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incorporate dawuud's feedback
* remove anonymity-roadmap * remove old torsocks section * minor edits
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Brian Warner
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@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ Using Tahoe-LAFS with an anonymizing network: Tor, I2P
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#. `Server anonymity, automatic configuration`_
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#. `Performance and security issues`_
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#. `Torsocks: the old way of configuring Tahoe-LAFS to use Tor`_
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@ -166,7 +165,7 @@ configurations, or to enable automatic server setup.
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The default configuration will attempt to contact a local Tor/I2P daemon
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listening on the usual ports (9050/9150 for Tor, 7656 for I2P). As long as
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there is a daemon running on the local host, and the necessary support
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libraries were installed, clients will be able to user Tor-based servers
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libraries were installed, clients will be able to use Tor-based servers
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without any special configuration.
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However note that this default configuration does not improve the client's
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@ -259,8 +258,7 @@ Then, do the following:
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HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/tahoe
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HiddenServicePort 3000 127.0.0.1:2000
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* Restart Tor, with ``/etc/init.d/tor restart`` or a systemd command. Wait a
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few seconds.
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* Restart Tor, with ``systemctl restart tor``. Wait a few seconds.
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* Read the ``hostname`` file in the hidden service directory (e.g.
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``/var/lib/tor/tahoe/hostname``). This will be a ``.onion`` address, like
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@ -313,9 +311,9 @@ either launches a new Tor daemon, or has access to the Tor control port (and
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enough authority to create a new onion service).
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This option will set ``anonymous = true``, ``[connections] tcp = tor``. It
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will allocate the necessary ports, instruct Tor to create the onion service,
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obtain the ``.onion`` address, and populate ``tub.port`` and ``tub.location``
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correctly.
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will allocate the necessary ports, instruct Tor to create the onion service
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(saving the private key somewhere inside NODEDIR/private/), obtain the
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``.onion`` address, and populate ``tub.port`` and ``tub.location`` correctly.
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Performance and security issues
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@ -331,16 +329,23 @@ There are several trade-offs effected by this decision.
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NAT/Firewall penetration
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------------------------
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Making a server be reachable via Tor or I2P makes it reachable even if there
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are NATs or firewalls preventing direct TCP/IP connections to the server.
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Making a server be reachable via Tor or I2P makes it reachable (by
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Tor/I2P-capable clients) even if there are NATs or firewalls preventing
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direct TCP/IP connections to the server.
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Anonymity
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---------
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Making a Tahoe-LAFS server accessible *only* via Tor or I2P can be used to
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guarantee that the Tahoe-LAFS clients use Tor or I2P to connect. This prevents
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misconfigured clients from accidentally de-anonymizing themselves by connecting
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to your server through the traceable Internet.
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guarantee that the Tahoe-LAFS clients use Tor or I2P to connect
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(specifically, the server should only advertise Tor/I2P addresses in the
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``tub.location`` config key). This prevents misconfigured clients from
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accidentally de-anonymizing themselves by connecting to your server through
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the traceable Internet.
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Clearly, a server which is available as both a Tor/I2P service *and* a
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regular TCP address is not itself anonymous: the .onion address and the real
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IP address of the server are easily linkable.
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Also, interaction, through Tor, with a Tor Hidden Service may be more
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protected from network traffic analysis than interaction, through Tor,
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@ -399,113 +404,3 @@ routers, so that you can give back as you use I2P. This will never impair the
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performance of your Tahoe-LAFS node, because your I2P router will always
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prioritize your own traffic.
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Torsocks: the old way of configuring Tahoe-LAFS to use Tor
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==========================================================
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Before the native Tor integration for Tahoe-LAFS, users would use Torsocks.
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Please see these pages for more information about Torsocks:
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* https://code.google.com/p/torsocks/
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* https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/torsocks
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* https://github.com/dgoulet/torsocks/
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Starting And Stopping
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---------------------
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Assuming you have your Tahoe-LAFS node directory placed in **~/.tahoe**,
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use Torsocks to start Tahoe like this::
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usewithtor tahoe start
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Likewise if restarting, then with Torsocks like this::
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usewithtor tahoe restart
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After Tahoe is started, additional Tahoe commandline commands will not
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need to be executed with Torsocks because the Tahoe gateway long running
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process handles all the network connectivity.
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Configuration
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-------------
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Before Tahoe-LAFS had native Tor integration it would deanonymize the user if a
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``tub.location`` value is not set. This is because Tahoe-LAFS at that time
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defaulted to autodetecting the external IP interface and announced that IP
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address to the server.
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**Tahoe-LAFS + Torsocks client configuration**
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**NOTE:** before diving into Tor + Tahoe-LAFS configurations you should ensure
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your familiarity with with installing Tor on unix systems. If you intend to operate
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an anonymous Tahoe-LAFS storage node then you will also want to read about configuring
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Tor Hidden Services. See here:
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https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-unix.html.en
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https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en
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Run a node using ``torsocks``, in client-only mode (i.e. we can
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make outbound connections, but other nodes will not be able to connect
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to us). The literal '``client.fakelocation``' will not resolve, but will
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serve as a reminder to human observers that this node cannot be reached.
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"Don't call us.. we'll call you"::
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tub.port = tcp:interface=127.0.0.1:8098
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tub.location = client.fakelocation:0
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**Tahoe-LAFS + Torsocks storage server configuration**
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Run a node behind a Tor proxy, and make the server available as a Tor
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"hidden service". (This assumes that other clients are running their
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node with ``torsocks``, such that they are prepared to connect to a
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``.onion`` address.) Your instance of Tor should be configured for
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Hidden Services... for instance specify the Hidden Service listening on port
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29212 should proxy to 127.0.0.1 port 8098 by adding this to your ``torrc`` ::
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HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/services/tahoe-storage
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HiddenServicePort 29212 127.0.0.1:8098
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once Tor is restarted, the ``.onion`` hostname will be in
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``/var/lib/tor/services/tahoe-storage/hostname``. Then set up your
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``tahoe.cfg`` like::
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tub.port = tcp:interface=127.0.0.1:8098
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tub.location = ualhejtq2p7ohfbb.onion:29212
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**Troubleshooting**
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On some NetBSD systems, torsocks may segfault::
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$ torsocks telnet www.google.com 80
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Segmentation fault (core dumped)
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and backtraces show looping libc and syscalls::
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#7198 0xbbbda26e in *__socket30 (domain=2, type=1, protocol=6) at socket.c:64
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#7199 0xbb84baf9 in socket () from /usr/lib/libc.so.12
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#7200 0xbbbda19b in tsocks_socket (domain=2, type=1, protocol=6) at socket.c:56
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#7201 0xbbbda26e in *__socket30 (domain=2, type=1, protocol=6) at socket.c:64
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#7202 0xbb84baf9 in socket () from /usr/lib/libc.so.12
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[...etc...]
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This has to do with the nature of the torsocks socket() call wrapper being unaware
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of NetBSD's internal binary backwards compatibility.
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Information on a the first parts of a solution patch can be found in a tor-dev
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thread here from Thomas Klausner:
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* https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2013-November/005741.html
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As of this writing, torsocks still exists in the pkgsrc wip tree here:
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* http://pkgsrc.se/wip/torsocks
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but the NetBSD-specific patches have been merged upstream into torsocks as of commitid 6adfba809267d9c217906d6974468db22293ab9b:
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* https://gitweb.torproject.org/torsocks.git/commit/6adfba809267d9c217906d6974468db22293ab9b
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@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
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.. -*- coding: utf-8-with-signature; fill-column: 77 -*-
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==============================
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Anonymity Development Roadmap
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==============================
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Development phases
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==================
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Phase 1. Use Tor and I2P for network connectivity and to protect identity of client
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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**note:** Client side is endpoint agnostic and server side has TCP endpoint support only.
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**Dependencies**
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* txsocksx: get this merged upstream -->> https://github.com/david415/txsocksx/tree/endpoint_parsers_retry_socks - *client Twisted endpoint for Tor*
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* `Foolscap trac ticket 203`_: *switch to using Twisted Endpoints*
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* `Tahoe-LAFS trac ticket 1010`_: *anonymous client mode*
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* `Tahoe-LAFS trac ticket 517`_: *make tahoe Tor- and I2P-friendly*
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.. _`Foolscap trac ticket 203`: http://foolscap.lothar.com/trac/ticket/203
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.. _`Tahoe-LAFS trac ticket 1010`: https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1010
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.. _`Tahoe-LAFS trac ticket 517`: https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/517
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Phase 2. Endpoint-agnostic Foolscap server side
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-----------------------------------------------
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Completing these two tickets will make Foolscap endpoint agnostic
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on the server side. Therefore any Twisted server endpoint/parser
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can be used with Foolscap
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#. Teach twisted to serialize a listeningPort into a client endpoint
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descriptor - https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/7603
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#. open new foolscap ticket - Add getClientEndpoint() to use the feature
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from twisted trac ticket 7603
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Phase 3. Integrated Tor and I2P Hidden Service feature for storage servers
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------
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#. open new txtorcon ticket - Teach endpoint to use control port feature
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from tor trac ticket 11291
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#. open new txi2p ticket - Add support for starting a local instance
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