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ReStructuredText
118 lines
5.3 KiB
ReStructuredText
.. -*- coding: utf-8-with-signature -*-
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Welcome to Tahoe-LAFS!
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======================
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Welcome to Tahoe-LAFS_, the first decentralized storage system with
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*provider-independent security*.
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.. _Tahoe-LAFS: https://tahoe-lafs.org
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What is "provider-independent security"?
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========================================
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Every seller of cloud storage services will tell you that their service is
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"secure". But what they mean by that is something fundamentally different
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from what we mean. What they mean by "secure" is that after you've given
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them the power to read and modify your data, they try really hard not to let
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this power be abused. This turns out to be difficult! Bugs,
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misconfigurations, or operator error can accidentally expose your data to
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another customer or to the public, or can corrupt your data. Criminals
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routinely gain illicit access to corporate servers. Even more insidious is
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the fact that the employees themselves sometimes violate customer privacy out
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of carelessness, avarice, or mere curiosity. The most conscientious of
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these service providers spend considerable effort and expense trying to
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mitigate these risks.
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What we mean by "security" is something different. *The service provider
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never has the ability to read or modify your data in the first place: never.*
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If you use Tahoe-LAFS, then all of the threats described above are non-issues
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to you. Not only is it easy and inexpensive for the service provider to
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maintain the security of your data, but in fact they couldn't violate its
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security if they tried. This is what we call *provider-independent
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security*.
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This guarantee is integrated naturally into the Tahoe-LAFS storage system and
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doesn't require you to perform a manual pre-encryption step or cumbersome key
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management. (After all, having to do cumbersome manual operations when
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storing or accessing your data would nullify one of the primary benefits of
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using cloud storage in the first place: convenience.)
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Here's how it works:
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.. image:: network-and-reliance-topology.svg
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A "storage grid" is made up of a number of storage servers. A storage server
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has direct attached storage (typically one or more hard disks). A "gateway"
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communicates with storage nodes, and uses them to provide access to the
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filesystem over protocols such as HTTP(S), SFTP or FTP.
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Note that you can find "client" used to refer to gateway nodes (which act as
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a client to storage servers), and also to processes or programs connecting to
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a gateway node and performing operations on the grid -- for example, a CLI
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command, Web browser, SFTP client, or FTP client.
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Users do not rely on storage servers to provide *confidentiality* nor
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*integrity* for their data -- instead all of the data is encrypted and
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integrity-checked by the gateway, so that the servers can neither read nor
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modify the contents of the files.
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Users do rely on storage servers for *availability*. The ciphertext is
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erasure-coded into ``N`` shares distributed across at least ``H`` distinct
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storage servers (the default value for ``N`` is 10 and for ``H`` is 7) so
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that it can be recovered from any ``K`` of these servers (the default
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value of ``K`` is 3). Therefore only the failure of ``H-K+1`` (with the
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defaults, 5) servers can make the data unavailable.
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In the typical deployment mode each user runs her own gateway on her own
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machine. This way she relies on her own machine for the confidentiality and
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integrity of the data.
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An alternate deployment mode is that the gateway runs on a remote machine and
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the user connects to it over HTTPS or SFTP. This means that the operator of
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the gateway can view and modify the user's data (the user *relies on* the
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gateway for confidentiality and integrity), but the advantage is that the
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user can access the filesystem with a client that doesn't have the gateway
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software installed, such as an Internet kiosk or cell phone.
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Access Control
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==============
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There are two kinds of files: immutable and mutable. When you upload a file
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to the storage grid you can choose which kind of file it will be in the
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grid. Immutable files can't be modified once they have been uploaded. A
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mutable file can be modified by someone with read-write access to it. A user
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can have read-write access to a mutable file or read-only access to it, or no
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access to it at all.
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A user who has read-write access to a mutable file or directory can give
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another user read-write access to that file or directory, or they can give
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read-only access to that file or directory. A user who has read-only access
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to a file or directory can give another user read-only access to it.
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When linking a file or directory into a parent directory, you can use a
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read-write link or a read-only link. If you use a read-write link, then
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anyone who has read-write access to the parent directory can gain read-write
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access to the child, and anyone who has read-only access to the parent
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directory can gain read-only access to the child. If you use a read-only
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link, then anyone who has either read-write or read-only access to the parent
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directory can gain read-only access to the child.
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For more technical detail, please see the `the doc page`_ on the Wiki.
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.. _the doc page: https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/wiki/Doc
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Get Started
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===========
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To use Tahoe-LAFS, please see quickstart.rst_.
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.. _quickstart.rst: quickstart.rst
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License
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=======
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Tahoe-LAFS is an open-source project; please see README.rst_ for details.
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.. _README.rst: ../README.rst
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