From fedc405800fc6c5aef4c878e2e2b81a4d8e6dcd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ic-builder Date: Sun, 6 Sep 2026 17:26:40 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] COO-area chats: secrets tooling runs as TSGCOO Linux account TSGCOO (docker group) operates the vault via /data2/TSGCOO/.local/bin/sm; reachableceo crosses over with sudo -u TSGCOO (NOPASSWD, sudoers.d). Ticket: https://projects.knownelement.com/issues/829 --- agents/global/AGENTS.md | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/agents/global/AGENTS.md b/agents/global/AGENTS.md index c68be80..04349ab 100644 --- a/agents/global/AGENTS.md +++ b/agents/global/AGENTS.md @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ question (see Questions). Effective 2026-08-31. - ALL builds/tests through the repo's compose lifecycle services (pinned-builder `check`). NEVER run toolchains on the host. Host runs only git, docker, unix utils. NO dev.sh, NO Makefile — docker compose is the only lifecycle interface (k8s/gitops-portable; template: go-cli-mcp-template #578). - Secrets: ONE place — the TSGCOO Bitwarden vault, accessed ONLY via the KNELSecretsManager Go CLI (`sm`, container ukrrs-secretsmgr-cli). RULING 2026-09-06: the legacy ~/.creds textfile pattern is RETIRED and ARCHIVED (/root/knel-creds-archive-20260906.zip, 400) — no new textfile creds, no upstream Rust bw CLI. NEVER in repos, images, compose files, app databases, logs, or error strings. +- COO-area chats run secrets tooling AS the TSGCOO Linux account (/data2/TSGCOO, docker group — no sudo; cross-over: `sudo -u TSGCOO`, NOPASSWD). Entry: /data2/TSGCOO/.local/bin/sm. Ruling 2026-09-06. - Host hygiene (ruling 2026-08-31, RETIRES the old curl ban): common shell commands on the host are fine, curl included. NOT fine: package installs on the host (apt-get/pip/etc) or piling work/toolchains onto it — ALL work runs in containers (python inside dev/build containers is fine). Keep the host a thin, clean layer. - Missing CLI on the host? DOCKER PULL IT (ruling 2026-08-31, standing permission): agents may pull tooling images freely — anything that makes the work easier (jq, ripgrep, etc. already fine from host; grab whatever else via `docker run --rm `). No permission needed; never apt/pip instead. - New gitea repos default to PUBLIC (ruling 2026-08-31): create with `--private=false`; go private only when the human asks or the content demands it (secrets are never repo content anyway — the Bitwarden vault (via `sm`) is the only home for those).