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Brian Warner 2011-10-31 05:08:31 +00:00
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85
docs/known_issues.rst
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@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ want to read `the "historical known issues" document`_.
Known Issues in Tahoe-LAFS v1.9.0, released 31-Oct-2011
=======================================================
* `Potential unauthorized access by JavaScript in unrelated files`_
* `Potential disclosure of file through embedded hyperlinks or JavaScript in that file`_
@ -239,3 +240,87 @@ Attackers can combine the above information with inferences based on timing
correlations. For instance, two files that are accessed close together in
time are likely to be related even if they are not linked in the directory
structure. Also, users that access the same files may be related to each other.
Known Issues in Tahoe-LAFS v1.8.2, released 30-Jan-2011
=======================================================
Unauthorized deletion of an immutable file by its storage index
---------------------------------------------------------------
Due to a flaw in the Tahoe-LAFS storage server software in v1.3.0 through
v1.8.2, a person who knows the "storage index" that identifies an immutable
file can cause the server to delete its shares of that file.
If an attacker can cause enough shares to be deleted from enough storage
servers, this deletes the file.
This vulnerability does not enable anyone to read file contents without
authorization (confidentiality), nor to change the contents of a file
(integrity).
A person could learn the storage index of a file in several ways:
1. By being granted the authority to read the immutable file—i.e. by being
granted a read capability to the file. They can determine the file's
storage index from its read capability.
2. By being granted a verify capability to the file. They can determine the
file's storage index from its verify capability. This case probably
doesn't happen often because users typically don't share verify caps.
3. By operating a storage server, and receiving a request from a client that
has a read cap or a verify cap. If the client attempts to upload,
download, or verify the file with their storage server, even if it doesn't
actually have the file, then they can learn the storage index of the file.
4. By gaining read access to an existing storage server's local filesystem,
and inspecting the directory structure that it stores its shares in. They
can thus learn the storage indexes of all files that the server is holding
at least one share of. Normally only the operator of an existing storage
server would be able to inspect its local filesystem, so this requires
either being such an operator of an existing storage server, or somehow
gaining the ability to inspect the local filesystem of an existing storage
server.
*how to manage it*
Tahoe-LAFS version v1.8.3 or newer (except v1.9a1) no longer has this flaw;
if you upgrade a storage server to a fixed release then that server is no
longer vulnerable to this problem.
Note that the issue is local to each storage server independently of other
storage servers—when you upgrade a storage server then that particular
storage server can no longer be tricked into deleting its shares of the
target file.
If you can't immediately upgrade your storage server to a version of
Tahoe-LAFS that eliminates this vulnerability, then you could temporarily
shut down your storage server. This would of course negatively impact
availability—clients would not be able to upload or download shares to that
particular storage server while it was shut down—but it would protect the
shares already stored on that server from being deleted as long as the server
is shut down.
If the servers that store shares of your file are running a version of
Tahoe-LAFS with this vulnerability, then you should think about whether
someone can learn the storage indexes of your files by one of the methods
described above. A person can not exploit this vulnerability unless they have
received a read cap or verify cap, or they control a storage server that has
been queried about this file by a client that has a read cap or a verify cap.
Tahoe-LAFS does not currently have a mechanism to limit which storage servers
can connect to your grid, but it does have a way to see which storage servers
have been connected to the grid. The Introducer's front page in the Web User
Interface has a list of all storage servers that the Introducer has ever seen
and the first time and the most recent time that it saw them. Each Tahoe-LAFS
gateway maintains a similar list on its front page in its Web User Interface,
showing all of the storage servers that it learned about from the Introducer,
when it first connected to that storage server, and when it most recently
connected to that storage server. These lists are stored in memory and are
reset to empty when the process is restarted.
See ticket `#1528`_ for technical details.
.. _#1528: https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1528

3
docs/quickstart.rst
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@ -21,8 +21,7 @@ might not be easy to set up on your platform. If the following
instructions don't Just Work without any further effort on your part,
then please write to `the tahoe-dev mailing list
<https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev>`_ where
friendly hackers will help you out. You might also find clues in the
`Advanced Installation`_ section described below.
friendly hackers will help you out.
Install Python
--------------

58
relnotes.txt
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@ -15,12 +15,12 @@ unique security and fault-tolerance properties:
https://tahoe-lafs.org/source/tahoe-lafs/trunk/docs/about.rst
The previous stable release of Tahoe-LAFS was v1.8.3, which was
released September 13, 2011 [1].
released September 13, 2011.
v1.9.0 offers a new mutable-file format (more efficient for
large files), a file-blacklisting feature, and a new
"drop-upload" feature. See the NEWS file [2] and
known_issues.rst [3] file for details.
"drop-upload" feature. See the NEWS file [3] and
known_issues.rst [4] file for details.
WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR?
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ have built other projects on top of Tahoe-LAFS and have
integrated Tahoe-LAFS with existing systems, including
Windows, JavaScript, iPhone, Android, Hadoop, Flume, Django,
Puppet, bzr, mercurial, perforce, duplicity, TiddlyWiki, and
more. See the Related Projects page on the wiki [4].
more. See the Related Projects page on the wiki [5].
We believe that strong cryptography, Free and Open Source
Software, erasure coding, and principled engineering practices
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ This software is developed under test-driven development, and
there are no known bugs or security flaws which would
compromise confidentiality or data integrity under recommended
use. (For all important issues that we are currently aware of
please see the known_issues.rst file [3].)
please see the known_issues.rst file [2].)
COMPATIBILITY
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ LICENCE
You may use this package under the GNU General Public License,
version 2 or, at your option, any later version. See the file
"COPYING.GPL" [5] for the terms of the GNU General Public
"COPYING.GPL" [4] for the terms of the GNU General Public
License, version 2.
You may use this package under the Transitive Grace Period
@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ version. (The Transitive Grace Period Public Licence has
requirements similar to the GPL except that it allows you to
delay for up to twelve months after you redistribute a derived
work before releasing the source code of your derived work.)
See the file "COPYING.TGPPL.rst" [6] for the terms of the
See the file "COPYING.TGPPL.rst" [5] for the terms of the
Transitive Grace Period Public Licence, version 1.
(You may choose to use this package under the terms of either
@ -93,24 +93,27 @@ INSTALLATION
Tahoe-LAFS works on Linux, Mac OS X, Windows, Solaris, *BSD,
and probably most other systems. Start with
"docs/quickstart.rst" [7].
"docs/quickstart.rst" [6].
HACKING AND COMMUNITY
Please join us on the mailing list [8]. Patches are gratefully
accepted -- the RoadMap page [9] shows the next improvements
that we plan to make and CREDITS [10] lists the names of people
who've contributed to the project. The Dev page [11] contains
Please join us on the mailing list [7]. Patches are gratefully
accepted -- the RoadMap page [8] shows the next improvements
that we plan to make and CREDITS [9] lists the names of people
who've contributed to the project. The Dev page [10] contains
resources for hackers.
SPONSORSHIP
Atlas Networks has contributed several hosted servers for
performance testing. Thank you to Atlas Networks for their
generous and public-spirited support.
performance testing. Thank you to Atlas Networks [11] for
their generous and public-spirited support.
And a special thanks to Least Authority Enterprises [12],
which employs several Tahoe-LAFS developers, for their
continued support.
HACK TAHOE-LAFS!
@ -118,7 +121,7 @@ If you can find a security flaw in Tahoe-LAFS which is serious
enough that we feel compelled to warn our users and issue a fix,
then we will award you with a customized t-shirts with your
exploit printed on it and add you to the "Hack Tahoe-LAFS Hall
Of Fame" [12].
Of Fame" [13].
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
@ -135,15 +138,16 @@ October 31, 2011
San Francisco, California, USA
[1] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/relnotes.txt?rev=5164
[2] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/trunk/NEWS.rst?rev=5352
[3] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/docs/known_issues.rst
[4] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/wiki/RelatedProjects
[5] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/COPYING.GPL
[6] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/COPYING.TGPPL.rst
[7] https://tahoe-lafs.org/source/tahoe/trunk/docs/quickstart.rst
[8] https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev
[9] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/roadmap
[10] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/trunk/CREDITS?rev=5352
[11] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/wiki/Dev
[12] https://tahoe-lafs.org/hacktahoelafs/
[1] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/trunk/NEWS.rst?rev=5356
[2] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/docs/known_issues.rst
[3] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/wiki/RelatedProjects
[4] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/COPYING.GPL
[5] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/COPYING.TGPPL.rst
[6] https://tahoe-lafs.org/source/tahoe/trunk/docs/quickstart.rst
[7] https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev
[8] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/roadmap
[9] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/trunk/CREDITS?rev=5356
[10] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/wiki/Dev
[11] http://atlasnetworks.us/
[12] http://leastauthority.com/
[13] https://tahoe-lafs.org/hacktahoelafs/