mirror of
https://github.com/servalproject/serval-dna.git
synced 2024-12-30 01:48:54 +00:00
45442d3eb4
Replaced 'int has_author' manifest element with new 'enum authorship' element to record the result of author authentication, to avoid repeating expensive crypto operations. Separated the handling of bundle secret arguments from author lookup and authentication. The new rhizome_apply_bundle_secret(m,bsk) is now called at the top level to set the manifest secret key (if it validates), and thereafter there is no need to pass the 'bsk' argument to any other functions, as they can simply check the 'haveSecret' field of the manifest. Removed rhizome_extract_privatekey() which combined author lookup and bundle secret validation, and replaced it with functions that only deal with the author: rhizome_lookup_author() and rhizome_authenticate_author(). Renamed other functions to make their purpose and effect clearer. Formalised the semantics of only storing AUTHENTICATED author SIDs in the 'author' column of the MANIFESTS table, which necessitated a change to a 'rhizomeops' test case: when adding a file using a BK-less manifest, the author column is set to null, so the Rhizome list output does not show the bundle as ".fromhere" and does not give an author for that bundle.
313 lines
9.6 KiB
C
313 lines
9.6 KiB
C
/*
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Serval Distributed Numbering Architecture (DNA)
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Copyright (C) 2010 Paul Gardner-Stephen
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This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
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as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
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of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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GNU General Public License for more details.
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
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*/
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include "serval.h"
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#include "conf.h"
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#include "str.h"
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#include "rhizome.h"
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int is_rhizome_enabled()
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{
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return config.rhizome.enable;
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}
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int is_rhizome_http_enabled()
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{
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return config.rhizome.enable
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&& config.rhizome.http.enable
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&& rhizome_db;
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}
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int is_rhizome_mdp_enabled()
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{
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return config.rhizome.enable
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&& config.rhizome.mdp.enable
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&& rhizome_db;
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}
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int is_rhizome_mdp_server_running()
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{
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return is_rhizome_mdp_enabled();
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}
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int is_rhizome_advertise_enabled()
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{
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return config.rhizome.enable
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&& config.rhizome.advertise.enable
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&& rhizome_db
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&& (is_rhizome_http_server_running() || is_rhizome_mdp_server_running());
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}
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int rhizome_fetch_delay_ms()
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{
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return config.rhizome.fetch_delay_ms;
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}
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/* Import a bundle from a pair of files, one containing the manifest and the optional other
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containing the payload. The logic is all in rhizome_bundle_import(). This function just wraps
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that function and manages file and object buffers and lifetimes.
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*/
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int rhizome_bundle_import_files(rhizome_manifest *m, const char *manifest_path, const char *filepath)
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{
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if (config.debug.rhizome)
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DEBUGF("(manifest_path=%s, filepath=%s)",
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manifest_path ? alloca_str_toprint(manifest_path) : "NULL",
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filepath ? alloca_str_toprint(filepath) : "NULL");
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unsigned char buffer[MAX_MANIFEST_BYTES];
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size_t buffer_len = 0;
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// manifest has been appended to the end of the file.
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if (strcmp(manifest_path, filepath)==0){
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unsigned char marker[4];
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int ret=0;
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FILE *f = fopen(filepath, "r");
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if (f == NULL)
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return WHYF_perror("Could not open manifest file %s for reading.", filepath);
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if (fseek(f, -sizeof(marker), SEEK_END))
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ret=WHY_perror("Unable to seek to end of file");
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if (ret==0){
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ret = fread(marker, 1, sizeof(marker), f);
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if (ret==sizeof(marker))
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ret=0;
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else
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ret=WHY_perror("Unable to read end of manifest marker");
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}
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if (ret==0){
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if (marker[2]!=0x41 || marker[3]!=0x10)
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ret=WHYF("Expected 0x4110 marker at end of file");
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}
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if (ret==0){
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buffer_len = read_uint16(marker);
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if (buffer_len < 1 || buffer_len > MAX_MANIFEST_BYTES)
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ret=WHYF("Invalid manifest length %zd", buffer_len);
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}
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if (ret==0){
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if (fseek(f, -(buffer_len+sizeof(marker)), SEEK_END))
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ret=WHY_perror("Unable to seek to end of file");
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}
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if (ret==0){
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ret = fread(buffer, 1, buffer_len, f);
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if (ret==buffer_len)
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ret=0;
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else
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ret=WHY_perror("Unable to read manifest contents");
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}
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fclose(f);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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manifest_path=(char*)buffer;
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}
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if (rhizome_read_manifest_file(m, manifest_path, buffer_len) == -1)
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return WHY("could not read manifest file");
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if (rhizome_manifest_verify(m))
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return WHY("could not verify manifest");
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/* Make sure we store signatures */
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// TODO, why do we need this? Why isn't the state correct from rhizome_read_manifest_file?
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// This feels like a hack...
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m->manifest_bytes=m->manifest_all_bytes;
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/* Do we already have this manifest or newer? */
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int64_t dbVersion = -1;
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if (sqlite_exec_int64(&dbVersion, "SELECT version FROM MANIFESTS WHERE id = ?;", RHIZOME_BID_T, &m->cryptoSignPublic, END) == -1)
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return WHY("Select failure");
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if (dbVersion>=m->version)
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return 2;
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int status = rhizome_import_file(m, filepath);
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if (status<0)
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return status;
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return rhizome_add_manifest(m, 1);
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}
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int rhizome_manifest_check_sanity(rhizome_manifest *m)
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{
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/* Ensure manifest meets basic sanity checks. */
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if (m->filesize == RHIZOME_SIZE_UNSET)
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return WHY("Manifest missing 'filesize' field");
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if (m->filesize && rhizome_filehash_t_is_zero(m->filehash))
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return WHY("Manifest 'filehash' field has not been set");
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if (m->service == NULL || !m->service[0])
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return WHY("Manifest missing 'service' field");
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if (!m->has_date)
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return WHY("Manifest missing 'date' field");
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if (m->version == 0)
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return WHY("Manifest must have a version number");
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if (strcasecmp(m->service, RHIZOME_SERVICE_FILE) == 0) {
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if (m->name == NULL)
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return WHY("Manifest missing 'name' field");
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} else if (strcasecmp(m->service, RHIZOME_SERVICE_MESHMS) == 0
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|| strcasecmp(m->service, RHIZOME_SERVICE_MESHMS2) == 0) {
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if (!m->has_sender)
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return WHY("MeshMS Manifest missing 'sender' field");
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if (!m->has_recipient)
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return WHY("MeshMS Manifest missing 'recipient' field");
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} else {
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return WHYF("Invalid service=%s", m->service);
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}
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if (config.debug.rhizome)
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DEBUGF("sender=%s", m->has_sender ? alloca_tohex_sid_t(m->sender) : "(null)");
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/* passes all sanity checks */
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return 0;
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}
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/* Sets the bundle key "BK" field of a manifest. Returns 1 if the field was set, 0 if not.
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*
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* This function must not be called unless the bundle secret is known.
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*
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* @author Andrew Bettison <andrew@servalproject.com>
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*/
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int rhizome_manifest_add_bundle_key(rhizome_manifest *m)
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{
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IN();
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assert(m->haveSecret);
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switch (m->authorship) {
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case ANONYMOUS: // there can be no BK field without an author
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case AUTHOR_UNKNOWN: // we already know the author is not in the keyring
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case AUTHENTICATION_ERROR: // already tried and failed to get Rhizome Secret
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break;
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case AUTHOR_NOT_CHECKED:
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case AUTHOR_LOCAL:
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case AUTHOR_AUTHENTIC:
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case AUTHOR_IMPOSTOR: {
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/* Set the BK using the provided author. Serval Security Framework defines BK as being:
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* BK = privateKey XOR sha512(RS##BID)
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* where BID = cryptoSignPublic,
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* RS is the rhizome secret for the specified author.
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* The nice thing about this specification is that:
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* privateKey = BK XOR sha512(RS##BID)
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* so the same function can be used to encrypt and decrypt the BK field.
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*/
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const unsigned char *rs;
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size_t rs_len = 0;
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enum rhizome_secret_disposition d = find_rhizome_secret(&m->author, &rs_len, &rs);
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switch (d) {
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case FOUND_RHIZOME_SECRET: {
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rhizome_bk_t bkey;
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if (rhizome_secret2bk(&m->cryptoSignPublic, rs, rs_len, bkey.binary, m->cryptoSignSecret) == 0) {
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rhizome_manifest_set_bundle_key(m, &bkey);
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m->authorship = AUTHOR_AUTHENTIC;
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RETURN(1);
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} else
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m->authorship = AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
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}
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break;
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case IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND:
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m->authorship = AUTHOR_UNKNOWN;
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break;
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case IDENTITY_HAS_NO_RHIZOME_SECRET:
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m->authorship = AUTHENTICATION_ERROR;
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break;
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default:
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FATALF("find_rhizome_secret() returned unknown code %d", (int)d);
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break;
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}
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}
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break;
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default:
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FATALF("m->authorship = %d", (int)m->authorship);
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}
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rhizome_manifest_del_bundle_key(m);
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switch (m->authorship) {
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case AUTHOR_UNKNOWN:
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WHYF("Cannot set BK because author=%s is not in keyring", alloca_tohex_sid_t(m->author));
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break;
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case AUTHENTICATION_ERROR:
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WHY("Cannot set BK due to error");
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break;
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default:
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break;
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}
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RETURN(0);
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}
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int rhizome_add_manifest(rhizome_manifest *m, int ttl)
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{
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if (config.debug.rhizome)
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DEBUGF("rhizome_add_manifest(m=%p, ttl=%d)",m, ttl);
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if (m->finalised==0)
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return WHY("Manifest must be finalised before being stored");
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/* Store time to live, clamped to within legal range */
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m->ttl = ttl < 0 ? 0 : ttl > 254 ? 254 : ttl;
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if (rhizome_manifest_check_sanity(m))
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return -1;
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assert(m->filesize != RHIZOME_SIZE_UNSET);
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if (m->filesize > 0 && !rhizome_exists(&m->filehash))
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return WHY("File has not been imported");
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/* If the manifest already has an ID */
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if (rhizome_bid_t_is_zero(m->cryptoSignPublic))
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return WHY("Manifest does not have an ID");
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/* Discard the new manifest unless it is newer than the most recent known version with the same ID */
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int64_t storedversion = -1;
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switch (sqlite_exec_int64(&storedversion, "SELECT version FROM MANIFESTS WHERE id = ?;", RHIZOME_BID_T, &m->cryptoSignPublic, END)) {
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case -1:
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return WHY("Select failed");
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case 0:
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if (config.debug.rhizome) DEBUG("No existing manifest");
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break;
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case 1:
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if (config.debug.rhizome)
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DEBUGF("Found existing version=%"PRId64", new version=%"PRId64, storedversion, m->version);
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if (m->version < storedversion)
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return WHY("Newer version exists");
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if (m->version == storedversion)
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return WHYF("Already have %s:%"PRId64", not adding", alloca_tohex_rhizome_bid_t(m->cryptoSignPublic), m->version);
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break;
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default:
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return WHY("Select found too many rows!");
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}
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/* Okay, it is written, and can be put directly into the rhizome database now */
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return rhizome_store_bundle(m);
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}
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/* When voice traffic is being carried, we need to throttle Rhizome down
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to a more sensible level. Or possibly even supress it entirely.
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*/
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time_ms_t rhizome_voice_timeout = -1;
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int rhizome_saw_voice_traffic()
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{
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/* We are in "voice mode" for a second after sending a voice frame */
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rhizome_voice_timeout=gettime_ms()+1000;
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return 0;
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}
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