go-attestation/attest/secureboot.go

182 lines
6.5 KiB
Go

package attest
import (
"bytes"
"errors"
"fmt"
"github.com/google/certificate-transparency-go/x509"
"github.com/google/go-attestation/attest/internal"
)
// SecurebootState describes the secure boot status of a machine, as determined
// by processing its event log.
type SecurebootState struct {
Enabled bool
// PlatformKeys enumerates keys which can sign a key exchange key.
PlatformKeys []x509.Certificate
// PlatformKeys enumerates key hashes which can sign a key exchange key.
PlatformKeyHashes [][]byte
// ExchangeKeys enumerates keys which can sign a database of permitted or
// forbidden keys.
ExchangeKeys []x509.Certificate
// ExchangeKeyHashes enumerates key hashes which can sign a database or
// permitted or forbidden keys.
ExchangeKeyHashes [][]byte
// PermittedKeys enumerates keys which may sign binaries to run.
PermittedKeys []x509.Certificate
// PermittedHashes enumerates hashes which permit binaries to run.
PermittedHashes [][]byte
// ForbiddenKeys enumerates keys which must not permit a binary to run.
ForbiddenKeys []x509.Certificate
// ForbiddenKeys enumerates hashes which must not permit a binary to run.
ForbiddenHashes [][]byte
// PreSeparatorAuthority describes the use of a secure-boot key to authorize
// the execution of a binary before the separator.
PreSeparatorAuthority []x509.Certificate
// PostSeparatorAuthority describes the use of a secure-boot key to authorize
// the execution of a binary after the separator.
PostSeparatorAuthority []x509.Certificate
}
// ParseSecurebootState parses a series of events to determine the
// configuration of secure boot on a device. An error is returned if
// the state cannot be determined, or if the event log is structured
// in such a way that it may have been tampered post-execution of
// platform firmware.
func ParseSecurebootState(events []Event) (*SecurebootState, error) {
// This algorithm verifies the following:
// - All events in PCR 7 have event types which are expected in PCR 7.
// - All events are parsable according to their event type.
// - All events have digests values corresponding to their data/event type.
// - No unverifiable events were present.
// - All variables are specified before the separator and never duplicated.
// - The SecureBoot variable has a value of 0 or 1.
// - If SecureBoot was 1 (enabled), authority events were present indicating
// keys were used to perform verification.
// - If SecureBoot was 1 (enabled), platform + exchange + database keys
// were specified.
// - No UEFI debugger was attached.
var (
out SecurebootState
seenSeparator bool
seenAuthority bool
seenVars = map[string]bool{}
)
for _, e := range events {
if e.Index != 7 {
continue
}
et, err := internal.UntrustedParseEventType(uint32(e.Type))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unrecognised event type: %v", err)
}
digestVerify := e.digestEquals(e.Data)
switch et {
case internal.Separator:
if seenSeparator {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("duplicate separator at event %d", e.sequence)
}
seenSeparator = true
if !bytes.Equal(e.Data, []byte{0, 0, 0, 0}) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid separator data at event %d: %v", e.sequence, e.Data)
}
if digestVerify != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid separator digest at event %d: %v", e.sequence, digestVerify)
}
case internal.EFIAction:
if string(e.Data) == "UEFI Debug Mode" {
return nil, errors.New("a UEFI debugger was present during boot")
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("event %d: unexpected EFI action event", e.sequence)
case internal.EFIVariableDriverConfig:
v, err := internal.ParseUEFIVariableData(bytes.NewReader(e.Data))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed parsing EFI variable at event %d: %v", e.sequence, err)
}
if _, seenBefore := seenVars[v.VarName()]; seenBefore {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("duplicate EFI variable %q at event %d", v.VarName(), e.sequence)
}
seenVars[v.VarName()] = true
if seenSeparator {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("event %d: variable %q specified after separator", e.sequence, v.VarName())
}
if digestVerify != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid digest for variable %q on event %d: %v", v.VarName(), e.sequence, digestVerify)
}
switch v.VarName() {
case "SecureBoot":
if len(v.VariableData) != 1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("event %d: SecureBoot data len is %d, expected 1", e.sequence, len(v.VariableData))
}
out.Enabled = v.VariableData[0] == 1
case "PK":
if out.PlatformKeys, out.PlatformKeyHashes, err = v.SignatureData(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("event %d: failed parsing platform keys: %v", e.sequence, err)
}
case "KEK":
if out.ExchangeKeys, out.ExchangeKeyHashes, err = v.SignatureData(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("event %d: failed parsing key exchange keys: %v", e.sequence, err)
}
case "db":
if out.PermittedKeys, out.PermittedHashes, err = v.SignatureData(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("event %d: failed parsing signature database: %v", e.sequence, err)
}
case "dbx":
if out.ForbiddenKeys, out.ForbiddenHashes, err = v.SignatureData(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("event %d: failed parsing forbidden signature database: %v", e.sequence, err)
}
}
case internal.EFIVariableAuthority:
a, err := internal.ParseUEFIVariableAuthority(bytes.NewReader(e.Data))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed parsing EFI variable authority at event %d: %v", e.sequence, err)
}
seenAuthority = true
if digestVerify != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid digest for authority on event %d: %v", e.sequence, digestVerify)
}
if !seenSeparator {
out.PreSeparatorAuthority = append(out.PreSeparatorAuthority, a.Certs...)
} else {
out.PostSeparatorAuthority = append(out.PostSeparatorAuthority, a.Certs...)
}
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected event type: %v", et)
}
}
if !out.Enabled {
return &out, nil
}
if !seenAuthority {
return nil, errors.New("secure boot was enabled but no key was used")
}
if len(out.PlatformKeys) == 0 && len(out.PlatformKeyHashes) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("secure boot was enabled but no platform keys were known")
}
if len(out.ExchangeKeys) == 0 && len(out.ExchangeKeyHashes) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("secure boot was enabled but no key exchange keys were known")
}
if len(out.PermittedKeys) == 0 && len(out.PermittedHashes) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("secure boot was enabled but no keys or hashes were permitted")
}
return &out, nil
}