incident-log: pwvault web-vault EncString crash case (2026-09-09)
Full symptom/root-cause/repair record for the InvalidTypeSymm web-vault crash so it is never re-derived. https://projects.knownelement.com/issues/942
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@@ -267,3 +267,44 @@ the workspace STATUS/memory.
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first login.
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- `scripts/totp.sh <base32-seed>` — current 6-digit TOTP code (pure bash,
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RFC-7636-vector tested).
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## Vaultwarden app (pwvault.turnsys.com) — known issue, quirks, and repair (2026-09-09)
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The fleet vault is a Cloudron **Vaultwarden** app (`com.github.bitwardenrs`,
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container id 48757d8a-… on tsys-cloudron-new; DB = **MySQL** database from
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the app container env `CLOUDRON_MYSQL_DATABASE`, on the shared `mysql`
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container — NOT sqlite; a stray `db.sqlite3` in /app/data is junk).
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**Known web-vault crash (upstream bug, Vaultwarden discussions #7334/#7464):**
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the 2026.7.0 web client + strict WASM SDK crash with
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`Unhandled error in angular: EncString(InvalidTypeSymm { enc_type: "0", parts: 1 })`
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during vault load → empty vault / endless spinner, on every browser, while
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native apps (iPad/desktop) and API-key clients work fine. Triggered by an
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account key-pair record the client's strict parser rejects
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(`accountKeys.publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair.publicKey` stored as a raw base64
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public key instead of an EncString). Repair that worked:
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`UPDATE users SET public_key = NULL WHERE uuid = '<uid>';` in the MySQL DB
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(take a Cloudron app backup first: `POST /api/v1/apps/<id>/backup` with
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`{"backupSiteId":"<id from GET /api/v1/backup_sites>"}`, poll
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`/api/v1/tasks/<taskId>`); the client regenerates a proper key pair on next
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login. NEVER write to the DB without a fresh backup + explicit founder
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approval for the pwvault container.
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**CLI 2FA quirk:** CLI-style logins (`client_id=cli`) are offered ONLY the
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recovery-code provider — an authenticator TOTP seed from the vault will be
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rejected at the 2FA prompt even when the authenticator is correctly
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enrolled (browser sessions get the authenticator prompt; CLI does not).
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Automated flows must use the **API key** (client_credentials grant), which
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bypasses 2FA entirely — `creds/cloudron`-style API keys are the automation
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path, passwords+TOTP are for humans in browsers.
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**Cloudron backup API pattern** (for pre-surgery backups): GET
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`/api/v1/backup_sites` → site id; POST `/api/v1/apps/<id>/backup` body
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`{"backupSiteId":"<id>"}`; poll `GET /api/v1/tasks/<taskId>` until
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`success:true`. Response field is `taskId` (not `id`).
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**TOTP seeds**: the account's authenticator seed for coo@turnsys.com is
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`BW_TOTP_SECRET` in `/data2/TSGCOO/.config/bw/env` — keep it in sync with
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what is actually enrolled server-side; a stale seed there was the source of
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a multi-hour misdiagnosis (the "wrong password"/"stale seed" theories).
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Clock skew was ruled out (workstation and server within 1s).
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