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docs: edit about.html, add P.S. about expansion of LAFS, add Andrew Orlowski to media list

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Zooko O'Whielacronx 2009-07-21 19:24:30 -07:00
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docs/about.html
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<h1>Welcome to Tahoe-LAFS</h1>
<p>Welcome to Tahoe, the Least-Authority Filesystem. Tahoe-LAFS is the only secure cloud storage system. All of the source code is available under a choice of two Free Software, Open Source licences.</p>
<h2>The only secure cloud storage system?</h2>
<p>Every seller of cloud storage services will tell you that their service is secure. But what they mean by that is something fundamentally different from what we mean. What they mean by "secure" is that they try really hard not to misuse the power to read or alter your data. This turns out to be hard. Bugs, misconfigurations, and operator error can accidentally expose your data to another customer or to the public, or can corrupt your data. Criminals routinely gain illicit access to corporate servers. Most insidiously of all, employees of the service provider itself may read or alter your data out of carelessness, avarice, or mere curiousity. The most conscientious of these service providers spend considerable effort and expense trying to mitigate these threats.</p>
<p>What we mean by "security" is something different. <em>The service provider never has the ability to read or alter your data in the first place.</em> Never. If you store your data with Tahoe-LAFS, then all of the threats above are non-issues to you. Not only is it easy for the service provider to avoid exposing or corrupting your data, but in fact they couldn't do so if they tried.</p>
<p>Here's how it works.</p>
<p>Every seller of cloud storage services will tell you that their service is secure. But what they mean by that is something fundamentally different from what we mean. What they mean by "secure" is that they try really hard not to misuse the power to read or alter your data. This turns out to be hard. Bugs, misconfigurations, and operator error can accidentally expose your data to another customer or to the public, or can corrupt your data. Criminals routinely gain illicit access to corporate servers. Most insidiously of all, employees of the service provider itself may read or alter your data out of carelessness, avarice, or mere curiousity. The most conscientious of these service providers spend considerable effort and expense trying to mitigate these risks.</p>
<p>What we mean by "security" is something different. <em>The service provider never has the ability to read or alter your data in the first place.</em> Never. If you store your data with Tahoe-LAFS, then all of the threats described above are non-issues to you. Not only is it easy for the service provider to avoid exposing or corrupting your data, but in fact they couldn't do so if they tried.</p>
<p>All that, and we don't sacrifice convenience or ease-of-use! Here's how it works.</p>
<img src="http://allmydata.org/~zooko/network-and-reliance-topology.png"></img>

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docs/how_to_make_a_tahoe_release.txt
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8 make sure buildbot is green
9 make sure debs got built and uploaded properly
10 make sure a sumo sdist tarball got built and uploaded properly
11 send out relnotes.txt: tahoe-announce@lists.allmydata.org, tahoe-dev@lists.allmydata.org, p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com, lwn@lwn.net, cap-talk@mail.eros-os.org, cryptography@metzdown.com, twisted-python@twistedmatrix.com, fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, duplicity-talk@nongnu.org, news@phoronix.com, python-list@python.org, cygwin@cygwin.com, linked in cloud storage group, The Boulder Linux Users' Group, cryptopp-users@googlegroups.com, the "decentralization" group on groups.yahoo.com
12 update Wiki: x front page news, x news, old news, x parade of release notes
11 send out relnotes.txt: tahoe-announce@lists.allmydata.org, tahoe-dev@lists.allmydata.org, p2p-hackers@lists.zooko.com, lwn@lwn.net, cap-talk@mail.eros-os.org, cryptography@metzdown.com, twisted-python@twistedmatrix.com, fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, duplicity-talk@nongnu.org, news@phoronix.com, python-list@python.org, cygwin@cygwin.com, linked in cloud storage group, The Boulder Linux Users' Group, cryptopp-users@googlegroups.com, the "decentralization" group on groups.yahoo.com, andrew.orlowski@theregister.co.uk
12 update Wiki: front page news, news, old news, parade of release notes
13 update hacktahoe.org
14 update "current version" information and make an "announcement of new release" on freshmeat
15 upload to pypi with "python ./setup.py sdist upload register"

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relnotes.txt
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April 13, 2009
Boulder, Colorado, USA
P.S. Just kidding about that acronym. "LAFS" actually stands for
"Lightweight Authorization File System". Or possibly for
"Least-Authority File System". There is no truth to the rumour that it
actually stands for "Long-lived Axe-tolerant File System".
[1] http://allmydata.org/pipermail/tahoe-dev/2009-March/001461.html
[2] http://allmydata.org/trac/tahoe/browser/relnotes.txt?rev=3620
[3] http://allmydata.org/trac/tahoe/browser/NEWS?rev=3835