serval-dna/dataformats.c
Andrew Bettison 4450116472 Refactor string functions, add str_fromprint()
Move lots of non-Serval-specific string functions from "serval.h"/dataformats.c
to "str.h"/str.c.

Add str_fromprint() function that reverses the effect of toprint(): interprets
escape sequences in the source string "\n\t\r\0\xHH\\" and replaces them with a
single char in the destination string.
2012-11-07 16:42:45 +10:30

314 lines
7.7 KiB
C

/*
Serval Distributed Numbering Architecture (DNA)
Copyright (C) 2010 Paul Gardner-Stephen
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
*/
#include "serval.h"
#include "rhizome.h"
#include "str.h"
#include <ctype.h>
int str_is_subscriber_id(const char *sid)
{
size_t len = 0;
return strn_is_subscriber_id(sid, &len) && sid[len] == '\0';
}
int strn_is_subscriber_id(const char *sid, size_t *lenp)
{
if (strncasecmp(sid, "broadcast", 9) == 0) {
if (lenp)
*lenp = 9;
return 1;
}
if (is_xsubstring(sid, SID_STRLEN)) {
if (lenp)
*lenp = SID_STRLEN;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int rhizome_strn_is_manifest_id(const char *id)
{
return is_xsubstring(id, RHIZOME_MANIFEST_ID_STRLEN);
}
int rhizome_str_is_manifest_id(const char *id)
{
return is_xstring(id, RHIZOME_MANIFEST_ID_STRLEN);
}
int rhizome_strn_is_bundle_key(const char *key)
{
return is_xsubstring(key, RHIZOME_BUNDLE_KEY_STRLEN);
}
int rhizome_str_is_bundle_key(const char *key)
{
return is_xstring(key, RHIZOME_BUNDLE_KEY_STRLEN);
}
int rhizome_strn_is_bundle_crypt_key(const char *key)
{
return is_xsubstring(key, RHIZOME_CRYPT_KEY_STRLEN);
}
int rhizome_str_is_bundle_crypt_key(const char *key)
{
return is_xstring(key, RHIZOME_CRYPT_KEY_STRLEN);
}
int rhizome_strn_is_file_hash(const char *hash)
{
return is_xsubstring(hash, RHIZOME_FILEHASH_STRLEN);
}
int rhizome_str_is_file_hash(const char *hash)
{
return is_xstring(hash, RHIZOME_FILEHASH_STRLEN);
}
int str_is_did(const char *did)
{
size_t len = 0;
return strn_is_did(did, &len) && did[len] == '\0';
}
int is_didchar(char c)
{
return isdigit(c) || c == '*' || c == '#' || c == '+';
}
int strn_is_did(const char *did, size_t *lenp)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < DID_MAXSIZE && is_didchar(did[i]); ++i)
;
if (i < DID_MINSIZE)
return 0;
if (lenp)
*lenp = i;
return 1;
}
int extractDid(unsigned char *packet,int *ofs,char *did)
{
int d=0;
int highP=1;
int nybl;
nybl=0;
while(nybl!=0xf&&(*ofs<(OFS_SIDDIDFIELD+SIDDIDFIELD_LEN))&&(d<64))
{
if (highP) nybl=packet[*ofs]>>4; else nybl=packet[*ofs]&0xf;
if (nybl<0xa) did[d++]='0'+nybl;
else
switch(nybl) {
case 0xa: did[d++]='*'; break;
case 0xb: did[d++]='#'; break;
case 0xc: did[d++]='+'; break;
}
if (highP) highP=0; else { (*ofs)++; highP=1; }
}
if (d>63) return WHY("DID too long");
did[d]=0;
return 0;
}
int stowDid(unsigned char *packet,int *ofs,char *did)
{
int highP=1;
int nybl;
int d=0;
int len=0;
if (debug&DEBUG_PACKETFORMATS) printf("Packing DID \"%s\"\n",did);
while(did[d]&&(d<DID_MAXSIZE))
{
switch(did[d])
{
case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3': case '4':
case '5': case '6': case '7': case '8': case '9':
nybl=did[d]-'0'; break;
case '*': nybl=0xa; break;
case '#': nybl=0xb; break;
case '+': nybl=0xc; break;
default:
WHY("Illegal digits in DID number");
return -1;
}
if (highP) { packet[*ofs]=nybl<<4; highP=0; }
else {
packet[(*ofs)++]|=nybl; highP=1;
len++;
}
d++;
}
if (d>=DID_MAXSIZE)
{
WHY("DID number too long");
return -1;
}
/* Append end of number code, filling the whole byte for fast and easy comparison */
if (highP) packet[(*ofs)++]=0xff;
else packet[(*ofs)++]|=0x0f;
len++;
/* Fill remainder of field with randomness to protect any encryption */
for(;len<SID_SIZE;len++) packet[(*ofs)++]=random()&0xff;
return 0;
}
int extractSid(const unsigned char *packet, int *ofs, char *sid)
{
(void) tohex(sid, packet + *ofs, SID_SIZE);
*ofs += SID_SIZE;
return 0;
}
int stowSid(unsigned char *packet, int ofs, const char *sid)
{
if (debug & DEBUG_PACKETFORMATS)
printf("stowing SID \"%s\"\n", sid);
if (strcasecmp(sid,"broadcast") == 0)
memset(packet + ofs, 0xff, SID_SIZE);
else if (fromhex(packet + ofs, sid, SID_SIZE) != SID_SIZE || sid[SID_STRLEN] != '\0')
return WHY("invalid SID");
return 0;
}
int packetGetID(unsigned char *packet,int len,char *did,char *sid)
{
int ofs=HEADERFIELDS_LEN;
switch(packet[ofs])
{
case 0: /* DID */
ofs++;
if (extractDid(packet,&ofs,did)) return WHY("Could not decode DID");
if (debug&DEBUG_PACKETFORMATS) DEBUGF("Decoded DID as %s", did);
return 0;
break;
case 1: /* SID */
ofs++;
if (len<(OFS_SIDDIDFIELD+SID_SIZE)) return WHY("Packet too short");
if (extractSid(packet,&ofs,sid)) return WHY("Could not decode SID");
return 0;
break;
default: /* no idea */
return WHY("Unknown ID key");
break;
}
return WHY("Impossible event #1 just occurred");
}
/*
One of the goals of our packet format is to make it very difficult to mount a known plain-text
attack against the ciphered part of the packet.
One defence is to make sure that no fixed fields are actually left zero.
We accomplish this by filling "zero" fields with randomised data that meets a simple test condition.
We have chosen to use the condition that if the modulo 256 sum of the bytes equals zero, then the packet
is assumed to be zero/empty.
The following two functions allow us to test this, and also to fill a field with safe "zero" data.
*/
int isFieldZeroP(unsigned char *packet,int start,int count)
{
int mod=0;
int i;
for(i=start;i<start+count;i++)
{
mod+=packet[i];
mod&=0xff;
}
if (debug&DEBUG_PACKETFORMATS) {
if (mod) DEBUGF("Field [%d,%d) is non-zero (mod=0x%02x)",start,start+count,mod);
else DEBUGF("Field [%d,%d) is zero",start,start+count);
}
if (mod) return 0; else return 1;
}
int safeZeroField(unsigned char *packet,int start,int count)
{
int mod=0;
int i;
if (debug&DEBUG_PACKETFORMATS)
DEBUGF("Known plain-text counter-measure: safe-zeroing [%d,%d)", start,start+count);
for(i=start;i<(start+count-1);i++)
{
packet[i]=random()&0xff;
mod+=packet[i];
mod&=0xff;
}
/* set final byte so that modulo sum is zero */
packet[i]=(0x100-mod)&0xff;
return 0;
}
int is_uri_char_scheme(char c)
{
return isalpha(c) || isdigit(c) || c == '+' || c == '-' || c == '.';
}
int is_uri_char_unreserved(char c)
{
return isalpha(c) || isdigit(c) || c == '-' || c == '.' || c == '_' || c == '~';
}
int is_uri_char_reserved(char c)
{
switch (c) {
case ':': case '/': case '?': case '#': case '[': case ']': case '@':
case '!': case '$': case '&': case '\'': case '(': case ')':
case '*': case '+': case ',': case ';': case '=':
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Return true if the string resembles a URI.
Based on RFC-3986 generic syntax, assuming nothing about the hierarchical part.
@author Andrew Bettison <andrew@servalproject.com>
*/
int str_is_uri(const char *uri)
{
const char *p = uri;
// Scheme is ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "-" / "." )
if (!isalpha(*p++))
return 0;
while (is_uri_char_scheme(*p))
++p;
// Scheme is followed by colon ":".
if (*p++ != ':')
return 0;
// Hierarchical part must contain only valid characters.
const char *q = p;
while (is_uri_char_unreserved(*p) || is_uri_char_reserved(*p))
++p;
return p != q && *p == '\0';
}