= Known Issues =

Below is a list of known issues in recent releases of Tahoe-LAFS, and how to
manage them.  The current version of this file can be found at

http://allmydata.org/source/tahoe/trunk/docs/known_issues.txt

Older versions of this document describing issues in older versions of
Tahoe-LAFS can be found at

http://allmydata.org/source/tahoe/trunk/docs/historical/historical_known_issues.txt

== issues in Tahoe v1.3.0, not yet released ==

=== unauthorized access by JavaScript in other tabs/frames ===

If you use a web browser to view a javascript-bearing HTML document that is
served from a Tahoe node, then that javascript program can learn the access
caps for any other file or directory, served by the same Tahoe node, that you
are currently viewing in other tabs or frames. This is a consequence of the
common "Same Origin Policy" as applied to javascript and inter-frame access,
in which the browser mistakenly believes that two documents retrieved from
the same server should have access to each others DOM state. Note that some
browsers are quite enthusiastic about interpreting <script> tags inside
viewed files, even ones not marked as HTML.

The current recommended workaround is to close all Tahoe-served tabs and
frames before opening a Tahoe-served javascript-bearing HTML file.

Please see ticket #615 for more details:
http://allmydata.org/trac/tahoe/ticket/615

== issues in Tahoe v1.2.0, released 2008-06-21 ==

=== issue 1: potential disclosure of a file through embedded
hyperlinks or JavaScript in that file ===

If there is a file stored on a Tahoe storage grid, and that file gets
downloaded and displayed in a web browser, then JavaScript or
hyperlinks within that file can leak the capability to that file to a
third party, which means that third party gets access to the file.

If there is JavaScript in the file, then it could deliberately leak
the capability to the file out to some remote listener.

If there are hyperlinks in the file, and they get followed, then
whichever server they point to receives the capability to the
file. Note that IMG tags are typically followed automatically by web
browsers, so being careful which hyperlinks you click on is not
sufficient to prevent this from happening.

==== how to manage it ====

For future versions of Tahoe, we are considering ways to close off
this leakage of authority while preserving ease of use -- the
discussion of this issue is ticket #127.

For the present, a good work-around is that if you want to store and
view a file on Tahoe and you want that file to remain private, then
remove from that file any hyperlinks pointing to other people's
servers and remove any JavaScript unless you are sure that the
JavaScript is not written to maliciously leak access.


=== issue 10: command-line arguments are leaked to other processes ===

Remember that command-line arguments are visible to other users
(through the 'ps' command, or the windows Process Explorer tool), so
if you are using a Tahoe node on a shared host, other users on that
host will be able to see (and capture) any directory caps that you set
up with the "tahoe add-alias" command.

==== how to manage it ====

Bypass add-alias and edit the NODEDIR/private/aliases file directly,
by adding a line like this:

fun: URI:DIR2:ovjy4yhylqlfoqg2vcze36dhde:4d4f47qko2xm5g7osgo2yyidi5m4muyo2vjjy53q4vjju2u55mfa

By entering the dircap through the editor, the command-line arguments are
bypassed, and other users will not be able to see them. Once you've added the
alias, no other secrets are passed through the command line, so this
vulnerability becomes less significant: they can still see your filenames and
other arguments you type there, but not the caps that Tahoe uses to permit
access to your files and directories.  In Tahoe v1.3.0, there is a new
"tahoe create-aliase" command that does this for you.


== issues in Tahoe v1.1.0, released 2008-06-11 ==

=== issue 9: more than one file can match an immutable file cap ===

In Tahoe v1.0 and v1.1, a flaw in the cryptographic integrity check
makes it possible for the original uploader of an immutable file to
produce more than one immutable file matching the same capability, so
that different downloads using the same capability could result in
different files.  This flaw can be exploited only by the original
uploader of an immutable file, which means that it is not a severe
vulnerability: you can still rely on the integrity check to make sure
that the file you download with a given capability is a file that the
original uploader intended.  The only issue is that you can't assume
that every time you use the same capability to download a file you'll
get the same file.

==== how to manage it ====

This was fixed in Tahoe v1.2.0, released 2008-07-21, under ticket
#491.  Upgrade to that release of Tahoe and then you can rely on the
property that there is only one file that you can download using a
given capability.  If you are still using Tahoe v1.0 or v1.1, then
remember that the original uploader could produce multiple files that
match the same capability, so for example if someone gives you a
capability, and you use it to download a file, and you give that
capability to your friend, and he uses it to download a file, you and
your friend could get different files.


=== issue 8: server out of space when writing mutable file ===

If a v1.0 or v1.1 storage server runs out of disk space or is
otherwise unable to write to its local filesystem, then problems can
ensue.  For immutable files, this will not lead to any problem (the
attempt to upload that share to that server will fail, the partially
uploaded share will be deleted from the storage server's "incoming
shares" directory, and the client will move on to using another
storage server instead).

If the write was an attempt to modify an existing mutable file,
however, a problem will result: when the attempt to write the new
share fails (e.g. due to insufficient disk space), then it will be
aborted and the old share will be left in place.  If enough such old
shares are left, then a subsequent read may get those old shares and
see the file in its earlier state, which is a "rollback" failure.
With the default parameters (3-of-10), six old shares will be enough
to potentially lead to a rollback failure.

==== how to manage it ====

Make sure your Tahoe storage servers don't run out of disk space.
This means refusing storage requests before the disk fills up. There
are a couple of ways to do that with v1.1.

First, there is a configuration option named "sizelimit" which will
cause the storage server to do a "du" style recursive examination of
its directories at startup, and then if the sum of the size of files
found therein is greater than the "sizelimit" number, it will reject
requests by clients to write new immutable shares.

However, that can take a long time (something on the order of a minute
of examination of the filesystem for each 10 GB of data stored in the
Tahoe server), and the Tahoe server will be unavailable to clients
during that time.

Another option is to set the "readonly_storage" configuration option
on the storage server before startup.  This will cause the storage
server to reject all requests to upload new immutable shares.

Note that neither of these configurations affect mutable shares: even
if sizelimit is configured and the storage server currently has
greater space used than allowed, or even if readonly_storage is
configured, servers will continue to accept new mutable shares and
will continue to accept requests to overwrite existing mutable shares.

Mutable files are typically used only for directories, and are usually
much smaller than immutable files, so if you use one of these
configurations to stop the influx of immutable files while there is
still sufficient disk space to receive an influx of (much smaller)
mutable files, you may be able to avoid the potential for "rollback"
failure.

A future version of Tahoe will include a fix for this issue.  Here is
[http://allmydata.org/pipermail/tahoe-dev/2008-May/000630.html the
mailing list discussion] about how that future version will work.


=== issue 7: pyOpenSSL/Twisted defect causes false alarms in tests ===

The combination of Twisted v8.0 or Twisted v8.1 with pyOpenSSL v0.7
causes the Tahoe v1.1 unit tests to fail, even though the behavior of
Tahoe itself which is being tested is correct.

==== how to manage it ====

If you are using Twisted v8.0 or Twisted v8.1 and pyOpenSSL v0.7, then
please ignore ERROR "Reactor was unclean" in test_system and
test_introducer. Upgrading to a newer version of Twisted or pyOpenSSL
will cause those false alarms to stop happening (as will downgrading
to an older version of either of those packages).