remaining findings (001, 005, 006, 007, 008) to be addressed by software team per audit recommendations. 💘 Generated with Crush Assisted-by: GLM-4 via Crush <crush@charm.land>
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@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ KNEL-Football is a hardened Debian 13 Linux distribution designed as a **secure
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| Severity | Count | Key Areas |
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|----------|-------|-----------|
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| Critical | 0 | - |
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| High | 2 | Secure Boot keys, Firewall output |
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| High | 1 | Secure Boot keys |
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| Medium | 4 | Docker privileged, USB automount, KDF config, Supply chain |
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| Low | 3 | Test gaps, Documentation, Input validation |
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| Info | 1 | Package management |
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| Info | 2 | Firewall (by design), Package management |
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---
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@@ -45,14 +45,19 @@ Keys generated at build time without HSM or secure storage. An attacker with bui
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**Impact**: Complete chain of trust compromise
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**Effort**: Medium (requires key management infrastructure)
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### 2. Firewall Output Chain Blocks Essential Services (HIGH)
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Default DROP policy on OUTPUT chain prevents DNS resolution, NTP synchronization, and system updates.
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**Impact**: System cannot function properly (DNS, time sync, updates)
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**Effort**: Low (add explicit allow rules)
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---
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## Design Decisions Confirmed
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### Firewall Output Policy (By Design)
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The strict OUTPUT DROP policy was confirmed as **intentional** for an immutable system:
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- Zero traffic leakage (no DNS poisoning, NTP spoofing, C2 exfiltration vectors)
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- Immutable system with no in-place updates (CVEs handled by ISO regeneration)
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- WireGuard endpoint loaded via USB disk (wg0.conf)
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- Time synchronized from host/hypervisor
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**Assessment**: Defensible security posture for an air-gapped access terminal.
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## Positive Security Observations
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1. **Strong SDLC Enforcement** - Pre-commit hooks enforce TDD, linting, and coverage
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@@ -67,9 +72,8 @@ Default DROP policy on OUTPUT chain prevents DNS resolution, NTP synchronization
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## Recommendations Priority
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### Must Fix Before Release
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1. Fix firewall OUTPUT chain to allow DNS/NTP/updates
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2. Disable USB automount (conflicts with security model)
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3. Verify Argon2id KDF is actually used in LUKS
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1. Disable USB automount (conflicts with security model)
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2. Verify Argon2id KDF is actually used in LUKS
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### Short-term (30 days)
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1. Implement Secure Boot key management with HSM or air-gapped storage
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@@ -92,7 +96,7 @@ Default DROP policy on OUTPUT chain prevents DNS resolution, NTP synchronization
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| NIST SP 800-53 AC-19 | ⚠️ Issue | USB automount |
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| NIST SP 800-111 | ✅ Pass | LUKS2 encryption |
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| CIS Benchmark 6.x | ✅ Pass | Comprehensive audit logging |
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| FedRAMP SC-7 | ⚠️ Issue | Firewall output policy |
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| FedRAMP SC-7 | ✅ Pass | Strict output policy (by design) |
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---
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@@ -105,9 +109,9 @@ Default DROP policy on OUTPUT chain prevents DNS resolution, NTP synchronization
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## Conclusion
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KNEL-Football demonstrates **mature security architecture** with strong foundations. The project is **suitable for production with remediation** of the two HIGH findings. The SDLC practices are exemplary and should be maintained.
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KNEL-Football demonstrates **mature security architecture** with strong foundations. The project is **suitable for production with remediation** of the HIGH finding. The SDLC practices are exemplary and should be maintained.
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**Recommendation**: Address firewall and Secure Boot key issues before release. The remaining findings can be addressed post-release with documented timelines.
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**Recommendation**: Address Secure Boot key management before release. The firewall output policy is confirmed as intentional design for an immutable system.
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---
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