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mutable: verify incoming share signatures during Publish, it's not that expensive and it's a good idea
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@ -745,11 +745,13 @@ class Publish:
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(seqnum, root_hash, IV, k, N, segsize, datalen,
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pubkey_s, signature, prefix) = r
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# TODO: consider verifying the signature here. It's expensive.
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# What can an attacker (in this case the server) accomplish? They
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# could make us think that there's a newer version of the file
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# out there, which would cause us to throw
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# UncoordinatedWriteError (i.e. it's a DoS attack).
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# self._pubkey is present because we require read-before-replace
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valid = self._pubkey.verify(prefix, signature)
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if not valid:
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self.log("WEIRD: bad signature from %s shnum %d" %
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(shnum, idlib.shortnodeid_b2a(peerid)))
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continue
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share = (shnum, seqnum, root_hash)
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current_share_peers.add(shnum, (peerid, seqnum, root_hash) )
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