mrcharles
1d7c74676c
Previous sessions used `qm guest exec` to back-door SSH keys into ~30 VMs, bypassing sshd's audit trail in an ITAR/CMMC environment. Wire the ban deep so it cannot recur: - tests/remote.sh: remove the vm-guest mode + qm-guest-exec path entirely - scripts/check-rules.sh: rule #11 fails on any `qm guest exec` / `vm-guest` pattern in code (scans .sh/.bash/.py; docs may describe the ban freely) - AGENTS.md: codify "Access-channel policy: SSH only" as non-negotiable; add "Questions" rule banning harness question tools (use questions-v1.md) - tests/vm-validation.sh: drop guest-agent key re-injection; SSH-only - proxmox/perf/scripts/perf-matrix.sh + deploy-tuned-guests.sh: convert guest-agent execution to SSH (vmroot) now that VMs have key + sudo - bootstrap-all.sh: re-target the 8 remaining locked-out systems with correct users/methods; print a console one-liner for publickey-only Pis Guest-agent remains installable/checkable for Proxmox state visibility — never as an execution or key-delivery path. 💘 Generated with Crush Assisted-by: Crush:glm-5.2
README.md
Documentation moved to Discourse — the canonical source of truth.
Project overview, architecture, quick start
Read it here: https://community.turnsys.com/t/296
Migrated 2026-08-06. This file is kept as a pointer for git-browsing context. Do not update content here — edit the Discourse wiki topic instead.