Just some minor clean ups like fixing whitespace and sorting things. I
added (bash)/removed (libusb) white space in order to look like the
other modules.
I sorted the --enable/--disable/--with blocks so that common stuff
looked similar which should aid in comparing modules. I also removed a
couple of duplicate config options (--disable-fallback-curses &
--disable-regex).
Signed-off-by: Manuel Mendez <github@i.m.mmlb.dev>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Laurion <insurgo@riseup.net>
Passing the path to libgcc in LDFLAGS appears to no longer be needed.
Removing this fixes compilation on a freshly cloned repo.
Fixes#1507
Signed-off-by: Michał Kopeć <michal.kopec@3mdeb.com>
Disable all optional algorithms except SM3. (SHA and AES are not
optional.) tpm2-tss uses SHA, AES, and SM3. Reduces size of libcrypto
by almost 1 MB, saves about 140 KB in ROM.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
Update OpenSSL to 3.0.8. Build with -Os. Install only libcrypto,
libssl is not currently needed. Don't buid tests.
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Hall <jonathon.hall@puri.sm>
-coreboot support of TPM v2.0 (shared config for TPM2 support across all 4 previous variations)
-swtpm set to be launched under TPM v2.0 mode under board config
-Documentation file under each board.md softlinks to qemu-coreboot-fbwhiptail-tpm1.md (which has been generalized)
This is skeleton for TPM v2 integration under Heads
-------------
WiP
TODO:
- libcurl cannot be built as a tpm2-tools dependency as of now not sure why. curl currently needs to be added in board config to be built
- Note: tpm-reset (master and here) needs some review, no handle of no tpm use case. Caller is responsible to not call it otherwise does nothing
- init tries to bind fd and fails currently
- Note: Check if whiptail is different of fbwhiptail in clearing screen. As of now every clear seems to be removed, still whiptail clears previous console output
- When no OS' /boot can be mounted, do not try to TPM reset (will fail)
- seal-hotpkey is not working properly
- setting disk unlock key asks for TPM ownership passphrase (sealing in NV requires ownership, but text is misleading user as if reowning TPM)
- We should cache input, feed tpm behind the scene and wipe passphrase and state clearly that this is TPM disk unlock kye passphrase.
- primary key from TPM2 is invalid most of the time from kexec-select-boot and verifying global hashes but is setuped correctly at disk unlock key setup
- would be nice to take advantage of bash function tracing to understand where we are for debugging purposes, code takes ash in consideration only
- tpmr says it implements nv calls but actually doesn't. Removing those falsely wrapped functions would help.
- Implementing them would be better
- REVIEW TODOS IN CODE
- READD CIRCLECI CONFIG
Current state:
- TPM unseal works without disk unlock key and generates TOTP properly (was missing die condition at unseal to not produce always good TOTP even if invalid)
- TPM disk encryption key fails. Hypothesis is that sealing with USB drivers loaded and measures in inconsistent with sealed with/without.
- TPM disk unsealing happens without USB modules being loaded in non-HOTP setup. This fails.
- Current tests are with fbwhiptail (no clear called so having traces on command line of what happens)
- Testing with HOTP implementation for sealing/unsealing since that forces USB module loads on each boot to remove this from failing possibilities
