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Improved section on performance and security issues

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str4d 2015-09-22 03:42:58 +00:00 committed by Brian Warner
parent 24beb033d6
commit 21013284c9
1 changed files with 31 additions and 21 deletions
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docs/anonymity-configuration.rst
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@ -298,12 +298,12 @@ complete configuration for server use-case 2 would look like::
Performance and security issues with Tor Hidden Services Performance and security issues
======================================================== ===============================
If you are running a server which does not itself need to be If you are running a server which does not itself need to be
anonymous, should you make it reachable as a Tor Hidden Service or anonymous, should you make it reachable via an anonymizing network or
not? Or should you make it reachable *both* as a Tor Hidden Service not? Or should you make it reachable *both* via an anonymizing network
and as a publicly traceable TCP/IP server? and as a publicly traceable TCP/IP server?
There are several trade-offs effected by this decision. There are several trade-offs effected by this decision.
@ -311,18 +311,16 @@ There are several trade-offs effected by this decision.
NAT/Firewall penetration NAT/Firewall penetration
------------------------ ------------------------
Making a server be reachable as a Tor Hidden Service makes it Making a server be reachable via Tor or I2P makes it reachable even if there
reachable even if there are NATs or firewalls preventing direct TCP/IP are NATs or firewalls preventing direct TCP/IP connections to the server.
connections to the server.
Anonymity Anonymity
--------- ---------
Making a Tahoe-LAFS server accessible *only* via Tor Hidden Services Making a Tahoe-LAFS server accessible *only* via Tor or I2P can be used to
can be used to guarantee that the Tahoe-LAFS clients use Tor to guarantee that the Tahoe-LAFS clients use Tor or I2P to connect. This prevents
connect. This prevents misconfigured clients from accidentally misconfigured clients from accidentally de-anonymizing themselves by connecting
de-anonymizing themselves by connecting to your server through the to your server through the traceable Internet.
traceable Internet.
Also, interaction, through Tor, with a Tor Hidden Service may be more Also, interaction, through Tor, with a Tor Hidden Service may be more
protected from network traffic analysis than interaction, through Tor, protected from network traffic analysis than interaction, through Tor,
@ -334,13 +332,12 @@ If so we need to link to it. If not, then maybe we should explain more here why
Performance Performance
----------- -----------
A client connecting to a Tahoe-LAFS server through Tor incurs A client connecting to a publicly traceable Tahoe-LAFS server through Tor incurs
substantially higher latency and sometimes worse throughput than the substantially higher latency and sometimes worse throughput than the same client
same client connecting to the same server over a normal traceable connecting to the same server over a normal traceable TCP/IP connection.
TCP/IP connection.
A client connecting to a Tahoe-LAFS server which is a Tor Hidden A client connecting to a Tahoe-LAFS server which is a Tor Hidden Service or I2P
Service incurs much more latency and probably worse throughput. server incurs much more latency and probably worse throughput.
Positive and negative effects on other Tor users Positive and negative effects on other Tor users
------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------
@ -360,12 +357,25 @@ Both of these effects are doubled if you upload or download files to a
Tor Hidden Service, as compared to if you upload or download files Tor Hidden Service, as compared to if you upload or download files
over Tor to a publicly traceable TCP/IP server. over Tor to a publicly traceable TCP/IP server.
Positive and negative effects on other I2P users
------------------------------------------------
Sending your Tahoe-LAFS traffic over I2P adds cover traffic for other I2P users
who are also transmitting data. So that is good for them -- increasing their
anonymity. It will not directly impair the performance of other I2P users'
interactive sessions, because the I2P network has several congestion control and
quality-of-service features, such as prioritizing smaller packets.
Performance and security issues with I2P However, if many users are sending Tahoe-LAFS traffic over I2P, and do not have
======================================== their I2P routers configured to participate in much traffic, then the I2P
network as a whole will suffer degradation. Each Tahoe-LAFS router using I2P has
their own anonymizing tunnels that their data is sent through. On average, one
Tahoe-LAFS node requires 12 other I2P routers to participate in their tunnels.
TBC It is therefore important that your I2P router is sharing bandwidth with other
routers, so that you can give back as you use I2P. This will never impair the
performance of your Tahoe-LAFS node, because your I2P router will always
prioritize your own traffic.