--- name: agent-provisioning description: > Provision TSYS Group agent identities end-to-end: Cloudron account (unique password, TOTP with seed captured to the TSGCOO vault), SSO first-login into Redmine / Gitea / Discourse / GLPI, per-system API key minting, vault item schema, and verification. Use whenever asked to "stand up" an identity or agent, create/fix Cloudron users, wire SSO, debug identity logins or 2FA, or store identity credentials — even if the word "provisioning" is not used. Policy-critical: encodes founder rulings #942 (unique passwords, Cloudron-only accounts, no reachableceo credentials). --- # Agent identity provisioning (TSYS Group) Stand up an agent identity so it can operate its own accounts in Cloudron and the four SSO-wired systems, with every credential landing in the TSGCOO Bitwarden vault. The Cloudron is the ONLY identity source: never create local accounts in Redmine, Gitea, Discourse, or GLPI — the system account comes into existence when the identity completes its first SSO login there. ## Non-negotiable policy (founder rulings — violating these invalidates the work) 1. **Unique password per identity.** One identity, one password, used only for its Cloudron account. Shared passwords are banned (Redmine #942). 2. **Cloudron-only accounts.** System access = SSO first-login. No local accounts, no admin-created users in the downstream systems. 3. **Never use reachableceo credentials.** Items like `creds/gitea-admin`, `creds/gitea`, `creds/redmine` are the founder's personal accounts and carry RESTRICTED notes. If an auth test resolves to user `reachableceo`, stop — you are holding the founder's identity. 4. **TOTP seeds MUST be stored in Bitwarden** (founder ruling 2026-09-08). Enroll TOTP and write the base32 seed to the vault item in the same breath — a seed that is not in the vault is treated as lost, because there is no admin 2FA reset on this Cloudron and no other record exists. 5. **Secrets live only in the vault** (KNELSecretsManager `sm` CLI) — never in repos, command output, logs, or transcripts. Mask credentials in every command's visible output. 6. **Bookkeeping in the same turn:** Redmine ticket on the provisioning program (#942 or its successor), cross-linked; vault item created;STATUS updated. ## Scope check Identity stand-up is the COO C2 lane's assigned program (founder directive, 2026-09-08). If your chat runs in another lane (SRE, security, OAM), confirm the founder assigned the stand-up to you before executing, or route a ticket to the COO C2 lane instead. ## Admin lever: Cloudron API token `creds/cloudron` holds a working admin API token (service user `api-token`, 64 chars). Use it as `Authorization: Bearer $PASSWORD`. Do NOT log into the dashboard interactively for admin work — the token is the compliant path. ```bash scripts/cloudron-api.sh GET /users?limit=100 # list users (note uid- UUIDs) scripts/cloudron-api.sh GET /users/ # fetch one user object ``` Route notes (this Cloudron, 2026-09): users are addressed by `uid-…` UUIDs, not usernames; there is NO `/api/v1/login` (dashboard auth is its own OIDC flow); there is NO admin route to reset another user's 2FA — so the seed capture in step 2 is not optional. ## Procedure ### 0. Prerequisites - Vault reachable: `sm get creds/cloudron` works (see references/vault.md). - For a NEW Cloudron user: the founder generates the invite, or you create the user via the admin token if the founder has authorized self-service. - A Redmine ticket to record the work (create one if none exists). ### 1. Cloudron account (unique password) Verify the account exists and matches the identity email pattern (`tsgstaff-@turnsys.com` for COO-line identities). Generate the unique password (32 chars), set it, and confirm a login works (step 2 proves it). ### 2. TOTP 2FA — enroll and CAPTURE THE SEED Enroll TOTP via the profile self-service surface and write the base32 seed to the vault item before anything else: ```bash sm setfield " Cloudron" totp_seed "" ``` If the identity already has 2FA enforced and no seed exists anywhere: STOP and ask the founder. There is no programmatic recovery (verified 2026-09-08). Compute codes offline when needed: `scripts/totp.sh `. ### 3. SSO first-login into each system The interactive login is scriptable with a cookie jar — no browser needed. `scripts/oidc-login.sh ` runs the whole flow and leaves a session cookie jar at `/tmp/oidc--.txt`. Entry points: | System | SSO start point | After login | |---|---|---| | GLPI | `https://cmdb.knownelement.com/plugins/singlesignon/front/callback.php/provider/1?remember=1` | account auto-provisioned | | Gitea | `https://git.knownelement.com/user/oauth2/cloudron` | account auto-provisioned | | Discourse | `https://community.turnsys.com/auth/openid_connect` | account auto-provisioned | | Redmine | `https://projects.knownelement.com/oauth` | account auto-provisioned (if the bounce in references/systems.md is hit, see that file) | Key gotcha (cost a debugging session — do not rediscover): the OIDC interaction login is `POST /openid/interaction//login` with JSON body `{"username": "...", "password": "..."}` — the field is **`username`**, not `login`, and the response is `{"redirectTo": ...}` on success. ### 4. Mint per-system API keys (as the identity, via its session) - **Redmine**: My account → API key (visible to self); also returned by `GET /users/current.json` with the session. - **Gitea**: Settings → Applications → new token with write scopes; or `POST /api/v1/users//tokens` using the session (requires basic auth of the same user for token endpoints). - **Discourse**: user API key flow; or admin-generated key if an admin lever is ever provided (none currently is — do not use founder keys). - **GLPI**: My account → API token (personal token); pair with the app token from `creds/glpi` (password field) for REST calls. Store each key in the vault item immediately (schema below). ### 5. Vault item schema — `creds/` One item per identity (NOT per system). Create it as a LOGIN item with: - login username = Cloudron username; password = the unique Cloudron password - URI = `https://my.knownelement.com` - fields: `email`, `organization`, `role`, `reports_to`, `created`, `services`, plus per-system: `redmine_api_key`, `gitea_token`, `discourse_user_api_key`, `glpi_user_token`, and `totp_seed` Historical items that predate this schema (e.g. `sec-*`, `sre-*` shared- password items) are remediation targets under #942 — upgrade them when the owner lane assigns the work, do not replicate their shape. ### 6. Verify the trail Prove each system knows the identity (expected: 200 + the identity's own name; a 200 from the wrong identity is a FAIL): ```bash curl -sf -H "X-Redmine-API-Key: $KEY" https://projects.knownelement.com/users/current.json | jq .user.login curl -sf -H "Authorization: token $TOKEN" https://git.knownelement.com/api/v1/user | jq .login ``` Then update the Redmine ticket (full URLs, `[agent] ` note) and the workspace STATUS/memory. ## References — read before touching the corresponding system - `references/cloudron.md` — admin API routes, OIDC interaction flow, 2FA. - `references/systems.md` — per-system SSO/API details and known breakage. - `references/vault.md` — sm CLI entry points, gotchas, fallbacks. - `references/incident-log.md` — what went wrong on 2026-09-07/08 and why, so the same failures are not re-derived. ## Scripts - `scripts/cloudron-api.sh METHOD PATH [JSON]` — authenticated admin call. - `scripts/oidc-login.sh ` — full SSO login via cookie jar; reads the identity's creds from the vault. - `scripts/totp.sh ` — current 6-digit TOTP code (pure bash).