TSYS Group COO
bde7845490
Policy rulings (#942): unique passwords, Cloudron-only SSO accounts, no reachableceo credentials, TOTP seeds MUST be captured to the vault. Cloudron admin API wrapper, cookie-jar OIDC login, RFC-6238-tested TOTP helper, per-system SSO/API references, incident log.
53 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
53 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
# Incident log — what broke and what it taught (append-only)
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## 2026-09-07 ~20:00 CT — shared-box degradation (RESOLVED 09-08)
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One box (152.53.37.179, mail.knownelement.com) hosts gitea, redmine,
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discourse, GLPI, pwvault, and fronts my.knownelement.com. During the
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incident:
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- Gitea `git-receive-pack` → HTTP 500 on ANY ref (pushes impossible);
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`POST /api/v1/repos` → plain-text 404. Reads + `POST /api/v1/markdown`
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worked fine — partial failure, not an outage.
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- my.knownelement.com → HTTP 500 leaking
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`"Access denied for user 'root'@'localhost'"` (a MySQL root credential
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breakage in whatever backs that vhost).
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- pwvault: unauthenticated endpoints answered in 0.2s, but AUTHENTICATED
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`/api/sync` hung to timeout — a lock/db-layer signature. All vault item
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reads fleet-wide were down; nothing credential-driven could proceed.
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- tsys-cloudron (tailscale 100.107.35.78, self-signed cert — use `curl -k`)
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404'd its hostname; with `Host: my.knownelement.com` it served the same
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JSON as the public vhost (proxy topology). devbox/preprod/sectestbed
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cloudron peers were offline for 1–2 days.
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Lessons: (1) when several "unrelated" systems on that box fail at once,
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treat it as one box incident — file one ticket, verify recovery per system;
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(2) HTTP-status-only checks lie — the vault was "up" (200s on static paths)
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while 100% of useful reads hung; test the authenticated path you actually
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need; (3) correlate carefully — the MySQL leak was the public box's vhost,
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not the cloudron control box; wrong attribution sent diagnosis down a
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rabbit hole (see #939 correction).
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## 2026-09-07 — identity/SSO archaeology (the reason this skill exists)
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- The August "10 identities enrolled + TOTP" batch captured NO seeds. coo's
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TOTP is therefore enforced-but-unrecoverable; no admin reset exists in
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this Cloudron version. Every future enrollment MUST store the seed.
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- `creds/sec-*` / `creds/sre-*` (Sep 07 batch, by VpEngOps) used ONE shared
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password across cloudron+gitea+redmine+discourse, and the stored password
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already fails Cloudron auth (401 tested). Shared passwords are banned
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(#942); treat those items as stale until their owning lane remediates.
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- Several "admin" vault candidates resolved to the founder's personal
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reachableceo accounts (gitea id 3, redmine user 5) and none were admin
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(gitea: 403 "user should be the site admin"; redmine: 403 on /users.json).
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They now carry RESTRICTED notes. The compliant Cloudron admin lever is the
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`api-token` user's token in `creds/cloudron`.
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- Debug order that works for auth weirdness: (1) what identity does this
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credential ACTUALLY resolve to (call /user or /users/current)?
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(2) does the route exist at all (SPA-bundle grep beats guessing)?
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(3) is the failure at nginx (HTML status pages) or the app (JSON errors)?
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---
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**Records:** Redmine #942 — https://projects.knownelement.com/issues/942 · Discourse docs home: https://community.turnsys.com (skill topic pending admin-key provisioning, tracked on #942)
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