Reverse order of use-case list in anonymity config doc

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David Stainton 2016-09-15 12:42:18 +00:00 committed by Brian Warner
parent a638a97806
commit ff9d3d8922

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@ -43,8 +43,9 @@ Use cases
There are three potential use-cases for Tahoe-LAFS on the client side:
1. User does not care to protect their anonymity or to connect to anonymous
storage servers. This document is not useful to you... so stop reading.
1. User wishes to always use an anonymizing network (Tor, I2P) to protect
their anonymity when connecting to Tahoe-LAFS storage grids (whether or
not the storage servers are anonymous).
2. User does not care to protect their anonymity but they wish to connect to
Tahoe-LAFS storage servers which are accessible only via Tor Hidden Services or I2P.
@ -54,16 +55,14 @@ There are three potential use-cases for Tahoe-LAFS on the client side:
* I2P is only used if a server connection hint uses ``i2p:``. These hints
generally have a ``.i2p`` address.
3. User wishes to always use an anonymizing network (Tor, I2P) to protect
their anonymity when connecting to Tahoe-LAFS storage grids (whether or
not the storage servers are anonymous).
3. User does not care to protect their anonymity or to connect to anonymous
storage servers. This document is not useful to you... so stop reading.
For Tahoe-LAFS storage servers there are three use-cases:
1. Storage server operator does not care to protect their own anonymity nor
to help the clients protect theirs. Stop reading this document and run
your Tahoe-LAFS storage server using publicly routed TCP/IP.
1. The operator wishes to protect their anonymity by making their Tahoe
server accessible only over I2P, via Tor Hidden Services, or both.
2. The operator does not *require* anonymity for the storage server, but they
want it to be available over both publicly routed TCP/IP and through an
@ -76,16 +75,17 @@ For Tahoe-LAFS storage servers there are three use-cases:
clients who themselves use that anonymizing network to protect their
anonymity.
3. Storage server operator does not care to protect their own anonymity nor
to help the clients protect theirs. Stop reading this document and run
your Tahoe-LAFS storage server using publicly routed TCP/IP.
See this Tor Project page for more information about Tor Hidden Services:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en
See this I2P Project page for more information about I2P:
https://geti2p.net/en/about/intro
3. The operator wishes to protect their anonymity by making their Tahoe
server accessible only over I2P, via Tor Hidden Services, or both.
Unresolved tickets
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