This is all minor stuff: unreachable debug code (that should be commented-out
instead of in an 'if False:' block), unnecessary 'pass' and 'global'
statements, redundantly-initialized variables. No behavior changes. Nothing
here was actually broken, it just looked suspicious to the static analysis at
https://lgtm.com/projects/g/tahoe-lafs/tahoe-lafs/alerts/?mode=list .
This delegates the construction of the server Endpoint object to the i2p/tor
Provider, which can use the i2p/tor section of the config file to add options
which would be awkward to express as text in an endpoint descriptor string.
refs ticket:2889 (but note this merely makes room for a function to be
written that can process I2CP options, it does not actually handle such
options, so it does not close this ticket yet)
We use it for two things: to create the foolscap connection handler, and
to possibly start an .onion listener at startup.
This also updates node._common_config_sections to accept the new tor
settings written by create-node/create-introducer.
This enables an I2P-only node, which disables TCP entirely (instead of
mapping TCP to Tor, which was the only other option that
reveal-IP-address=False would allow).
closes ticket:2824
We now use::
tub.port = disabled
tub.location = disabled
instead of using an empty value (but the key still being present, since
if the key is missing entirely, that means "be automatic").
closes ticket:2816
This adds a safety flag named `[node] reveal-IP-address`, for which the
default value is True. When this is set to False, any configuration that
might reveal the node's IP address (to servers, or the external network)
will cause a PrivacyError to be raised at startup, terminating the node
before it gets a chance to betray the user's privacy. It also adds docs
and tests.
refs ticket:1010
This only catches txtorcon not being installed (which should be fixed by
doing `pip install tahoe-lafs[tor]`). It doesn't notice that the Tor
daemon is not running (which we can't detect during startup, only
afterwards, when it's harder to notify the user), in which case Tor
connections (and all connections when "tcp = tor" is enabled) will just
fail silently.
This introduces a py.test-based integration suite (currently just
containing magic-folder end-to-end tests). Also adds a tox environment
("integration") to run them.
The test setup is:
- a "flogtool gather" instance
- an Introducer
- five Storage nodes
- Alice and Bob client nodes
- Alice and Bob have paired magic-folders
Updated config docs. Added errors if we're not listening but were told
to enable storage, helper, or if we're the Introducer server.
closes ticket:2816
"gifts" are third-party references (where Alice sends Bob a reference to
Carol, and Carol lives in a different Tub than either Alice or Bob).
Tahoe doesn't currently use these, and they make it possible for e.g. a
server to provoke a client into making a connection to an IP address of
the server's choosing. If the client isn't configured otherwise, this
would use raw TCP (revealing the client's IP address) even if the
connection to the server used Tor.
A connection policy of `tcp: tor` would block this, but it seems like a
good idea to disable gifts entirely.
closes ticket:2810
Foolscap has limitations that prevent us from accepting anything but a
TCP endpoint, but that will change in the future, so make the tahoe.cfg
syntax accept an endpoint, but then reject non-TCP ones. See the ticket
for details: refs ticket:2813.
This depends upon the new `foolscap.connections.tor.socks_port(host,
port)` API in foolscap-0.12.2, so it bumps the dependency to that (the
previous commit depended upon 0.12.1, but I hadn't gotten around to
updating the dep before now).
