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90 lines
3.8 KiB
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90 lines
3.8 KiB
Plaintext
= Known Issues =
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Below is a list of known issues in recent releases of Tahoe-LAFS, and how to
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manage them. The current version of this file can be found at
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http://allmydata.org/source/tahoe/trunk/docs/known_issues.txt
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Older versions of this document describing issues in older versions of
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Tahoe-LAFS can be found at
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http://allmydata.org/source/tahoe/trunk/docs/historical/historical_known_issues.txt
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== issues in Tahoe v1.3.0, released 2009-02-13 ==
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=== potential unauthorized access by JavaScript in unrelated files ===
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If you view a file stored in Tahoe through a web user interface,
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JavaScript embedded in that file might be able to access other files or
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directories stored in Tahoe which you view through the same web user
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interface. Such a script would be able to send the contents of those
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other files or directories to the author of the script, and if you have
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the ability to modify the contents of those files or directories, then
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that script could modify or delete those files or directories.
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==== how to manage it ====
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For future versions of Tahoe, we are considering ways to close off
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this leakage of authority while preserving ease of use -- the
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discussion of this issue is ticket #615.
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For the present, either do not view files stored in Tahoe through a web
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user interface, or turn off JavaScript in your web browser before doing
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so, or limit your viewing to files which you know don't contain
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malicious JavaScript.
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=== potential disclosure of file through embedded
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hyperlinks or JavaScript in that file ===
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If there is a file stored on a Tahoe storage grid, and that file gets
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downloaded and displayed in a web browser, then JavaScript or
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hyperlinks within that file can leak the capability to that file to a
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third party, which means that third party gets access to the file.
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If there is JavaScript in the file, then it could deliberately leak
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the capability to the file out to some remote listener.
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If there are hyperlinks in the file, and they get followed, then
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whichever server they point to receives the capability to the
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file. Note that IMG tags are typically followed automatically by web
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browsers, so being careful which hyperlinks you click on is not
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sufficient to prevent this from happening.
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==== how to manage it ====
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For future versions of Tahoe, we are considering ways to close off
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this leakage of authority while preserving ease of use -- the
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discussion of this issue is ticket #127.
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For the present, a good work-around is that if you want to store and
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view a file on Tahoe and you want that file to remain private, then
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remove from that file any hyperlinks pointing to other people's
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servers and remove any JavaScript unless you are sure that the
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JavaScript is not written to maliciously leak access.
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=== command-line arguments are leaked to other local users ===
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Remember that command-line arguments are visible to other users
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(through the 'ps' command, or the windows Process Explorer tool), so
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if you are using a Tahoe node on a shared host, other users on that
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host will be able to see (and capture) any directory caps that you set
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up with the "tahoe add-alias" command.
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==== how to manage it ====
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Bypass add-alias and edit the NODEDIR/private/aliases file directly,
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by adding a line like this:
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fun: URI:DIR2:ovjy4yhylqlfoqg2vcze36dhde:4d4f47qko2xm5g7osgo2yyidi5m4muyo2vjjy53q4vjju2u55mfa
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By entering the dircap through the editor, the command-line arguments are
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bypassed, and other users will not be able to see them. Once you've added the
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alias, no other secrets are passed through the command line, so this
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vulnerability becomes less significant: they can still see your filenames and
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other arguments you type there, but not the caps that Tahoe uses to permit
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access to your files and directories. In Tahoe v1.3.0, there is a new
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"tahoe create-aliase" command that does this for you.
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