We said "share N" in some places that ought to say "block N", and we no
longer use "peer" to describe where we're pushing a share to (now we say
"server").
Thanks to CcxWrk for the catch.
I think the preferred way to listen on both IPv4 and IPv6 will be to use
"--port=tcp:PORT,tcp6:PORT". This is now reflected in the docs.
refs ticket:867
This enables an I2P-only node, which disables TCP entirely (instead of
mapping TCP to Tor, which was the only other option that
reveal-IP-address=False would allow).
closes ticket:2824
running.rst: split out the server/introducer text, so someone who only
care about running a client doesn't need to read about hostnames or
--port/--location.
servers.rst: more background text on ports and locations, make section
names less storage-centric
* replace sample IPv4/IPv6 addresses with reserved ones from RFC-6890
* remove initial blank line: prevents github from rendering the .rst
* emphasize --hostname, then have --port/--location as a special-case
* list --port first (describe it "from the inside out"), then --location
* explain difference between --port and --location
* in endpoint strings, put interface= at end, to emphasize port
* add servers.rst to index.rst so it'll show up on readthedocs
* don't mention "partial-cone NAT": that's only relevant if/when we get
real ICE-style NAT-hole-punching
This includes configuring servers to use IPv4, IPv6, IPv6 with
port forwarding firewall and suggesting the use of i2p/tor if
NAT penetration is needed: provided links to configuration and
anonymity-configuration
These are obsolete. Tests are run with 'tox', or by running 'trial
allmydata' from a populated virtualenv. A populated virtualenv is also
the right way to get a repl: just run 'python'.
refs ticket:2735
So "tahoe create-node --hide-ip" causes "reveal-IP-address = false" to
get written into tahoe.cfg . This also changes the default tahoe.cfg to
include "reveal-IP-address = true", for clarity.
refs ticket:1010
We now use::
tub.port = disabled
tub.location = disabled
instead of using an empty value (but the key still being present, since
if the key is missing entirely, that means "be automatic").
closes ticket:2816
This adds a safety flag named `[node] reveal-IP-address`, for which the
default value is True. When this is set to False, any configuration that
might reveal the node's IP address (to servers, or the external network)
will cause a PrivacyError to be raised at startup, terminating the node
before it gets a chance to betray the user's privacy. It also adds docs
and tests.
refs ticket:1010
This removes the section that describes automatic configuration using
transport-agnostic endpoint-centric tub.port strings. That was the
approach where tub.port used "onion:80:hiddenServiceDir=PATH", and
Foolscap was able to query the generated Listener to find out what
address it was supposed to advertise. We considered this for a long
time, but in the end decided to use a more static approach, where
foolscap/tahoe never try to guess it's location: Tahoe always requires
tub.location= to be set.
When we get automatic configuration implemented, it'll be a simple CLI
argument, something like "tahoe create-server --listen=tor".
Instead, this document now explains how to configure Tor to create the
hidden service, then how to copy the generated .onion address into the
tahoe config.
This also removes a lot of other text that seems irrelevant now, and
refers the user to the tahoe.cfg docs (configuration.rst) instead of
including all the `[tor]`/`[i2p]` docs inline.
Closes ticket:2815
