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mutable: verify incoming share signatures during Publish, it's not that expensive and it's a good idea

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Brian Warner 2007-11-08 14:02:36 -07:00
parent a4606d6560
commit 30a91c84c8
1 changed files with 7 additions and 5 deletions
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12
src/allmydata/mutable.py
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@ -745,11 +745,13 @@ class Publish:
(seqnum, root_hash, IV, k, N, segsize, datalen, (seqnum, root_hash, IV, k, N, segsize, datalen,
pubkey_s, signature, prefix) = r pubkey_s, signature, prefix) = r
# TODO: consider verifying the signature here. It's expensive. # self._pubkey is present because we require read-before-replace
# What can an attacker (in this case the server) accomplish? They valid = self._pubkey.verify(prefix, signature)
# could make us think that there's a newer version of the file if not valid:
# out there, which would cause us to throw self.log("WEIRD: bad signature from %s shnum %d" %
# UncoordinatedWriteError (i.e. it's a DoS attack). (shnum, idlib.shortnodeid_b2a(peerid)))
continue
share = (shnum, seqnum, root_hash) share = (shnum, seqnum, root_hash)
current_share_peers.add(shnum, (peerid, seqnum, root_hash) ) current_share_peers.add(shnum, (peerid, seqnum, root_hash) )