KNEL/KNELSecretsManager

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docs QA: diagrams must parse in a real mermaid renderer

The first architecture set did not render (backslash-n escapes,
semicolons in sequence messages, braces in text). All diagrams
rewritten to conservative syntax and QA-verified with mermaid-cli
(3/3 PARSE-OK). qa-diagrams.sh added; CI enforces it on docs changes.

Ticket: https://projects.knownelement.com/issues/832

2026-09-06 19:29:04 -05:00

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KNELSecretsManager — Architecture

Status: production. Ruling chain: ADR-002 (containerized CLI) -> ADR-003 (pure-Go smcli, Rust bw retired). Founder directives: #829/#832.

Components

flowchart LR
    V["Vaultwarden vault - pwvault.turnsys.com"]
    C["smcli container - ukrrs-secretsmgr-cli"]
    S1["TSGCOO entry - data2 TSGCOO bin sm"]
    S2["lane crossover - tools sm"]
    W1["mred-vp - Redmine identity"]
    W2["ci-green.sh - Gitea admin"]
    W3["redmine-sweep.sh"]
    B["KNELBMS on-box secrets.yaml"]
    K["pfv-k8s secrets - glpi-creds, flux PAT"]
    R["nightly timers - pve backup, glpi reconcile"]
    S1 --> C
    S2 --> C
    W1 --> C
    W2 --> C
    W3 --> C
    C -->|HTTPS login sync CRUD| V
    C -.-> B
    C -.-> K
    C -.-> R

Auth + unlock sequence

sequenceDiagram
    participant U as Consumer
    participant S as smcli
    participant V as Vault
    U->>S: login with email password TOTP seed
    S->>V: POST prelogin - get KDF params
    V-->>S: PBKDF2 iterations or Argon2id
    S->>S: derive master key and auth hash
    S->>V: POST identity connect token
    V-->>S: 400 - two factor required
    S->>S: compute TOTP code - RFC 6238
    S->>V: token request plus twoFactorToken
    V-->>S: access token and encrypted keys
    S->>V: GET sync
    V-->>S: profile key - encrypted
    S->>S: stretch master key - decrypt user key
    S->>S: write state file 0600

Item payloads are type-2 encStrings (AES-256-CBC + HMAC-SHA256, 32B enc + 32B mac keys) encrypted/decrypted locally; the vault never sees plaintext.

Consumer pattern

# env-style consumers (export lines; URI/USERNAME/PASSWORD + original keys)
eval "$(docker exec -i ukrrs-secretsmgr-cli smcli env creds/<name>)"
# surgical single-field rotation update
docker exec -i ukrrs-secretsmgr-cli smcli setfield creds/<name> <KEY> <newvalue>

Items are LOGIN type: username + password/API-key as first-class fields, service URLs as URIs, remaining keys as named custom fields (hidden where secret). Original env key names are preserved as the custom-field names.

Rotation program (#829)

All pre-migration material is presumed BURNED (plaintext on disk + LLM exposure). Waves, each item = rotate at source -> setfield in vault -> rewire consumers to sm env -> validate (guard rule: never write the vault from a failed rotation):

Tooling tokens (librenms*, wazuh DONE, grafana*, gvm, technitium, phpipam, rancher-sectest, beszel, pihole, PMG pair, PBS tokens)
Agent identities (gitea agent-stack, vptechops gitea/redmine)
Platform (cloudron API token, kuma, discourse)
Deep-wired (flux PAT + gitea runner + HA on-box secrets.yaml + k8s secrets + PVE upsagent tokens)

* item-specific notes: librenms — token-mint API route absent on this install (UI/DB path); grafana — SSO-managed, local admin parked (instance password policy blocks CLI reset).

KNELBMS integration

See integration-knelbms.md. Short form: the BMS deploy pipeline (KNELBMS repo, packages/deploy_pipeline.yaml) consumes gitea_auth_header + kuma_push_url + pve_*_api_token from on-box /config/secrets.yaml; the vault is the source of record and rotations push to the box through the CR-gated provisioning path.

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