2014-09-05 00:24:36 +00:00
.. -*- coding: utf-8-with-signature; fill-column: 77 -* -
=============================
Anonymity Development Roadmap
=============================
Development phases
==================
2014-09-05 00:30:19 +00:00
1. Use Tor for network connectivity and protect identity of client
2014-09-05 00:24:36 +00:00
**note:** Client side is endpoint agnostic and server side has TCP endpoint support.
2014-09-05 00:30:19 +00:00
**Dependencies** ::
* txsocksx: get this merged upstream -->> https://github.com/david415/txsocksx/tree/endpoint_parsers_retry_socks
* foolscap#203
* #1010
* #517
2014-09-05 00:24:36 +00:00
2014-09-05 00:30:19 +00:00
2. Use I2p for network connectivity and protect identity of client
2014-09-05 00:24:36 +00:00
* txi2p
2014-09-05 01:14:22 +00:00
* Add "endpoint parameters" to Tahoe
* Servers provide the minimum client endpoint string required to connect to them:
* `` tcp:example.org:1337 ``
* `` ssl:example.org:443 ``
* `` i2p:longstring.b32.i2p ``
* Clients may need to extend the strings with client-specific per-type parameters in order to successfully connect:
* `` tcp:example.org:1337:timeout=60 ``
* `` ssl:example.org:443:caCertsDir=/etc/ssl/certs ``
* `` i2p:longstring.b32.i2p:tunnelNick=tahoe:inport=10000 ``
* These should be set in `` tahoe.cfg `` :
* `` [node]clientEndpointParams = tcp:timeout=60,ssl:caCertsDir=/etc/ssl/certs,i2p:tunnelNick=tahoe:inport=10000 ``
* Tahoe parses, keeps an internal map, applies the relevant params to a client endpoint string before connecting
* Client endpoint string whitelisting
* Server publishes an endpoint string for a client to connect to
* A malicious server could publish strings containing client-specific parameters that compromise the user
* Unsure what parameters could actually be used maliciously on their own, but definitely possible in concert with other attacks.
* The client should not accept strings that contain client-specific parameters
* How to tell the difference? Tahoe can't keep a list of everything that is safe.
* Maybe an endpoint API method that takes a client endpoint string and returns a safe one.
2014-09-05 00:24:36 +00:00
3. endpoint-agnostic Foolscap server side
2014-09-05 00:30:19 +00:00
Completing these two tickets will make Foolscap endpoint agnostic on the server side. Therefore any Twisted server endpoint/parser can be used with Foolscap
2014-09-05 00:24:36 +00:00
* teach twisted to serialize a listeningPort into a client endpoint descriptor - https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/7603
* new foolscap ticket - Add getClientEndpoint() to use the feature from twisted trac ticket 7603
4. Integrated Tor Hidden Service feature for storage servers
* teach tor to create Hidden Service directories with group rx perms https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/11291
* new txtorcon ticket - Teach endpoint to use control port feature from tor trac ticket 11291
