Previous sessions used `qm guest exec` to back-door SSH keys into ~30 VMs,
bypassing sshd's audit trail in an ITAR/CMMC environment. Wire the ban deep
so it cannot recur:
- tests/remote.sh: remove the vm-guest mode + qm-guest-exec path entirely
- scripts/check-rules.sh: rule #11 fails on any `qm guest exec` / `vm-guest`
pattern in code (scans .sh/.bash/.py; docs may describe the ban freely)
- AGENTS.md: codify "Access-channel policy: SSH only" as non-negotiable;
add "Questions" rule banning harness question tools (use questions-v1.md)
- tests/vm-validation.sh: drop guest-agent key re-injection; SSH-only
- proxmox/perf/scripts/perf-matrix.sh + deploy-tuned-guests.sh: convert
guest-agent execution to SSH (vmroot) now that VMs have key + sudo
- bootstrap-all.sh: re-target the 8 remaining locked-out systems with
correct users/methods; print a console one-liner for publickey-only Pis
Guest-agent remains installable/checkable for Proxmox state visibility —
never as an execution or key-delivery path.
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Assisted-by: Crush:glm-5.2
- tsys-ucs-01/02 moved to EXCLUDE in access-matrix.sh
- Close [#418] — no longer need 2FA removal or SSH key push
Refs [#418]
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Assisted-by: Crush:glm-5.2
agent-bootstrap.sh:
- Accept AGENT_USER env var (defaults to localuser)
- Push SSH key to root + $AGENT_USER + labuser (if present)
- Grant NOPASSWD sudo to $AGENT_USER (not hardcoded localuser)
- Skip qemu-guest-agent on bare metal (systemd-detect-virt) [#419]
bootstrap-all.sh:
- Pass AGENT_USER per system group:
subopi* → subodev, ultix-field → ultixfield
- All 8 remaining NO-KEY systems covered with correct user + escalation
This closes the gap where subodev/ultixfield systems would get the key
pushed to localuser (which doesn't exist) instead of the real agent user.
Refs [#403], [#419]
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Assisted-by: Crush:glm-5.2
Replace complex log-capture with direct scp+ssh+ssh -t calls so password
prompts work at the terminal. Same sudo/su split per system type.
Refs [#403]
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- Split into sudo vs su escalation methods:
sudo: cloudron + siem (Ubuntu Server, no root password)
su: everything else (root has password)
- Capture full output to bootstrap-logs/<name>.log for debugging
- Show last 5 lines on screen, full log for agent review
Refs [#403]
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Assisted-by: Crush:glm-5.2
access-matrix.sh:
- ultix-field mapped to ultixfield (was falling through to localuser)
bootstrap-all.sh:
- Removed stlpc-garage (now accessible)
- ultix-field moved to ultixfield user
- Added ssh -t for proper su terminal allocation
- 14 systems remaining
Refs [#403]
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Assisted-by: Crush:glm-5.2
access-matrix.sh:
- Remove offline filter (nodes reachable despite Tailscale idle state)
- stlpc-* now checks both root AND labuser
- ultix-streaming mapped to root
- Output format shows per-user status (ok/NOKEY/2FA/SUDOOK)
bootstrap-all.sh:
- Updated to exact NO-KEY list from ground-truth sweep (15 systems)
- Removed all already-accessible systems
- stlp-3dscanner flagged as unknown (not in bootstrap)
Refs [#403]
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Assisted-by: Crush:glm-5.2
Add non-negotiable "Agent Authority" section to AGENTS.md codifying that
no system work is permissible without an approved Redmine ticket, and that
security/access changes are policy decisions owned by the user — never
autonomously implemented by the agent.
Also add the access bootstrap toolkit:
- agent-bootstrap.sh: in-guest key + sudo setup (localuser sudo only per policy)
- bootstrap-all.sh: workstation-side push to remaining NO-KEY systems
- access-matrix.sh: full fleet SSH/sudo probe
- probe-ssh.sh, probe-ssh-localuser.sh, probe-ga.sh, pivot-probe.sh,
ga-push-key.sh: diagnostic scripts used during access audit
Refs [#403]
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Assisted-by: Crush:glm-5.2
mrcharles