TODO:
- $(pcrs) call sometimes fail in DEBUG call, outputting too many chars to be inserted in kmesg. Call removed here since redundant (PCR6 already extended with LUKS header)
- Notes added for TPM2 simplification over TPM1 in code as TODO
Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
Fixes linuxboot#1092.
Supersedes linuxboot#1093
- Cherry-picks ed1c23a (credit to @hardened-vault) thank you!)
- Addresses and correct self-review under linuxboot#1093 (@hardened-vault: you don't answer often here!)
- kexec-unseal-key: Warn a user who attempts to default boot while his Disk Unlock Key passphrase fails to unseal because LUKS headers changed.
(linuxboot#1093 (comment))
- kexec-seal-key: Identical as in ed1c23a
- kexec-add-key: Tell the user that the Headers did not change when changing TPM released Disk Unlock Key
(Through changing default boot at Options->Boot Options -> Show OS boot options: select a new boot option
and set a Disk Unlock Key in TPM, accept to modify disk and sign /boot options)
- Here, we cancel the diff output shown on screen linuxboot#1093 (comment)
- And we change the warning given to the user to past tense "Headers of LUKS containers to be unlocked via TPM Disk Unlock Key passphrase did not change."
Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
Exception: scripts sourcing/calls within etc/ash_functions continues to use old TRACE functions until we switch to bash completely getting rid of ash.
This would mean getting rid of legacy boards (flash + legacy boards which do not have enough space for bash in flash boards) once and for all.
Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
Next steps on this is introspection and PCRs reconstruction helpers, which will output in DEBUG and be usable from recovery shell.
We have to keep in mind that providing those tools is useful in DEBUG mode and for users having access to Recovery Shell.
But currently, having access to cbmem -L output and final PCRs content is making it too easy for Evil Maid to know what needs to be hardcoded to pass measured boot.
Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
Changes:
- As per master: when TOTP cannot unseal TOTP, user is prompted to either reset or regenerate TOTP
- Now, when either is done and a previous TPM Disk Unlock Key was setuped, the user is guided into:
- Regenerating checksums and signing them
- Regenerating TPM disk Unlock Key and resealing TPM disk Unlock Key with passphrase into TPM
- LUKS header being modified, user is asked to resign kexec.sig one last time prior of being able to default boot
- When no previous Disk Unlock Key was setuped, the user is guided into:
- The above, plus
- Detection of LUKS containers,suggesting only relevant partitions
- Addition of TRACE and DEBUG statements to troubleshoot actual vs expected behavior while coding
- Were missing under TPM Disk Unlock Key setup codepaths
- Fixes for #645 : We now check if only one slots exists and we do not use it if its slot1.
- Also shows in DEBUG traces now
Unrelated staged changes
- ash_functions: warn and die now contains proper spacing and eye attaction
- all warn and die calls modified if containing warnings and too much punctuation
- unify usage of term TPM Disk Unlock Key and Disk Recovery Key
These were still writing some debugging output containing flags and
PCRs even when debug was not enabled. Use DEBUG.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Provide tpmr commands pcrread, pcrsize, calcfuturepcr, and seal for
both TPM1 and TPM2.
Combine seal logic for TPM1/TPM2 in seal-totp, kexec-seal-key. This is
essentially the TPM2 logic now that tpmr provides the same wrapped
commands for both TPM1 and TPM2.
Remove algorithm prefix from PCR list in tpmr unseal for consistency
with tpmr seal.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Provide mask_param() function to uniformly mask secret parameters,
while still indicating whether they are empty.
Extend DO_WITH_DEBUG to allow masking a password parameter by position,
using mask_param(). Move from ash_functions to functions (isn't used
by ash scripts).
Mask password parameters in kexec-unseal-key and tpmr seal. Use
mask_param() on existing masked params in tpmr.
Trim more troubleshooting output from tpm2_extend() in tpmr.
Clarify tpmr kexec_finalize echo; it's the TPM's platform heirarchy,
users might not know what this was referring to.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Provide tpmr unseal to unseal a file with TPM1 or TPM2. For TPM1, it
wraps tpm nv_readvalue and tpm unsealfile. For TPM2, it wraps tpm2
unseal.
kexec-unseal-key, seal-hotpkey, unseal-hotp, and unseal-totp no longer
need to differentiate TPM1/TPM2.
Fixes spurious shred errors on TPM2 that only apply to TPM1 (temporary
sealed secret file and shred are now internal to tpmr).
Fixes TPM1 disk unlock key unsealing due to logic errors relating to
exit status of tpmr unseal or tpm unsealfile (now always uses status of
tpmr unseal).
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Trace parameters to seal/unseal and some key tpm2 invocations. Trace
invocation of tpmr seal/unseal for disk unlock key.
Add DO_WITH_DEBUG() to trace a command and parameters, then execute it.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
When sealing/unsealing with a password, use a policy including both the
specified PCRs and the object password. Fixes sealing and unsealing
disk unlock key.
tpm2 seems to have a bug in parameter decryption when using a policy
session and password in this way, disable encryption in the policy
session as a workaround.
Flags still need to be set on the sealed object correctly, as the
password is normally allowed on its own as an alternative to policy
auth.
Add -Q to some tpm2 invocations to silence diagnostics on stdout.
Pass filename for unsealed secret rather than capturing from stdout
for robustness against tpm2 diagnostics on stdout.
Fix unseal result check in kexec-unseal-key.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
- /tmp/debug.log is created and appended by all TRACE and DEBUG calls in code
- fix some logic errors seen when no DEBUG entry were outputted in /tmp/debug.log
Always send password via stdin to tpm2 create, tpm2 unseal. The password
could being with things like 'file:', 'str:', 'pcr:' that would be
interpreted by tpm2.
Deduplicate the TPM1/2 code in kexec-unseal-key. The TPM2 code was not
actually prompting for the password or sending it to tpmr unseal.
Password is still not working yet though.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Most logic throughout Heads doesn't need to know TPM1 versus TPM2 (and
shouldn't, the differences should be localized). Some checks were
incorrect and are fixed by this change. Most checks are now unchanged
relative to master.
There are not that many places outside of tpmr that need to
differentiate TPM1 and TPM2. Some of those are duplicate code that
should be consolidated (seal-hotpkey, unseal-totp, unseal-hotp), and
some more are probably good candidates for abstracting in tpmr so the
business logic doesn't have to know TPM1 vs. TPM2.
Previously, CONFIG_TPM could be variously 'y', 'n', or empty. Now it
is always 'y' or 'n', and 'y' means "any TPM". Board configs are
unchanged, setting CONFIG_TPM2_TOOLS=y implies CONFIG_TPM=y so this
doesn't have to be duplicated and can't be mistakenly mismatched.
There were a few checks for CONFIG_TPM = n that only coincidentally
worked for TPM2 because CONFIG_TPM was empty (not 'n'). This test is
now OK, but the checks were also cleaned up to '!= "y"' for robustness.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
-coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations)
-swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config
-Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized)
This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads
-------------
WiP
TODO:
- libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built
- Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing
- init tries to bind fd and fails currently
- Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output
- When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail)
- seal-hotpkey is not working properly
- setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM)
- We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase.
- primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup
- would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only
- tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help.
- Implementing them would be better
- REVIEW TODOS IN CODE
- READD CIRCLECI CONFIG
Current state:
- TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid)
- TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without.
- TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails.
- Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens)
- Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
Closes issue #226
Also changed to procedure to show LVM volume groups and block
device ids to aid in choosing the right combination during the
TPM LUKS key sealing process.
