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known_issues.txt: add issue #491 and renumber issues
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@ -6,7 +6,34 @@ to manage them.
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== issues in Tahoe v1.1.0, released 2008-06-11 ==
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=== issue 1: server out of space when writing mutable file ===
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=== issue 9: more than one file can match an immutable file cap ===
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In Tahoe v1.0 and v1.1.0, a flaw in the cryptographic integrity check
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makes it possible for the original uploader of an immutable file to
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produce more than one immutable file matching the same capability, so
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that different downloads using the same capability could result in
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different files. This flaw can be exploited only by the original
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uploader of an immutable file, which means that it is not a severe
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vulnerability. You can still rely on the integrity check to make sure
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that the file you download with a given capability is a file that the
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original uploader intended. The flaw is that the integrity check does
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not also provide the guarantee that the original uploader could have
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uploaded only one file per capability.
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==== how to manage it ====
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This was fixed in Tahoe v1.1.1, released 2008-07-21, under ticket
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#491. Upgrade to that release of Tahoe and then you can rely on the
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property that there is only one file that you can download using a
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given capability. If you are still using Tahoe v1.0.0 or v1.1.0, then
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remember that the original uploader could produce multiple files that
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match the same capability, so for example if someone gives you a
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capability, and you use it to download a file, and you give that
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capability to your friend, and he uses it to download a file, you and
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your friend could get different files.
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=== issue 8: server out of space when writing mutable file ===
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If a v1.0 or v1.1.0 storage server runs out of disk space or is
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otherwise unable to write to its local filesystem, then problems can
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@ -64,9 +91,7 @@ A future version of Tahoe will include a fix for this issue. Here is
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mailing list discussion] about how that future version will work.
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== issues in Tahoe v1.1.0 and v1.0.0 ==
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=== issue 2: pyOpenSSL/Twisted defect causes false alarms in tests ===
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=== issue 7: pyOpenSSL/Twisted defect causes false alarms in tests ===
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The combination of Twisted v8 and pyOpenSSL v0.7 causes the Tahoe v1.1
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unit tests to fail, even though the behavior of Tahoe itself which is
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@ -84,7 +109,7 @@ those false alarms to stop happening.
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(Tahoe v1.0 was superceded by v1.1 which was released 2008-06-11.)
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=== issue 3: server out of space when writing mutable file ===
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=== issue 6: server out of space when writing mutable file ===
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In addition to the problems caused by insufficient disk space
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described above, v1.0 clients which are writing mutable files when the
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@ -98,7 +123,7 @@ write to their local filesystem (including that there is space
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available) as described in "issue 1" above.
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=== issue 4: server out of space when writing immutable file ===
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=== issue 5: server out of space when writing immutable file ===
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Tahoe v1.0 clients are using v1.0 servers which are unable to write to
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their filesystem during an immutable upload will correctly detect the
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@ -115,7 +140,7 @@ always able to write to their local filesystem (including that there
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is space available) as described in "issue 1" above.
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=== issue 5: large directories or mutable files of certain sizes ===
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=== issue 4: large directories or mutable files of certain sizes ===
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If a client attempts to upload a large mutable file with a size
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greater than about 3,139,000 and less than or equal to 3,500,000 bytes
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@ -142,7 +167,7 @@ to v1.1 but the client is still v1.0 then the client will still suffer
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this failure.)
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=== issue 6: uploading files greater than 12 GiB ===
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=== issue 3: uploading files greater than 12 GiB ===
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If a Tahoe v1.0 client uploads a file greater than 12 GiB in size, the file will
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be silently corrupted so that it is not retrievable, but the client will think
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@ -157,7 +182,7 @@ Tahoe storage grid. Tahoe v1.1 clients will refuse to upload files larger than
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limitation so that larger files can be uploaded.
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=== issue 7: pycryptopp defect resulting in data corruption ===
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=== issue 2: pycryptopp defect resulting in data corruption ===
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Versions of pycryptopp earlier than pycryptopp-0.5.0 had a defect
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which, when compiled with some compilers, would cause AES-256
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@ -176,7 +201,7 @@ test}}}. If the tests pass, then your compiler does not trigger this
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failure.
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=== issue 8: potential disclosure of a file through embedded
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=== issue 1: potential disclosure of a file through embedded
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hyperlinks or JavaScript in that file ===
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If there is a file stored on a Tahoe storage grid, and that file gets
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@ -204,5 +229,3 @@ view a file on Tahoe and you want that file to remain private, then
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remove from that file any hyperlinks pointing to other people's
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servers and remove any JavaScript unless you are sure that the
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JavaScript is not written to maliciously leak access.
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