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3.2 KiB
ReStructuredText
49 lines
3.2 KiB
ReStructuredText
Secure coding guidelines
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========================
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The platform does what it can to be secure by default and safe by design. Unfortunately the platform cannot
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prevent every kind of security mistake. This document describes what to think about when writing applications
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to block various kinds of attack. Whilst it may be tempting to just assume no reasonable counterparty would
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attempt to subvert your trades using flow level attacks, relying on trust for software security makes it
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harder to scale up your operations later when you might want to add counterparties quickly and without
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extensive vetting.
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Flows
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-----
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:doc:`flow-state-machines` are how your app communicates with other parties on the network. Therefore they
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are the typical entry point for malicious data into your app and must be treated with care.
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The ``receive`` methods return data wrapped in the ``UntrustworthyData<T>`` marker type. This type doesn't add
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any functionality, it's only there to remind you to properly validate everything that you get from the network.
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Remember that the other side may *not* be running the code you provide to take part in the flow: they are
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allowed to do anything! Things to watch out for:
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* A transaction that doesn't match a partial transaction built or proposed earlier in the flow, for instance,
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if you propose to trade a cash state worth $100 for an asset, and the transaction to sign comes back from the
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other side, you must check that it points to the state you actually requested. Otherwise the attacker could
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get you to sign a transaction that spends a much larger state to you, if they know the ID of one!
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* A transaction that isn't of the right type. There are two transaction types: general and notary change. If you
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are expecting one type but get the other you may find yourself signing a transaction that transfers your assets
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to the control of a hostile notary.
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* Unexpected changes in any part of the states in a transaction. If you have access to all the needed data, you
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could re-run the builder logic and do a comparison of the resulting states to ensure that it's what you expected.
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For instance if the data needed to construct the next state is available to both parties, the function to
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calculate the transaction you want to mutually agree could be shared between both classes implementing both
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sides of the flow.
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The theme should be clear: signing is a very sensitive operation, so you need to be sure you know what it is you
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are about to sign, and that nothing has changed in the small print! Once you have provided your signature over a
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transaction to a counterparty, there is no longer anything you can do to prevent them from committing it to the ledger.
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Contracts
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---------
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Contracts are arbitrary functions inside a JVM sandbox and therefore they have a lot of leeway to shoot themselves
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in the foot. Things to watch out for:
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* Changes in states that should not be allowed by the current state transition. You will want to check that no
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fields are changing except the intended fields!
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* Accidentally catching and discarding exceptions that might be thrown by validation logic.
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* Calling into other contracts via virtual methods if you don't know what those other contracts are or might do.
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