skills: cloudron.md records pointer
This commit is contained in:
@@ -60,8 +60,10 @@ scripts/cloudron-api.sh GET /users/<uid> # fetch one user object
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Route notes (this Cloudron, 2026-09): users are addressed by `uid-…` UUIDs,
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not usernames; there is NO `/api/v1/login` (dashboard auth is its own OIDC
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flow); there is NO admin route to reset another user's 2FA — so the seed
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capture in step 2 is not optional.
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flow, client `cid-webadmin`, PKCE S256); admin CAN clear a user's TOTP via
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`POST /api/v1/users/<uid>/totp_disable` (empty JSON body) — use it when a
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seed was lost, then re-enroll with capture. Admin password set:
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`POST /api/v1/users/<uid>/password {"password":"…"}`.
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## Procedure
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@@ -76,26 +78,61 @@ capture in step 2 is not optional.
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Verify the account exists and matches the identity email pattern
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(`tsgstaff-<login>@turnsys.com` for COO-line identities). Generate the unique
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password (32 chars), set it, and confirm a login works (step 2 proves it).
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password (32 chars), set it via the admin API, and store it in the vault item
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login password field:
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```bash
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scripts/cloudron-api.sh POST /users/<uid>/password '{"password":"<32-char>"}'
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sm setfield "<login> Cloudron" password "<32-char>"
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```
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### 2. TOTP 2FA — enroll and CAPTURE THE SEED
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Enroll TOTP via the profile self-service surface and write the base32 seed to
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the vault item before anything else:
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Two cases:
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```bash
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sm setfield "<login> Cloudron" totp_seed "<BASE32SEED>"
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```
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- **Seed lost / never captured** (TOTP enforced, no `totp_seed` in vault):
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clear first — `scripts/cloudron-api.sh POST /users/<uid>/totp_disable` —
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then proceed to enroll fresh.
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- **No 2FA yet**: enroll directly.
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Enrollment runs in the identity's own dashboard session (the totp routes are
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self-scoped — an admin token gets 404s there):
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1. `scripts/cloudron-oidc-login.sh <username> <vault-item>` — full OIDC
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login (PKCE + interaction + consent) yielding the identity's Bearer at
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`/tmp/.oidc-bearer-<username>`.
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2. `scripts/cloudron-totp-enroll.sh <username> <vault-item>` — reads the
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pending secret, enables with a computed code, stores the seed via
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`sm setfield`, and verifies end-to-end.
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If the API confirm path is rejected, fall back to the dashboard UI in the
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browser: the forced "Enable TOTP" dialog shows the seed; read it, compute
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with `scripts/totp.sh`, fill the Token field and submit. CRITICAL: the
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pending secret REGENERATES every time the dialog re-renders — always read
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the seed and submit the code within the same window, and verify enrollment
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by a real TOTP login (a totpToken in a login is silently ignored for users
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without 2FA — "success" there proves nothing).
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If the identity already has 2FA enforced and no seed exists anywhere: STOP and
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ask the founder. There is no programmatic recovery (verified 2026-09-08).
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Compute codes offline when needed: `scripts/totp.sh <seed>`.
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### 3. SSO first-login into each system
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### 3. TOTP enrollment (in the identity's dashboard session)
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```bash
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scripts/cloudron-oidc-login.sh <username> <vault-item> # OIDC login -> Bearer
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scripts/cloudron-totp-enroll.sh <username> <vault-item> # enroll + seed + verify
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```
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If the API enable path is rejected, fall back to the dashboard UI dialog (see
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step 2's note). The verify pass inside the scripts performs a real TOTP login
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and is the ONLY trustworthy success signal.
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### 4. SSO first-login into each system
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The interactive login is scriptable with a cookie jar — no browser needed.
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`scripts/oidc-login.sh <system>` runs the whole flow and leaves a session
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cookie jar at `/tmp/oidc-<login>-<system>.txt`. Entry points:
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`scripts/oidc-login.sh <system> <login>` runs the whole flow and leaves a
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session cookie jar at `/tmp/oidc-<login>-<system>.txt`. Entry points:
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| System | SSO start point | After login |
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|---|---|---|
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@@ -106,10 +143,11 @@ cookie jar at `/tmp/oidc-<login>-<system>.txt`. Entry points:
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Key gotcha (cost a debugging session — do not rediscover): the OIDC
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interaction login is `POST /openid/interaction/<uid>/login` with JSON body
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`{"username": "...", "password": "..."}` — the field is **`username`**, not
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`login`, and the response is `{"redirectTo": ...}` on success.
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`{"username": "...", "password": "...", "totpToken": "..."}` — the field is
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**`username`**, not `login`, and the response is `{"redirectTo": ...}` on
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success.
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### 4. Mint per-system API keys (as the identity, via its session)
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### 5. Mint per-system API keys (as the identity, via its session)
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- **Redmine**: My account → API key (visible to self); also returned by
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`GET /users/current.json` with the session.
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@@ -123,9 +161,12 @@ interaction login is `POST /openid/interaction/<uid>/login` with JSON body
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Store each key in the vault item immediately (schema below).
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### 5. Vault item schema — `creds/<login>`
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### 6. Vault item schema — `creds/<login>`
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One item per identity (NOT per system). Create it as a LOGIN item with:
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One item per identity (NOT per system), created as a LOGIN item (never a
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note — `sm set` makes notes; `sm convert <name>` converts, but REGENERATE
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the password via the admin API afterwards because convert drops field
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values):
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- login username = Cloudron username; password = the unique Cloudron password
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- URI = `https://my.knownelement.com`
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@@ -137,7 +178,20 @@ Historical items that predate this schema (e.g. `sec-*`, `sre-*` shared-
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password items) are remediation targets under #942 — upgrade them when the
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owner lane assigns the work, do not replicate their shape.
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### 6. Verify the trail
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### 7. Update the org chart (MANDATORY — an uncharted identity is an incomplete task)
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After provisioning changes the identity estate:
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1. Update the org table in `TSYSGroupCorporate/TSYSGroupAIOS`
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`agents/global/AGENTS.md` (branch + PR per the house-rules flow; the
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symlink serves it live once merged).
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2. Update `reachableceo/org-buildout` `docs/org-chart.md` (the rendered
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chart) in the same turn.
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3. Note the change on the provisioning ticket.
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Details: `references/org-chart-update.md`.
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### 7. Verify the trail
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Prove each system knows the identity (expected: 200 + the identity's own
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name; a 200 from the wrong identity is a FAIL):
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@@ -155,12 +209,19 @@ the workspace STATUS/memory.
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- `references/cloudron.md` — admin API routes, OIDC interaction flow, 2FA.
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- `references/systems.md` — per-system SSO/API details and known breakage.
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- `references/vault.md` — sm CLI entry points, gotchas, fallbacks.
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- `references/org-chart-update.md` — the mandatory post-provisioning chart sync.
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- `references/incident-log.md` — what went wrong on 2026-09-07/08 and why, so
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the same failures are not re-derived.
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## Scripts
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- `scripts/cloudron-api.sh METHOD PATH [JSON]` — authenticated admin call.
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- `scripts/oidc-login.sh <glpi|gitea|discourse|redmine> <login>` — full SSO
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login via cookie jar; reads the identity's creds from the vault.
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- `scripts/totp.sh <base32-seed>` — current 6-digit TOTP code (pure bash).
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- `scripts/cloudron-oidc-login.sh <username> [vault-item]` — full OIDC
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dashboard login (PKCE + interaction + consent); Bearer at
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`/tmp/.oidc-bearer-<username>`.
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- `scripts/cloudron-totp-enroll.sh <username> [vault-item]` — enroll TOTP,
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capture the seed to the vault, verify end-to-end.
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- `scripts/oidc-login.sh <glpi|gitea|discourse|redmine> <login>` — system SSO
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login via cookie jar.
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- `scripts/totp.sh <base32-seed>` — current 6-digit TOTP code (pure bash,
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RFC-7636-vector tested).
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@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
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# Org chart update (mandatory post-provisioning step)
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The org chart lives in THREE places and all three move together in the same
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turn a provisioning change lands:
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| Where | What | How |
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|---|---|---|
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| `TSYSGroupCorporate/TSYSGroupAIOS` `agents/global/AGENTS.md` — "Org chart & agent lanes" | THE canonical operational map (every session loads it via symlink) | branch `coo/…` or lane branch → PR → founder merge |
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| `reachableceo/org-buildout` `docs/org-chart.md` | The rendered full-group chart (publishable) | same-turn commit |
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| Redmine provisioning ticket | Per-identity state (pw/2FA/seed/systems) | comment with commit URLs |
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Rules:
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1. **Chart before claimed-done.** A provisioned identity that isn't in the
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chart is an incomplete task; a charted identity without a ticket is
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invisible work. Both fail review.
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2. House-rules/policy changes additionally require a `house-rules-v*` tag bump
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(see the versioning section at the bottom of AGENTS.md).
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3. The COO C2 lane charts; lanes below SVP execute. If you are not the COO
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lane, your provisioning ticket IS the chart-change request.
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4. When the chart changes, so does reality somewhere: verify the identity's
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vault item (unique password, totp_seed, per-system tokens) before drawing
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it as operational.
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Sequence for one provisioning run (branch `coo/…` in TSYSGroupAIOS):
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```bash
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# 1. edit agents/global/AGENTS.md org table (if lane structure changed)
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# 2. edit org-buildout docs/org-chart.md + STATUS.md
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# 3. commit both, push both (HTTPS + the acting identity's token)
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# 4. PR for TSYSGroupAIOS if policy-level; org-buildout pushes direct per its flow
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# 5. Redmine comment links every commit URL
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```
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---
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**Records:** Redmine #942 — https://projects.knownelement.com/issues/942 · Discourse docs home: https://community.turnsys.com (skill topic pending admin-key provisioning, tracked on #942)
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@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
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#!/bin/bash
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# Cloudron OIDC dashboard login (SPA-mimic, PKCE) for an identity.
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# usage: cloudron-oidc-login.sh <cloudron-username> [vault-item]
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# Performs: prompt=login auth -> interaction login (password + TOTP from
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# vault totp_seed if present) -> consent confirm -> code exchange.
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# Writes the access token to /tmp/.oidc-bearer-<username> and a session
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# cookie jar /tmp/oidc-jar-<username>.txt. Prints checkpoints to stderr.
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set -uo pipefail
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U="${1:?usage: cloudron-oidc-login.sh <cloudron-username> [vault-item]}"
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ITEM="${2:-$U Cloudron}"
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BASE="https://my.knownelement.com"
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CLIENT="cid-webadmin"
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REDIRECT="$BASE/authcallback.html" # used in the auth request below via explicit URL encoding
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DBG="${CLOUDRON_SELF_DEBUG:-0}"
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if [ "$(id -un)" = "TSGCOO" ]; then
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SM() { /data2/TSGCOO/.local/bin/sm "$@" </dev/null; }
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else
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SM() { sudo -u TSGCOO /data2/TSGCOO/.local/bin/sm "$@" </dev/null; }
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fi
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PW=$(SM get "$ITEM" --field password)
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[ -n "$PW" ] || { echo "FAIL: no password in vault item $ITEM" >&2; exit 1; }
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SEED=$(SM get "$ITEM" --field totp_seed 2>/dev/null || true)
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VERIFIER=$(openssl rand -base64 48 | tr '+/' '-_' | tr -d '=\n' | cut -c1-64)
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CHALLENGE=$(printf '%s' "$VERIFIER" | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | openssl base64 | tr '+/' '-_' | tr -d '=\n')
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AUTH="$BASE/openid/auth?client_id=$CLIENT&response_type=code&scope=openid%20email%20profile&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fmy.knownelement.com%2Fauthcallback.html&code_challenge=$CHALLENGE&code_challenge_method=S256"
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JAR="/tmp/oidc-jar-$U.txt"; rm -f "$JAR"
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INT=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{url_effective}' -c "$JAR" -L --max-redirs 8 "$AUTH")
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[ "$DBG" = 1 ] && echo "DBG int: ${INT:0:70}" >&2
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case "$INT" in */openid/interaction/*) : ;; *) echo "FAIL: no interaction (auto-resolved session?)"; exit 3;; esac
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UIDPATH=$(printf '%s' "$INT" | grep -o '/openid/interaction/[^?]*')
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BODY="{\"username\":\"$U\",\"password\":\"$PW\""
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if [ -n "$SEED" ]; then
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TCODE=$(bash "$(dirname "$0")/totp.sh" "$SEED")
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BODY="$BODY,\"totpToken\":\"$TCODE\""
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fi
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BODY="$BODY}"
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LOGIN_RESP=$(curl -sk -b "$JAR" -c "$JAR" -X POST "$BASE$UIDPATH/login" \
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-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "$BODY")
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unset BODY
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[ "$DBG" = 1 ] && echo "DBG login: ${LOGIN_RESP:0:70}" >&2
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case "$LOGIN_RESP" in
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*redirectTo*) : ;;
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*twoFactorRequired*) echo "FAIL: 2FA required but no usable seed in vault" >&2; exit 4;;
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*) echo "FAIL: login rejected: $LOGIN_RESP" >&2; exit 5;;
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esac
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RED=$(printf '%s' "$LOGIN_RESP" | sed -n 's/.*"redirectTo":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')
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CALLBACK=$(curl -sk -b "$JAR" -c "$JAR" -o /dev/null -w '%{url_effective}' -L --max-redirs 8 "$RED")
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[ "$DBG" = 1 ] && echo "DBG after resume: ${CALLBACK:0:70}" >&2
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case "$CALLBACK" in
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*/openid/interaction/*)
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CUIDPATH=$(printf '%s' "$CALLBACK" | grep -o '/openid/interaction/[^?]*')
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CLOC=$(curl -sk -b "$JAR" -c "$JAR" -D - -o /dev/null -X POST "$BASE$CUIDPATH/confirm" \
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-d '' | grep -i '^location:' | head -1 | tr -d '\r' | sed 's/^[Ll]ocation: //')
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[ -n "$CLOC" ] || { echo "FAIL: consent confirm produced no redirect" >&2; exit 6; }
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case "$CLOC" in http*) : ;; *) CLOC="$BASE$CLOC" ;; esac
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CALLBACK=$(curl -sk -b "$JAR" -c "$JAR" -o /dev/null -w '%{url_effective}' -L --max-redirs 8 "$CLOC")
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;;
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esac
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CODE=$(printf '%s' "$CALLBACK" | sed -n 's/[?&]code=\([^&]*\).*/\1/p')
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[ "$DBG" = 1 ] && echo "DBG code len: ${#CODE}" >&2
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[ -n "$CODE" ] || { echo "FAIL: no authorization code at callback: $CALLBACK" >&2; exit 6; }
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TOKRESP=$(curl -sk -b "$JAR" -c "$JAR" -X POST "$BASE/openid/token" \
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-H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
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--data-urlencode "grant_type=authorization_code" \
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--data-urlencode "code=$CODE" \
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--data-urlencode "client_id=$CLIENT" \
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--data-urlencode "redirect_uri=$REDIRECT" \
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--data-urlencode "code_verifier=$VERIFIER")
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ACCESS=$(printf '%s' "$TOKRESP" | sed -n 's/.*"access_token":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')
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[ -n "$ACCESS" ] || { echo "FAIL: token exchange: $(printf '%s' "$TOKRESP" | head -c 120)" >&2; exit 7; }
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printf '%s' "$ACCESS" > "/tmp/.oidc-bearer-$U"
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chmod 600 "/tmp/.oidc-bearer-$U"
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WHO=$(curl -sk "$BASE/api/v1/profile" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS" | sed -n 's/.*"username":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')
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echo "OK: bearer for '$WHO' at /tmp/.oidc-bearer-$U (session jar $JAR)"
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@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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#!/bin/bash
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# Enroll TOTP for an identity (2FA must NOT be enforced yet — run
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# cloudron-oidc-login.sh first, or admin totp_disable for seed-lost users).
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# usage: cloudron-totp-enroll.sh <cloudron-username> [vault-item]
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# Captures the seed into the vault item and verifies end-to-end.
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set -euo pipefail
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U="${1:?usage: cloudron-totp-enroll.sh <cloudron-username> [vault-item]}"
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ITEM="${2:-$U Cloudron}"
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BASE="https://my.knownelement.com"
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BEARER_FILE="/tmp/.oidc-bearer-$U"
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[ -f "$BEARER_FILE" ] || { echo "FAIL: run cloudron-oidc-login.sh $U first" >&2; exit 1; }
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ACCESS=$(cat "$BEARER_FILE")
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MYUID=$(curl -sk "$BASE/api/v1/profile" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS" | sed -n 's/.*"id":"\(uid-[^"]*\)".*/\1/p')
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[ -n "$MYUID" ] || { echo "FAIL: bearer rejected" >&2; exit 2; }
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SECRET=$(curl -sk "$BASE/api/v1/users/$MYUID/totp_setup" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS" | sed -n 's/.*"secret":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')
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if [ -z "$SECRET" ]; then
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SECRET=$(curl -sk -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/users/$MYUID/totp_setup" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' | sed -n 's/.*"secret":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')
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fi
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[ -n "$SECRET" ] || { echo "FAIL: no totp secret returned" >&2; exit 3; }
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CODE=$(bash "$(dirname "$0")/totp.sh" "$SECRET")
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ENAB=$(curl -sk -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/users/$MYUID/totp_setup" -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "{\"totpSecret\":\"$SECRET\",\"totpToken\":\"$CODE\"}")
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case "$ENAB" in *Invalid*|*404*|*"No such route"*) echo "PARTIAL: enable said: $(printf '%s' "$ENAB" | head -c 100)";; esac
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SM() { if [ "$(id -un)" = "TSGCOO" ]; then /data2/TSGCOO/.local/bin/sm "$@" </dev/null; else sudo -u TSGCOO /data2/TSGCOO/.local/bin/sm "$@" </dev/null; fi; }
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SM setfield "$ITEM" totp_seed "$SECRET" >/dev/null
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# end-to-end verify: fresh login with the stored seed
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bash "$(dirname "$0")/cloudron-oidc-login.sh" "$U" "$ITEM" >/dev/null 2>&1
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if [ -s "$BEARER_FILE" ]; then
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WHO=$(curl -sk "$BASE/api/v1/profile" -H "Authorization: Bearer $(cat "$BEARER_FILE")" | sed -n 's/.*"username":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')
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[ "$WHO" = "$U" ] && echo "OK: $U 2FA enrolled, seed in vault ($ITEM), TOTP login verified as $WHO" \
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&& exit 0
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fi
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echo "PARTIAL: verify failed — check state for $U"
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@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
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#!/bin/bash
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# Full SSO login for an identity into one of the four systems, via cookie jar.
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# usage: oidc-login.sh <glpi|gitea|discourse|redmine> <login>
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# Reads the Cloudron password from vault item "<login> Cloudron" (env login
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# triple; USERNAME may be the email form). Success leaves cookie jar at
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# /tmp/oidc-<login>-<system>.txt and prints the landing URL.
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# TOTP-enforced identity? Set TOTP_CODE=$(scripts/totp.sh <seed>) first.
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set -euo pipefail
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SYS="${1:?usage: oidc-login.sh <glpi|gitea|discourse|redmine> <login>}"
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LOGIN="${2:?usage: oidc-login.sh <glpi|gitea|discourse|redmine> <login>}"
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case "$SYS" in
|
||||
glpi) START="https://cmdb.knownelement.com/plugins/singlesignon/front/callback.php/provider/1?remember=1"; APP="https://cmdb.knownelement.com";;
|
||||
gitea) START="https://git.knownelement.com/user/oauth2/cloudron"; APP="https://git.knownelement.com";;
|
||||
discourse) START="https://community.turnsys.com/auth/openid_connect"; APP="https://community.turnsys.com";;
|
||||
redmine) START="https://projects.knownelement.com/oauth"; APP="https://projects.knownelement.com";;
|
||||
*) echo "unknown system: $SYS" >&2; exit 2;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
if [ "$(id -un)" = "TSGCOO" ]; then
|
||||
SM() { /data2/TSGCOO/.local/bin/sm "$@" </dev/null; }
|
||||
else
|
||||
SM() { sudo -u TSGCOO /data2/TSGCOO/.local/bin/sm "$@" </dev/null; }
|
||||
fi
|
||||
eval "$(SM env "$LOGIN Cloudron")"
|
||||
[ -n "${PASSWORD:-}" ] || { echo "vault item '$LOGIN Cloudron' empty" >&2; exit 1; }
|
||||
USER_FIELD="${USERNAME:-$LOGIN}"
|
||||
JAR="/tmp/oidc-${LOGIN}-${SYS}.txt"; rm -f "$JAR"
|
||||
|
||||
# 1. Start the SSO flow; follow redirects to the OIDC interaction page.
|
||||
INTURL=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{redirect_url}' -c "$JAR" "$START")
|
||||
case "$INTURL" in
|
||||
https://my.knownelement.com/openid/interaction/*) : ;;
|
||||
*) echo "no interaction redirect (got: '${INTURL:-none}'). If this is redmine, see references/systems.md (known bounce). If discourse, the route may need CSRF via a real session." >&2; exit 3;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Interaction login. Field name is `username` (NOT `login`).
|
||||
BODY="{\"username\":\"$USER_FIELD\",\"password\":\"$PASSWORD\""
|
||||
if [ -n "${TOTP_CODE:-}" ]; then BODY="$BODY,\"totpToken\":\"$TOTP_CODE\""; fi
|
||||
BODY="$BODY}"
|
||||
RESP=$(curl -s -b "$JAR" -c "$JAR" -X POST "${INTURL}/login" \
|
||||
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "$BODY")
|
||||
unset BODY
|
||||
|
||||
case "$RESP" in
|
||||
*redirectTo*)
|
||||
RED=$(printf '%s' "$RESP" | sed -n 's/.*"redirectTo":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p')
|
||||
case "$RED" in http*) : ;; *) RED="$APP$RED" ;; esac
|
||||
FINAL=$(curl -s -L -b "$JAR" -c "$JAR" -o /dev/null -w '%{url_effective}' "$RED")
|
||||
echo "logged in: cookie jar $JAR"
|
||||
echo "landing: $FINAL"
|
||||
echo "verify the identity before use (users/current or /api/v1/user)."
|
||||
;;
|
||||
*twoFactorRequired*)
|
||||
echo "2FA enforced and no/invalid TOTP_CODE given." >&2
|
||||
echo "If the seed is in the vault: TOTP_CODE=\$(scripts/totp.sh \$(sm get '$LOGIN Cloudron' --field totp_seed)) $0 $SYS $LOGIN" >&2
|
||||
exit 4;;
|
||||
*)
|
||||
echo "login rejected: $RESP" >&2
|
||||
exit 5;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ COUNTER=$(printf '%016x' $(( NOW / STEP )))
|
||||
# bash vars cannot hold null bytes - keep the counter as a FORMAT string and
|
||||
# let printf emit the raw bytes straight into the pipe.
|
||||
FMT=$(printf '%s' "$COUNTER" | sed 's/../\\x&/g')
|
||||
# intentional: FMT emits raw counter bytes incl. NULs - the whole point
|
||||
# shellcheck disable=SC2059
|
||||
# intentional: FMT emits raw counter bytes (NULs) - the whole point
|
||||
# shellcheck disable=SC2059
|
||||
MAC=$(printf "$FMT" | openssl dgst -sha1 -mac HMAC -macopt "hexkey:$KEYHEX" -binary \
|
||||
| od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n')
|
||||
OFFSET=$(( 0x${MAC: -1} ))
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user