docs(audit): add comprehensive security audit report
External security audit of KNEL-AIMiddleware before release: - FINAL-REPORT.md: Executive summary, risk assessment, remediation roadmap - 01-dockerfile-security.md: 38/40 containers run as root (HIGH) - 02-shell-script-security.md: 83 missing set -e/u directives (HIGH) - 03-docker-compose-security.md: 3 privileged services documented (MEDIUM) - 04-secrets-audit.md: PASS - no hardcoded secrets found - 05-vulnerability-scan.md: 14+ CVEs, 1 CRITICAL OpenSSL (golang:1.23-alpine) Assessment: CONDITIONAL PASS for release 💘 Generated with Crush Assisted-by: GLM-5 via Crush <crush@charm.land>
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Charles N Wyble
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docs/audit/2026-02-20/03-docker-compose-security.md
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docs/audit/2026-02-20/03-docker-compose-security.md
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# Docker Compose Security Audit
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**Date:** 2026-02-20
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**Auditor:** External Security Review
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**Scope:** `docker-compose.yml` and container orchestration
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## Executive Summary
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| Metric | Value |
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|--------|-------|
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| Total Services | 40+ |
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| High Severity Issues | 3 |
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| Medium Severity Issues | 1 |
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| Low Severity Issues | 1 |
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## Detailed Findings
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### 1. Docker Socket Mount (HIGH)
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**Severity:** HIGH
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**Affected Services:** `docker-mcp`, `mcp-ansible`
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**CWE:** CWE-250 (Execution with Unnecessary Privileges)
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#### Description
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Two services mount the Docker socket, granting full Docker daemon access:
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```yaml
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# docker-mcp
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volumes:
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- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock
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# mcp-ansible
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volumes:
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- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock
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```
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This provides equivalent access to root on the host system.
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#### Impact
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- Full control over all containers on host
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- Ability to mount host filesystem
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- Potential for container escape
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- Access to secrets in other containers
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#### Risk Assessment
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- **Necessary for Function:** Yes - these services manage Docker/containers
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- **Mitigation Required:** Yes
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#### Recommendation
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1. Run these services with explicit user constraints where possible
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2. Document the privilege requirement clearly
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3. Consider socket proxy (docker-socket-proxy) for least privilege
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4. Isolate on dedicated management nodes in production
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```yaml
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# Alternative with socket proxy
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services:
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docker-mcp:
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environment:
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- DOCKER_HOST=tcp://docker-proxy:2375
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depends_on:
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- docker-proxy
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docker-proxy:
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image: tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy
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volumes:
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- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock
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environment:
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- CONTAINERS=1
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- IMAGES=1
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# Only allow specific operations
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```
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---
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### 2. Kubernetes Config Mount (HIGH)
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**Severity:** HIGH
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**Affected Service:** `kubernetes-mcp`
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**CWE:** CWE-250 (Execution with Unnecessary Privileges)
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#### Description
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The kubernetes-mcp service mounts kubeconfig:
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```yaml
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volumes:
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- ~/.kube/config:/home/appuser/.kube/config:ro
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```
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This grants Kubernetes cluster admin access to the container.
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#### Impact
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- Full control over Kubernetes cluster
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- Access to all secrets in cluster
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- Ability to deploy privileged workloads
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- Cluster admin equivalent access
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#### Risk Assessment
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- **Necessary for Function:** Yes - required for Kubernetes management
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- **Mitigation Required:** Yes
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#### Recommendation
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1. Use read-only mount (`:ro` flag) - already implemented
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2. Consider ServiceAccount tokens instead of kubeconfig
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3. Implement RBAC with minimal required permissions
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4. Document required permissions clearly
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---
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### 3. Privileged Access Pattern (MEDIUM)
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**Severity:** MEDIUM
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**Affected:** Multiple services requiring system access
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**CWE:** CWE-269 (Improper Privilege Management)
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#### Description
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Several services require elevated privileges for their function:
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| Service | Privilege Type | Justification |
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|---------|---------------|---------------|
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| docker-mcp | Docker socket | Container management |
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| mcp-ansible | Docker socket | Container orchestration |
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| kubernetes-mcp | kubeconfig | Cluster management |
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| ssh-mcp | SSH keys | Remote server access |
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#### Recommendation
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Document each privileged service with:
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- Required access level
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- Business justification
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- Mitigating controls
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- Audit logging requirements
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---
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### 4. Default Credential Pattern (LOW)
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**Severity:** LOW
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**Affected Service:** `ghost-mcp`
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**CWE:** CWE-1188 (Initialization with Hard-Coded Network Resource Configuration)
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#### Description
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Ghost MCP service shows a placeholder credential pattern:
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```yaml
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# Line 224
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environment:
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- GHOST_API_KEY=${GHOST_API_KEY:-your-api-key-here}
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```
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While this is a placeholder (not a real credential), it establishes a pattern that could lead to:
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- Developers committing real credentials
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- Default credentials being used in development
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#### Recommendation
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- Remove default values entirely
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- Fail fast if required variables not set
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- Use `${VAR:?VAR must be set}` pattern
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```yaml
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environment:
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- GHOST_API_KEY=${GHOST_API_KEY:?GHOST_API_KEY must be set}
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```
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---
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## Network Security Analysis
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### Network Configuration
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All services use default Docker networking (bridge). No custom networks defined.
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#### Recommendations
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1. Create isolated networks for service groups:
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```yaml
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networks:
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mcp-servers:
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driver: bridge
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lsp-servers:
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driver: bridge
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```
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2. Limit inter-service communication where not required
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---
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## Resource Limits
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### Current State
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No resource limits defined for any service.
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#### Risk
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- Resource exhaustion (memory/CPU)
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- Noisy neighbor problems
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- Potential denial of service
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#### Recommendation
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Add resource constraints:
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```yaml
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deploy:
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resources:
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limits:
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cpus: '0.5'
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memory: 512M
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reservations:
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memory: 256M
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```
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---
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## Health Checks
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### Current State
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No health checks defined.
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#### Recommendation
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Add health checks for monitoring:
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```yaml
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:8080/health"]
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interval: 30s
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timeout: 10s
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retries: 3
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start_period: 40s
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```
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---
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## Positive Findings
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1. **No host network mode** - Services use bridge networking
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2. **No privileged mode** - No containers run with `privileged: true`
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3. **Environment variables externalized** - Using `.env` file pattern
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4. **Read-only mounts where appropriate** - kubeconfig mounted read-only
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5. **Consistent container naming** - `kneldevstack-aimiddleware-` prefix
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---
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## Remediation Priority
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| Priority | Finding | Effort | Impact |
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|----------|---------|--------|--------|
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| 1 | Document privileged services | Low | High |
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| 2 | Add resource limits | Low | Medium |
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| 3 | Implement socket proxy for Docker access | Medium | High |
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| 4 | Remove default credential patterns | Low | Low |
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| 5 | Add health checks | Medium | Medium |
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| 6 | Create network segmentation | Medium | Medium |
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