mirror of
https://github.com/servalproject/serval-dna.git
synced 2024-12-20 21:53:12 +00:00
3b1ae5cbb0
To support release signing operations without having to copy the release keyring from its USB stick (into an instance directory), and reducing the risk of corrupting the release keyring file while using it in-place.
1691 lines
57 KiB
C
1691 lines
57 KiB
C
/*
|
|
Copyright (C) 2010-2012 Paul Gardner-Stephen, Serval Project.
|
|
|
|
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
|
|
modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
|
|
as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2
|
|
of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
|
|
|
|
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
|
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
|
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
|
GNU General Public License for more details.
|
|
|
|
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
|
|
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
|
|
Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
|
#include <assert.h>
|
|
#include "constants.h"
|
|
#include "serval.h"
|
|
#include "str.h"
|
|
#include "mem.h"
|
|
#include "rotbuf.h"
|
|
#include "conf.h"
|
|
#include "rhizome.h"
|
|
#include "nacl.h"
|
|
#include "overlay_address.h"
|
|
|
|
static int _keyring_open(keyring_file *k, const char *path, const char *mode)
|
|
{
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("opening %s in \"%s\" mode", alloca_str_toprint(path), mode);
|
|
k->file = fopen(path, mode);
|
|
if (!k->file) {
|
|
if (errno != EPERM && errno != ENOENT)
|
|
return WHYF_perror("fopen(%s, \"%s\")", alloca_str_toprint(path), mode);
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("cannot open %s in \"%s\" mode", alloca_str_toprint(path), mode);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Open keyring file, read BAM and create initial context using the stored salt.
|
|
*/
|
|
keyring_file *keyring_open(const char *path, int writeable)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Allocate structure */
|
|
keyring_file *k = emalloc_zero(sizeof(keyring_file));
|
|
if (!k)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
/* Open keyring file read-write if we can, else use it read-only, else create it. */
|
|
if (writeable && _keyring_open(k, path, "r+") == -1) {
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!k->file && _keyring_open(k, path, "r") == -1) {
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!k->file && writeable && _keyring_open(k, path, "w+") == -1) {
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!k->file) {
|
|
WHYF_perror("cannot open or create keyring file %s", alloca_str_toprint(path));
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (fseeko(k->file, 0, SEEK_END)) {
|
|
WHYF_perror("fseeko(%s, 0, SEEK_END)", alloca_str_toprint(path));
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
k->file_size=ftello(k->file);
|
|
if (k->file_size<KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE) {
|
|
/* Uninitialised, so write 2KB of zeroes,
|
|
followed by 2KB of random bytes as salt. */
|
|
if (fseeko(k->file, 0, SEEK_SET)) {
|
|
WHYF_perror("fseeko(%s, 0, SEEK_END)", alloca_str_toprint(path));
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
unsigned char buffer[KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE];
|
|
bzero(&buffer[0],KEYRING_BAM_BYTES);
|
|
if (fwrite(buffer, 2048, 1, k->file)!=1) {
|
|
WHYF_perror("fwrite(%p, 2048, 1, %s)", buffer, alloca_str_toprint(path));
|
|
WHY("Could not write empty bitmap in fresh keyring file");
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (urandombytes(&buffer[0],KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE-KEYRING_BAM_BYTES)) {
|
|
WHYF("Could not get random keyring salt to put in fresh keyring file %s", path);
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (fwrite(buffer, KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE - KEYRING_BAM_BYTES, 1, k->file) != 1) {
|
|
WHYF_perror("fwrite(%p, %lu, 1, %s)", buffer, (long)(KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE - KEYRING_BAM_BYTES), alloca_str_toprint(path));
|
|
WHYF("Could not write keyring salt in fresh keyring file");
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
k->file_size=KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Read BAMs for each slab in the file */
|
|
keyring_bam **b=&k->bam;
|
|
off_t offset=0;
|
|
while(offset<k->file_size) {
|
|
/* Read bitmap from slab.
|
|
Also, if offset is zero, read the salt */
|
|
if (fseeko(k->file,offset,SEEK_SET)) {
|
|
WHYF_perror("fseeko(%s, %ld, SEEK_SET)", alloca_str_toprint(path), (long)offset);
|
|
WHY("Could not seek to BAM in keyring file");
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
*b = emalloc_zero(sizeof(keyring_bam));
|
|
if (!(*b)) {
|
|
WHYF("Could not allocate keyring_bam structure for key ring file %s", path);
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
(*b)->file_offset=offset;
|
|
/* Read bitmap */
|
|
int r=fread((*b)->bitmap, KEYRING_BAM_BYTES, 1, k->file);
|
|
if (r!=1) {
|
|
WHYF_perror("fread(%p, %ld, 1, %s)", (*b)->bitmap, (long)KEYRING_BAM_BYTES, alloca_str_toprint(path));
|
|
WHYF("Could not read BAM from keyring file");
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Read salt if this is the first bitmap block.
|
|
We setup a context for this self-supplied key-ring salt.
|
|
(other keyring salts may be provided later on, resulting in
|
|
multiple contexts being loaded) */
|
|
if (!offset) {
|
|
k->contexts[0] = emalloc_zero(sizeof(keyring_context));
|
|
if (!k->contexts[0]) {
|
|
WHYF("Could not allocate keyring_context for keyring file %s", path);
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
// First context is always with null keyring PIN.
|
|
k->contexts[0]->KeyRingPin = str_edup("");
|
|
k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSaltLen=KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE-KEYRING_BAM_BYTES;
|
|
k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSalt = emalloc(k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSaltLen);
|
|
if (!k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSalt) {
|
|
WHYF("Could not allocate keyring_context->salt for keyring file %s", path);
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
r = fread(k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSalt, k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSaltLen, 1, k->file);
|
|
if (r!=1) {
|
|
WHYF_perror("fread(%p, %d, 1, %s)", k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSalt, k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSaltLen, alloca_str_toprint(path));
|
|
WHYF("Could not read salt from keyring file %s", path);
|
|
keyring_free(k);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
k->context_count=1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Skip to next slab, and find next bam pointer. */
|
|
offset+=KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE*(KEYRING_BAM_BYTES<<3);
|
|
b=&(*b)->next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return k;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void keyring_free(keyring_file *k)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
if (!k) return;
|
|
|
|
/* Close keyring file handle */
|
|
if (k->file) fclose(k->file);
|
|
k->file=NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Free BAMs (no substructure, so easy) */
|
|
keyring_bam *b=k->bam;
|
|
while(b) {
|
|
keyring_bam *last_bam=b;
|
|
b=b->next;
|
|
/* Clear out any private data */
|
|
bzero(last_bam,sizeof(keyring_bam));
|
|
/* release structure */
|
|
free(last_bam);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Free contexts (including subordinate identities and dynamically allocated salt strings).
|
|
Don't forget to overwrite any private data. */
|
|
for(i=0;i<KEYRING_MAX_CONTEXTS;i++)
|
|
if (k->contexts[i]) {
|
|
keyring_free_context(k->contexts[i]);
|
|
k->contexts[i]=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Wipe everything, just to be sure. */
|
|
bzero(k,sizeof(keyring_file));
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void keyring_free_context(keyring_context *c)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
if (!c) return;
|
|
|
|
if (c->KeyRingPin) {
|
|
/* Wipe pin before freeing (slightly tricky since this is a variable length string */
|
|
for(i=0;c->KeyRingPin[i];i++) c->KeyRingPin[i]=' '; i=0;
|
|
free(c->KeyRingPin); c->KeyRingPin=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (c->KeyRingSalt) {
|
|
bzero(c->KeyRingSalt,c->KeyRingSaltLen);
|
|
c->KeyRingSalt=NULL;
|
|
c->KeyRingSaltLen=0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Wipe out any loaded identities */
|
|
for(i=0;i<KEYRING_MAX_IDENTITIES;i++)
|
|
if (c->identities[i]) keyring_free_identity(c->identities[i]);
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure any private data is wiped out */
|
|
bzero(c,sizeof(keyring_context));
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void keyring_free_identity(keyring_identity *id)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
if (id->PKRPin) {
|
|
/* Wipe pin before freeing (slightly tricky since this is a variable length string */
|
|
for(i=0;id->PKRPin[i];i++) {
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("clearing PIN char '%c'", id->PKRPin[i]);
|
|
id->PKRPin[i]=' ';
|
|
}
|
|
i=0;
|
|
|
|
free(id->PKRPin); id->PKRPin=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for(i=0;i<PKR_MAX_KEYPAIRS;i++)
|
|
if (id->keypairs[i])
|
|
keyring_free_keypair(id->keypairs[i]);
|
|
|
|
if (id->subscriber){
|
|
id->subscriber->identity=NULL;
|
|
if (id->subscriber->reachable == REACHABLE_SELF)
|
|
id->subscriber->reachable = REACHABLE_NONE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bzero(id,sizeof(keyring_identity));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void keyring_free_keypair(keypair *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (kp->private_key) {
|
|
bzero(kp->private_key,kp->private_key_len);
|
|
free(kp->private_key);
|
|
kp->private_key=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (kp->public_key) {
|
|
bzero(kp->public_key,kp->public_key_len);
|
|
free(kp->public_key);
|
|
kp->public_key=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bzero(kp,sizeof(keypair));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Create a new keyring context for the loaded keyring file.
|
|
We don't need to load any identities etc, as that happens when we enter
|
|
an identity pin.
|
|
If the pin is NULL, it is assumed to be blank.
|
|
The pin does NOT have to be numeric, and has no practical length limitation,
|
|
as it is used as an input into a hashing function. But for sanity sake, let's
|
|
limit it to 16KB.
|
|
*/
|
|
int keyring_enter_keyringpin(keyring_file *k, const char *pin)
|
|
{
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("k=%p", k);
|
|
if (!k) return WHY("k is null");
|
|
if (k->context_count>=KEYRING_MAX_CONTEXTS)
|
|
return WHY("Too many loaded contexts already");
|
|
if (k->context_count<1)
|
|
return WHY("Cannot enter PIN without keyring salt being available");
|
|
int cn;
|
|
for (cn = 0; cn < k->context_count; ++cn)
|
|
if (strcmp(k->contexts[cn]->KeyRingPin, pin) == 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
k->contexts[k->context_count] = emalloc_zero(sizeof(keyring_context));
|
|
if (!k->contexts[k->context_count])
|
|
return WHY("Could not allocate new keyring context structure");
|
|
keyring_context *c=k->contexts[k->context_count];
|
|
/* Store pin */
|
|
c->KeyRingPin = pin ? str_edup(pin) : str_edup("");
|
|
/* Get salt from the zeroeth context */
|
|
c->KeyRingSalt = emalloc(k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSaltLen);
|
|
if (!c->KeyRingSalt) {
|
|
free(c);
|
|
k->contexts[k->context_count]=NULL;
|
|
return WHY("Could not copy keyring salt from context zero");
|
|
}
|
|
c->KeyRingSaltLen=k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSaltLen;
|
|
bcopy(&k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSalt[0],&c->KeyRingSalt[0],c->KeyRingSaltLen);
|
|
k->context_count++;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Enter an identity pin and search for matching records.
|
|
This involves going through the bitmap for each slab, and
|
|
then trying each keyring pin and identity pin with each
|
|
record marked as allocated.
|
|
We might find more than one matching identity, and that's okay;
|
|
we just load them all.
|
|
*/
|
|
int keyring_enter_identitypin(keyring_file *k,char *pin)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!k) return WHY("k is null");
|
|
|
|
return WHY("Not implemented");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
En/Decrypting a block requires use of the first 32 bytes of the block to provide
|
|
salt. The next 64 bytes constitute a message authentication code (MAC) that is
|
|
used to verify the validity of the block. The verification occurs in a higher
|
|
level function, and all we need to know here is that we shouldn't decrypt the
|
|
first 96 bytes of the block.
|
|
*/
|
|
int keyring_munge_block(unsigned char *block,int len /* includes the first 96 bytes */,
|
|
unsigned char *KeyRingSalt,int KeyRingSaltLen,
|
|
const char *KeyRingPin, const char *PKRPin)
|
|
{
|
|
int exit_code=1;
|
|
unsigned char hashKey[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES];
|
|
unsigned char hashNonce[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char work[65536];
|
|
|
|
if (len<96) return WHY("block too short");
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *PKRSalt=&block[0];
|
|
int PKRSaltLen=32;
|
|
|
|
#if crypto_stream_xsalsa20_KEYBYTES>crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES
|
|
#error crypto primitive key size too long -- hash needs to be expanded
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if crypto_stream_xsalsa20_NONCEBYTES>crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES
|
|
#error crypto primitive nonce size too long -- hash needs to be expanded
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Generate key and nonce hashes from the various inputs */
|
|
unsigned ofs;
|
|
#define APPEND(buf, len) { \
|
|
assert(ofs <= sizeof work); \
|
|
unsigned __len = (len); \
|
|
if (__len > sizeof work - ofs) { \
|
|
WHY("Input too long"); \
|
|
goto kmb_safeexit; \
|
|
} \
|
|
bcopy((buf), &work[ofs], __len); \
|
|
ofs += __len; \
|
|
}
|
|
/* Form key as hash of various concatenated inputs.
|
|
The ordering and repetition of the inputs is designed to make rainbow tables
|
|
infeasible */
|
|
ofs=0;
|
|
APPEND(PKRSalt,PKRSaltLen);
|
|
APPEND(PKRPin,strlen(PKRPin));
|
|
APPEND(PKRSalt,PKRSaltLen);
|
|
APPEND(KeyRingPin,strlen(KeyRingPin));
|
|
crypto_hash_sha512(hashKey,work,ofs);
|
|
|
|
/* Form the nonce as hash of various other concatenated inputs */
|
|
ofs=0;
|
|
APPEND(KeyRingPin,strlen(KeyRingPin));
|
|
APPEND(KeyRingSalt,KeyRingSaltLen);
|
|
APPEND(KeyRingPin,strlen(KeyRingPin));
|
|
APPEND(PKRPin,strlen(PKRPin));
|
|
crypto_hash_sha512(hashNonce,work,ofs);
|
|
|
|
/* Now en/de-crypt the remainder of the block.
|
|
We do this in-place for convenience, so you should not pass in a mmap()'d
|
|
lump. */
|
|
crypto_stream_xsalsa20_xor(&block[96],&block[96],len-96, hashNonce,hashKey);
|
|
exit_code=0;
|
|
|
|
kmb_safeexit:
|
|
/* Wipe out all sensitive structures before returning */
|
|
ofs=0;
|
|
bzero(&work[0],65536);
|
|
bzero(&hashKey[0],crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES);
|
|
bzero(&hashNonce[0],crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES);
|
|
return exit_code;
|
|
#undef APPEND
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const char *keytype_str(unsigned ktype)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (ktype) {
|
|
case KEYTYPE_CRYPTOBOX: return "CRYPTOBOX";
|
|
case KEYTYPE_CRYPTOSIGN: return "CRYPTOSIGN";
|
|
case KEYTYPE_RHIZOME: return "RHIZOME";
|
|
case KEYTYPE_DID: return "DID";
|
|
default: return "";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct keytype {
|
|
size_t public_key_size;
|
|
size_t private_key_size;
|
|
size_t packed_size;
|
|
int (*packer)(const struct keytype *, const keypair *, struct rotbuf *);
|
|
int (*unpacker)(const struct keytype *, keypair *, struct rotbuf *);
|
|
void (*dumper)(const keypair *, XPRINTF, int);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int pack_private_only(const struct keytype *kt, const keypair *kp, struct rotbuf *rb)
|
|
{
|
|
rotbuf_putbuf(rb, kp->private_key, kt->private_key_size);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int pack_private_public(const struct keytype *kt, const keypair *kp, struct rotbuf *rb)
|
|
{
|
|
rotbuf_putbuf(rb, kp->private_key, kt->private_key_size);
|
|
rotbuf_putbuf(rb, kp->public_key, kt->public_key_size);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_raw_hex(const keypair *kp, XPRINTF xpf, int include_secret)
|
|
{
|
|
if (kp->public_key_len)
|
|
xprintf(xpf, " pub=%s", alloca_tohex(kp->public_key, kp->public_key_len));
|
|
if (include_secret && kp->private_key_len)
|
|
xprintf(xpf, " sec=%s", alloca_tohex(kp->private_key, kp->private_key_len));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int unpack_private_public(const struct keytype *kt, keypair *kp, struct rotbuf *rb)
|
|
{
|
|
rotbuf_getbuf(rb, kp->private_key, kt->private_key_size);
|
|
rotbuf_getbuf(rb, kp->public_key, kt->public_key_size);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int unpack_private_only(const struct keytype *kt, keypair *kp, struct rotbuf *rb)
|
|
{
|
|
rotbuf_getbuf(rb, kp->private_key, kt->private_key_size);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int unpack_private_derive_scalarmult_public(const struct keytype *kt, keypair *kp, struct rotbuf *rb)
|
|
{
|
|
rotbuf_getbuf(rb, kp->private_key, kt->private_key_size);
|
|
/* Compute public key from private key.
|
|
*
|
|
* Public key calculation as below is taken from section 3 of:
|
|
* http://cr.yp.to/highspeed/naclcrypto-20090310.pdf
|
|
*
|
|
* This can take a while on a mobile phone since it involves a scalarmult operation, so searching
|
|
* through all slots for a pin could take a while (perhaps 1 second per pin:slot cominbation).
|
|
* This is both good and bad. The other option is to store the public key as well, which would
|
|
* make entering a pin faster, but would also make trying an incorrect pin faster, thus
|
|
* simplifying some brute-force attacks. We need to make a decision between speed/convenience
|
|
* and security here.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!rb->wrap)
|
|
crypto_scalarmult_curve25519_base(kp->public_key, kp->private_key);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int pack_did_name(const struct keytype *kt, const keypair *kp, struct rotbuf *rb)
|
|
{
|
|
// Ensure name is nul terminated.
|
|
if (strnchr((const char *)kp->public_key, kt->public_key_size, '\0') == NULL)
|
|
return WHY("missing nul terminator");
|
|
return pack_private_public(kt, kp, rb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int unpack_did_name(const struct keytype *kt, keypair *kp, struct rotbuf *rb)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unpack_private_public(kt, kp, rb) == -1)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
// Fail if name is not nul terminated.
|
|
return strnchr((const char *)kp->public_key, kt->public_key_size, '\0') == NULL ? -1 : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void dump_did_name(const keypair *kp, XPRINTF xpf, int include_secret)
|
|
{
|
|
xprintf(xpf, " DID=%s", alloca_str_toprint_quoted((const char *)kp->private_key, "\"\""));
|
|
xprintf(xpf, " Name=%s", alloca_str_toprint_quoted((const char *)kp->public_key, "\"\""));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This is where all the supported key types are declared. In order to preserve backward
|
|
* compatibility (reading keyring files from older versions of Serval DNA), DO NOT ERASE OR RE-USE
|
|
* ANY KEY TYPE ENTRIES FROM THIS ARRAY. If a key type is no longer used, it must be permanently
|
|
* deprecated, ie, recognised and simply skipped. The packer and unpacker functions can be changed
|
|
* to NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
|
|
[KEYTYPE_CRYPTOBOX] = {
|
|
/* Only the private key is stored, and the public key (SID) is derived from the private key
|
|
* when the keyring is read.
|
|
*/
|
|
.private_key_size = crypto_box_curve25519xsalsa20poly1305_SECRETKEYBYTES,
|
|
.public_key_size = crypto_box_curve25519xsalsa20poly1305_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
|
|
.packed_size = crypto_box_curve25519xsalsa20poly1305_SECRETKEYBYTES,
|
|
.packer = pack_private_only,
|
|
.unpacker = unpack_private_derive_scalarmult_public,
|
|
.dumper = dump_raw_hex
|
|
},
|
|
[KEYTYPE_CRYPTOSIGN] = {
|
|
/* The NaCl API does not expose any method to derive a cryptosign public key from its private
|
|
* key, although there must be an internal NaCl function to do so. Subverting the NaCl API to
|
|
* invoke that function risks incompatibility with future releases of NaCl, so instead the
|
|
* public key is stored redundantly in the keyring.
|
|
*/
|
|
.private_key_size = crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch_SECRETKEYBYTES,
|
|
.public_key_size = crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
|
|
.packed_size = crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch_SECRETKEYBYTES + crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
|
|
.packer = pack_private_public,
|
|
.unpacker = unpack_private_public,
|
|
.dumper = dump_raw_hex
|
|
},
|
|
[KEYTYPE_RHIZOME] = {
|
|
/* The Rhizome Secret (a large, unguessable number) is stored in the private key field, and
|
|
* the public key field is not used.
|
|
*/
|
|
.private_key_size = 32,
|
|
.public_key_size = 0,
|
|
.packed_size = 32,
|
|
.packer = pack_private_only,
|
|
.unpacker = unpack_private_only,
|
|
.dumper = dump_raw_hex
|
|
},
|
|
[KEYTYPE_DID] = {
|
|
/* The DID is stored in unpacked form in the private key field, and the name in nul-terminated
|
|
* ASCII form in the public key field.
|
|
*/
|
|
.private_key_size = 32,
|
|
.public_key_size = 64,
|
|
.packed_size = 32 + 64,
|
|
.packer = pack_did_name,
|
|
.unpacker = unpack_did_name,
|
|
.dumper = dump_did_name
|
|
}
|
|
// ADD MORE KEY TYPES HERE
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int keyring_pack_identity(keyring_context *c, keyring_identity *id, unsigned char packed[KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
/* Convert an identity to a KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE bytes long block that consists of 32 bytes of random
|
|
* salt, a 64 byte (512 bit) message authentication code (MAC) and the list of key pairs. */
|
|
if (urandombytes(packed, PKR_SALT_BYTES) == -1)
|
|
return WHY("Could not generate salt");
|
|
/* Calculate MAC */
|
|
keyring_identity_mac(c, id, packed /* pkr salt */,
|
|
packed + PKR_SALT_BYTES /* write mac in after salt */);
|
|
/* There was a known plain-text opportunity here: byte 96 must be 0x01, and some other bytes are
|
|
* likely deducible, e.g., the location of the trailing 0x00 byte can probably be guessed with
|
|
* confidence. Payload rotation will frustrate this attack.
|
|
*/
|
|
uint16_t rotation;
|
|
if (urandombytes((unsigned char *)&rotation, sizeof rotation) == -1)
|
|
return WHY("urandombytes() failed to generate random rotation");
|
|
#ifdef NO_ROTATION
|
|
rotation=0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
// The two bytes immediately following the MAC describe the rotation offset.
|
|
packed[PKR_SALT_BYTES + PKR_MAC_BYTES] = rotation >> 8;
|
|
packed[PKR_SALT_BYTES + PKR_MAC_BYTES + 1] = rotation & 0xff;
|
|
/* Pack the key pairs into the rest of the slot as a rotated buffer. */
|
|
struct rotbuf rbuf;
|
|
rotbuf_init(&rbuf,
|
|
packed + PKR_SALT_BYTES + PKR_MAC_BYTES + 2,
|
|
KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE - (PKR_SALT_BYTES + PKR_MAC_BYTES + 2),
|
|
rotation);
|
|
unsigned kp;
|
|
for (kp = 0; kp < id->keypair_count && !rbuf.wrap; ++kp) {
|
|
unsigned ktype = id->keypairs[kp]->type;
|
|
if (ktype == 0x00 || ktype >= NELS(keytypes)) {
|
|
WHYF("illegal key type 0x%02x at kp=%u", ktype, kp);
|
|
goto scram;
|
|
}
|
|
const struct keytype *kt = &keytypes[ktype];
|
|
if (kt->packer == NULL) {
|
|
WARNF("unsupported key type 0x%02x, omitted from keyring file", ktype);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("pack key type = 0x%02x", ktype);
|
|
// First byte is the key type code.
|
|
rotbuf_putc(&rbuf, ktype);
|
|
// The next two bytes are the key pair length, for forward compatibility: so older software can
|
|
// skip over key pairs with an unrecognised type. The original four first key types do not
|
|
// store the length, for the sake of backward compatibility with legacy keyring files. Their
|
|
// entry lengths are hard-coded.
|
|
size_t keypair_len = kt->packed_size;
|
|
switch (ktype) {
|
|
case KEYTYPE_CRYPTOBOX:
|
|
case KEYTYPE_CRYPTOSIGN:
|
|
case KEYTYPE_RHIZOME:
|
|
case KEYTYPE_DID:
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
rotbuf_putc(&rbuf, (keypair_len >> 8) & 0xff);
|
|
rotbuf_putc(&rbuf, keypair_len & 0xff);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
// The remaining bytes is the key pair in whatever format it uses.
|
|
struct rotbuf rbstart = rbuf;
|
|
if (kt->packer(kt, id->keypairs[kp], &rbuf) != 0)
|
|
break;
|
|
// Ensure the correct number of bytes were written.
|
|
unsigned packed = rotbuf_delta(&rbstart, &rbuf);
|
|
if (packed != keypair_len) {
|
|
WHYF("key type 0x%02x packed wrong length (packed %u, expecting %u)", ktype, packed, (int)keypair_len);
|
|
goto scram;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Final byte is a zero key type code.
|
|
rotbuf_putc(&rbuf, 0x00);
|
|
if (rbuf.wrap > 1) {
|
|
WHY("slot overrun");
|
|
goto scram;
|
|
}
|
|
if (kp < id->keypair_count) {
|
|
WHY("error filling slot");
|
|
goto scram;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Randomfill the remaining part of the slot to frustrate any known-plain-text attack on the
|
|
* keyring.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
while (rotbuf_next_chunk(&rbuf, &buf, &len))
|
|
if (urandombytes(buf, len))
|
|
return WHY("urandombytes() failed to back-fill packed identity block");
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
scram:
|
|
/* Randomfill the entire slot to erase any secret keys that may have found their way into it, to
|
|
* avoid leaking sensitive information out through a possibly re-used memory buffer.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (urandombytes(packed, KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE) == -1)
|
|
WHY("urandombytes() failed to in-fill packed identity block");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int cmp_keypair(const keypair *a, const keypair *b)
|
|
{
|
|
int c = a->type < b->type ? -1 : a->type > b->type ? 1 : 0;
|
|
if (c == 0 && a->public_key_len) {
|
|
assert(a->public_key_len == b->public_key_len);
|
|
assert(a->public_key != NULL);
|
|
assert(b->public_key != NULL);
|
|
c = memcmp(a->public_key, b->public_key, a->public_key_len);
|
|
}
|
|
if (c == 0 && a->private_key_len) {
|
|
assert(a->private_key_len == b->private_key_len);
|
|
assert(a->private_key != NULL);
|
|
assert(b->private_key != NULL);
|
|
c = memcmp(a->private_key, b->private_key, a->private_key_len);
|
|
}
|
|
return c;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static keyring_identity *keyring_unpack_identity(unsigned char *slot, const char *pin)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Skip salt and MAC */
|
|
keyring_identity *id = emalloc_zero(sizeof(keyring_identity));
|
|
if (!id) { WHY("malloc of identity failed"); return NULL; }
|
|
if (!slot) { WHY("slot is null"); return NULL; }
|
|
id->PKRPin = str_edup(pin);
|
|
// The two bytes immediately following the MAC describe the rotation offset.
|
|
uint16_t rotation = (slot[PKR_SALT_BYTES + PKR_MAC_BYTES] << 8) | slot[PKR_SALT_BYTES + PKR_MAC_BYTES + 1];
|
|
/* Pack the key pairs into the rest of the slot as a rotated buffer. */
|
|
struct rotbuf rbuf;
|
|
rotbuf_init(&rbuf,
|
|
slot + PKR_SALT_BYTES + PKR_MAC_BYTES + 2,
|
|
KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE - (PKR_SALT_BYTES + PKR_MAC_BYTES + 2),
|
|
rotation);
|
|
while (!rbuf.wrap) {
|
|
if (id->keypair_count >= PKR_MAX_KEYPAIRS) {
|
|
WHY("too many key pairs");
|
|
keyring_free_identity(id);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
struct rotbuf rbo = rbuf;
|
|
unsigned char ktype = rotbuf_getc(&rbuf);
|
|
if (rbuf.wrap || ktype == 0x00)
|
|
break; // End of data, stop looking
|
|
const struct keytype *kt = &keytypes[ktype];
|
|
size_t keypair_len;
|
|
// No length bytes after the original four key types, for backward compatibility. All other key
|
|
// types are followed by a two-byte keypair length.
|
|
switch (ktype) {
|
|
case KEYTYPE_CRYPTOBOX:
|
|
case KEYTYPE_CRYPTOSIGN:
|
|
case KEYTYPE_RHIZOME:
|
|
case KEYTYPE_DID:
|
|
keypair_len = kt->packed_size;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
keypair_len = rotbuf_getc(&rbuf) << 8;
|
|
keypair_len |= rotbuf_getc(&rbuf);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rbuf.wrap)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (ktype < NELS(keytypes) && kt->unpacker) {
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("unpack key type = 0x%02x at offset %u", ktype, (int)rotbuf_position(&rbo));
|
|
struct rotbuf rbstart = rbuf;
|
|
// Create keyring entries to hold the key pair.
|
|
keypair *kp = NULL;
|
|
if ( (kp = id->keypairs[id->keypair_count] = emalloc_zero(sizeof(keypair))) == NULL
|
|
|| (kt->private_key_size && (kp->private_key = emalloc(kt->private_key_size)) == NULL)
|
|
|| (kt->public_key_size && (kp->public_key = emalloc(kt->public_key_size)) == NULL)
|
|
) {
|
|
keyring_free_identity(id);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
kp->type = ktype;
|
|
kp->private_key_len = kt->private_key_size;
|
|
kp->public_key_len = kt->public_key_size;
|
|
if (kt->unpacker(kt, kp, &rbuf) != 0) {
|
|
// If there is an error, it is probably an empty slot.
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("key type 0x%02x does not unpack", ktype);
|
|
keyring_free_identity(id);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
// Ensure that the correct number of bytes was consumed.
|
|
size_t unpacked = rotbuf_delta(&rbstart, &rbuf);
|
|
if (unpacked != keypair_len) {
|
|
// If the number of bytes unpacked does not match the keypair length, it is probably an
|
|
// empty slot.
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("key type 0x%02x unpacked wrong length (unpacked %u, expecting %u)", ktype, (int)unpacked, (int)keypair_len);
|
|
keyring_free_identity(id);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
// Got a valid key pair! Sort the key pairs by (key type, public key, private key) and weed
|
|
// out duplicates.
|
|
{
|
|
int c = 1;
|
|
unsigned i = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < id->keypair_count && (c = cmp_keypair(id->keypairs[i], id->keypairs[id->keypair_count])) < 0; ++i)
|
|
;
|
|
if (c > 0) {
|
|
keypair *tmp = id->keypairs[id->keypair_count];
|
|
unsigned j;
|
|
for (j = id->keypair_count; j > i; --j)
|
|
id->keypairs[j] = id->keypairs[j - 1];
|
|
id->keypairs[i] = tmp;
|
|
}
|
|
if (c)
|
|
++id->keypair_count;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("unsupported key type 0x%02x at offset %u, skipping %u bytes", ktype, (int)rotbuf_position(&rbo), (int)keypair_len);
|
|
rotbuf_advance(&rbuf, keypair_len); // skip
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// If the buffer offset overshot, we got an invalid keypair code and length combination.
|
|
if (rbuf.wrap > 1) {
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("slot overrun by %u bytes", rbuf.wrap - 1);
|
|
keyring_free_identity(id);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("unpacked %d key pairs", id->keypair_count);
|
|
return id;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int keyring_identity_mac(keyring_context *c, keyring_identity *id,
|
|
unsigned char *pkrsalt,unsigned char *mac)
|
|
{
|
|
//assert(id->keypair_count >= 1);
|
|
unsigned char work[65536];
|
|
unsigned ofs = 0;
|
|
#define APPEND(buf, len) { \
|
|
assert(ofs <= sizeof work); \
|
|
unsigned __len = (len); \
|
|
if (__len > sizeof work - ofs) { \
|
|
bzero(work, ofs); \
|
|
return WHY("Input too long"); \
|
|
} \
|
|
bcopy((buf), &work[ofs], __len); \
|
|
ofs += __len; \
|
|
}
|
|
APPEND(&pkrsalt[0], 32);
|
|
APPEND(id->keypairs[0]->private_key, id->keypairs[0]->private_key_len);
|
|
APPEND(id->keypairs[0]->public_key, id->keypairs[0]->public_key_len);
|
|
APPEND(id->PKRPin, strlen(id->PKRPin));
|
|
#undef APPEND
|
|
crypto_hash_sha512(mac, work, ofs);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Read the slot, and try to decrypt it.
|
|
Decryption is symmetric with encryption, so the same function is used
|
|
for munging the slot before making use of it, whichever way we are going.
|
|
Once munged, we then need to verify that the slot is valid, and if so
|
|
unpack the details of the identity.
|
|
*/
|
|
int keyring_decrypt_pkr(keyring_file *k,keyring_context *c,
|
|
const char *pin,int slot_number)
|
|
{
|
|
int exit_code=1;
|
|
unsigned char slot[KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned char hash[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES];
|
|
keyring_identity *id=NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* 1. Read slot. */
|
|
if (fseeko(k->file,slot_number*KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE,SEEK_SET))
|
|
return WHY_perror("fseeko");
|
|
if (fread(&slot[0],KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE,1,k->file)!=1)
|
|
return WHY_perror("fread");
|
|
/* 2. Decrypt data from slot. */
|
|
if (keyring_munge_block(slot,KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE,
|
|
k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSalt,
|
|
k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSaltLen,
|
|
c->KeyRingPin,pin)) {
|
|
WHYF("keyring_munge_block() failed, slot=%u", slot_number);
|
|
goto kdp_safeexit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* 3. Unpack contents of slot into a new identity in the provided context. */
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("unpack slot %u", slot_number);
|
|
if (((id = keyring_unpack_identity(slot, pin)) == NULL) || id->keypair_count < 1)
|
|
goto kdp_safeexit; // Not a valid slot
|
|
id->slot = slot_number;
|
|
|
|
/* 4. Verify that slot is self-consistent (check MAC) */
|
|
if (keyring_identity_mac(k->contexts[0],id,&slot[0],hash)) {
|
|
WHY("could not calculate MAC for identity");
|
|
goto kdp_safeexit;
|
|
}
|
|
/* compare hash to record */
|
|
if (memcmp(hash,&slot[32],crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES))
|
|
{
|
|
WHY("Slot is not valid (MAC mismatch)");
|
|
dump("computed",hash,crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES);
|
|
dump("stored",&slot[32],crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES);
|
|
goto kdp_safeexit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// add any unlocked subscribers to our memory table, flagged as local sid's
|
|
int i=0;
|
|
for (i=0;i<id->keypair_count;i++){
|
|
if (id->keypairs[i]->type == KEYTYPE_CRYPTOBOX){
|
|
id->subscriber = find_subscriber(id->keypairs[i]->public_key, SID_SIZE, 1);
|
|
if (id->subscriber){
|
|
if (id->subscriber->reachable==REACHABLE_NONE)
|
|
id->subscriber->reachable=REACHABLE_SELF;
|
|
id->subscriber->identity = id;
|
|
if (!my_subscriber)
|
|
my_subscriber=id->subscriber;
|
|
}
|
|
// only one key per identity supported
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Well, it's all fine, so add the id into the context and return */
|
|
c->identities[c->identity_count++]=id;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
kdp_safeexit:
|
|
/* Clean up any potentially sensitive data before exiting */
|
|
bzero(slot,KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
bzero(hash,crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES);
|
|
if (id) {
|
|
keyring_free_identity(id);
|
|
id = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return exit_code;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Try all valid slots with the PIN and see if we find any identities with that PIN.
|
|
We might find more than one. */
|
|
int keyring_enter_pin(keyring_file *k, const char *pin)
|
|
{
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("k=%p, pin=%s", k, alloca_str_toprint(pin));
|
|
IN();
|
|
if (!k) RETURN(-1);
|
|
if (!pin) pin="";
|
|
|
|
int slot;
|
|
int identitiesFound=0;
|
|
|
|
for(slot=0;slot<k->file_size/KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE;slot++)
|
|
{
|
|
/* slot zero is the BAM and salt, so skip it */
|
|
if (slot&(KEYRING_BAM_BITS-1)) {
|
|
/* Not a BAM slot, so examine */
|
|
off_t file_offset=slot*KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
/* See if this part of the keyring file is organised */
|
|
keyring_bam *b=k->bam;
|
|
while (b&&(file_offset>=b->file_offset+KEYRING_SLAB_SIZE))
|
|
b=b->next;
|
|
if (!b) continue;
|
|
|
|
/* Now see if slot is marked in-use. No point checking unallocated slots,
|
|
especially since the cost can be upto a second of CPU time on a phone. */
|
|
int position=slot&(KEYRING_BAM_BITS-1);
|
|
int byte=position>>3;
|
|
int bit=position&7;
|
|
if (b->bitmap[byte]&(1<<bit)) {
|
|
/* Slot is occupied, so check it.
|
|
We have to check it for each keyring context (ie keyring pin) */
|
|
int c;
|
|
for(c=0;c<k->context_count;c++)
|
|
{
|
|
int result=keyring_decrypt_pkr(k,k->contexts[c],pin?pin:"",slot);
|
|
if (!result)
|
|
identitiesFound++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Tell the caller how many identities we found */
|
|
RETURN(identitiesFound);
|
|
OUT();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Create a new identity in the specified context (which supplies the keyring pin)
|
|
with the specified PKR pin.
|
|
The crypto_box and crypto_sign key pairs are automatically created, and the PKR
|
|
is packed and written to a hithero unallocated slot which is then marked full.
|
|
Requires an explicit call to keyring_commit()
|
|
*/
|
|
keyring_identity *keyring_create_identity(keyring_file *k,keyring_context *c, const char *pin)
|
|
{
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("k=%p", k);
|
|
/* Check obvious abort conditions early */
|
|
if (!k) { WHY("keyring is NULL"); return NULL; }
|
|
if (!k->bam) { WHY("keyring lacks BAM (not to be confused with KAPOW)"); return NULL; }
|
|
if (!c) { WHY("keyring context is NULL"); return NULL; }
|
|
if (c->identity_count>=KEYRING_MAX_IDENTITIES)
|
|
{ WHY("keyring context has too many identities"); return NULL; }
|
|
|
|
if (!pin) pin="";
|
|
|
|
keyring_identity *id = emalloc_zero(sizeof(keyring_identity));
|
|
if (!id)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Store pin */
|
|
id->PKRPin = str_edup(pin);
|
|
if (!id->PKRPin) {
|
|
WHY("Could not store pin");
|
|
goto kci_safeexit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Find free slot in keyring.
|
|
Slot 0 in any slab is the BAM and possible keyring salt, so only search for
|
|
space in slots 1 and above. */
|
|
/* XXX Only stores to first slab! */
|
|
keyring_bam *b=k->bam;
|
|
for(id->slot=1;id->slot<KEYRING_BAM_BITS;id->slot++)
|
|
{
|
|
int position=id->slot&(KEYRING_BAM_BITS-1);
|
|
int byte=position>>3;
|
|
int bit=position&7;
|
|
if (!(b->bitmap[byte]&(1<<bit)))
|
|
/* found a free slot */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (id->slot>=KEYRING_BAM_BITS) {
|
|
WHY("no free slots in first slab (and I don't know how to store in subsequent slabs yet");
|
|
goto kci_safeexit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate key pairs */
|
|
|
|
/* crypto_box key pair */
|
|
id->keypairs[0] = emalloc_zero(sizeof(keypair));
|
|
if (!id->keypairs[0]) {
|
|
WHY("malloc failed preparing first key pair storage");
|
|
goto kci_safeexit;
|
|
}
|
|
id->keypair_count=1;
|
|
id->keypairs[0]->type=KEYTYPE_CRYPTOBOX;
|
|
id->keypairs[0]->private_key_len=crypto_box_curve25519xsalsa20poly1305_SECRETKEYBYTES;
|
|
id->keypairs[0]->private_key = emalloc(id->keypairs[0]->private_key_len);
|
|
if (!id->keypairs[0]->private_key) {
|
|
WHY("malloc failed preparing first private key storage");
|
|
goto kci_safeexit;
|
|
}
|
|
id->keypairs[0]->public_key_len=crypto_box_curve25519xsalsa20poly1305_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
|
|
id->keypairs[0]->public_key = emalloc(id->keypairs[0]->public_key_len);
|
|
if (!id->keypairs[0]->public_key) {
|
|
WHY("malloc failed preparing first public key storage");
|
|
goto kci_safeexit;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Filter out public keys that start with 0x0, as they are reserved for address
|
|
abbreviation. */
|
|
id->keypairs[0]->public_key[0]=0;
|
|
while(id->keypairs[0]->public_key[0]<0x10)
|
|
crypto_box_curve25519xsalsa20poly1305_keypair(id->keypairs[0]->public_key,
|
|
id->keypairs[0]->private_key);
|
|
|
|
/* crypto_sign key pair */
|
|
id->keypairs[1] = emalloc_zero(sizeof(keypair));
|
|
if (!id->keypairs[1]) {
|
|
WHY("malloc failed preparing second key pair storage");
|
|
goto kci_safeexit;
|
|
}
|
|
id->keypair_count=2;
|
|
id->keypairs[1]->type=KEYTYPE_CRYPTOSIGN;
|
|
id->keypairs[1]->private_key_len=crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch_SECRETKEYBYTES;
|
|
id->keypairs[1]->private_key = emalloc(id->keypairs[1]->private_key_len);
|
|
if (!id->keypairs[1]->private_key) {
|
|
WHY("malloc failed preparing second private key storage");
|
|
goto kci_safeexit;
|
|
}
|
|
id->keypairs[1]->public_key_len=crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
|
|
id->keypairs[1]->public_key = emalloc(id->keypairs[1]->public_key_len);
|
|
if (!id->keypairs[1]->public_key) {
|
|
WHY("malloc failed preparing second public key storage");
|
|
goto kci_safeexit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch_keypair(id->keypairs[1]->public_key,
|
|
id->keypairs[1]->private_key);
|
|
|
|
/* Rhizome Secret (for protecting Bundle Private Keys) */
|
|
id->keypairs[2] = emalloc_zero(sizeof(keypair));
|
|
if (!id->keypairs[2]) {
|
|
WHY("malloc failed preparing second key pair storage");
|
|
goto kci_safeexit;
|
|
}
|
|
id->keypair_count=3;
|
|
id->keypairs[2]->type=KEYTYPE_RHIZOME;
|
|
id->keypairs[2]->private_key_len=32;
|
|
id->keypairs[2]->private_key = emalloc(id->keypairs[2]->private_key_len);
|
|
if (!id->keypairs[2]->private_key) {
|
|
WHY("malloc failed preparing second private key storage");
|
|
goto kci_safeexit;
|
|
}
|
|
id->keypairs[2]->public_key_len=0;
|
|
id->keypairs[2]->public_key=NULL;
|
|
urandombytes(id->keypairs[2]->private_key,id->keypairs[2]->private_key_len);
|
|
|
|
/* Mark slot in use */
|
|
int position=id->slot&(KEYRING_BAM_BITS-1);
|
|
int byte=position>>3;
|
|
int bit=position&7;
|
|
b->bitmap[byte]|=(1<<bit);
|
|
|
|
/* Add identity to data structure */
|
|
c->identities[c->identity_count++]=id;
|
|
|
|
// add new identity to in memory table
|
|
id->subscriber = find_subscriber(id->keypairs[0]->public_key, SID_SIZE, 1);
|
|
if (id->subscriber){
|
|
if (id->subscriber->reachable==REACHABLE_NONE)
|
|
id->subscriber->reachable=REACHABLE_SELF;
|
|
id->subscriber->identity = id;
|
|
if (!my_subscriber)
|
|
my_subscriber=id->subscriber;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Everything went fine */
|
|
return id;
|
|
|
|
kci_safeexit:
|
|
if (id) keyring_free_identity(id);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int keyring_commit(keyring_file *k)
|
|
{
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("k=%p", k);
|
|
if (!k) return WHY("keyring was NULL");
|
|
if (k->context_count<1) return WHY("Keyring has no contexts");
|
|
unsigned errorCount = 0;
|
|
/* Write all BAMs */
|
|
keyring_bam *b;
|
|
for (b = k->bam; b; b = b->next) {
|
|
if (fseeko(k->file, b->file_offset, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
|
|
WHYF_perror("fseeko(%d, %ld, SEEK_SET)", fileno(k->file), (long)b->file_offset);
|
|
errorCount++;
|
|
} else if (fwrite(b->bitmap, KEYRING_BAM_BYTES, 1, k->file) != 1) {
|
|
WHYF_perror("fwrite(%p, %ld, 1, %d)", b->bitmap, (long)KEYRING_BAM_BYTES, fileno(k->file));
|
|
errorCount++;
|
|
} else if (fwrite(k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSalt, k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSaltLen, 1, k->file)!=1) {
|
|
WHYF_perror("fwrite(%p, %ld, 1, %d)", k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSalt, (long)k->contexts[0]->KeyRingSaltLen, fileno(k->file));
|
|
errorCount++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* For each identity in each context, write the record to disk.
|
|
This re-salts every identity as it is re-written, and the pin
|
|
for each identity and context is used, so changing a keypair or pin
|
|
is as simple as updating the keyring_identity or related structure,
|
|
and then calling this function. */
|
|
int cn,in;
|
|
for(cn=0;cn<k->context_count;cn++)
|
|
for(in=0;in<k->contexts[cn]->identity_count;in++)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char pkr[KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE];
|
|
if (keyring_pack_identity(k->contexts[cn],
|
|
k->contexts[cn]->identities[in],
|
|
pkr))
|
|
errorCount++;
|
|
else {
|
|
/* Now crypt and store block */
|
|
/* Crypt */
|
|
if (keyring_munge_block(pkr,
|
|
KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE,
|
|
k->contexts[cn]->KeyRingSalt,
|
|
k->contexts[cn]->KeyRingSaltLen,
|
|
k->contexts[cn]->KeyRingPin,
|
|
k->contexts[cn]->identities[in]->PKRPin)) {
|
|
WHY("keyring_munge_block() failed");
|
|
errorCount++;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Store */
|
|
off_t file_offset = KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE * k->contexts[cn]->identities[in]->slot;
|
|
if (!file_offset) {
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("ID cn=%d in=%d has slot=0", cn, in);
|
|
} else if (fseeko(k->file, file_offset, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
|
|
WHYF_perror("fseeko(%d, %ld, SEEK_SET)", fileno(k->file), (long)file_offset);
|
|
errorCount++;
|
|
} else if (fwrite(pkr, KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE, 1, k->file) != 1) {
|
|
WHYF_perror("fwrite(%p, %ld, 1, %d)", pkr, (long)KEYRING_PAGE_SIZE, fileno(k->file));
|
|
errorCount++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (fflush(k->file) == -1) {
|
|
WHYF_perror("fflush(%d)", fileno(k->file));
|
|
errorCount++;
|
|
}
|
|
return errorCount ? WHYF("%u errors commiting keyring to disk", errorCount) : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int keyring_set_did(keyring_identity *id, const char *did, const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!id) return WHY("id is null");
|
|
if (!did) return WHY("did is null");
|
|
if (!name) name="Mr. Smith";
|
|
|
|
/* Find where to put it */
|
|
int i;
|
|
for(i=0;i<id->keypair_count;i++)
|
|
if (id->keypairs[i]->type==KEYTYPE_DID) {
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUG("Identity contains DID");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i>=PKR_MAX_KEYPAIRS) return WHY("Too many key pairs");
|
|
|
|
/* allocate if needed */
|
|
if (i>=id->keypair_count) {
|
|
id->keypairs[i] = emalloc_zero(sizeof(keypair));
|
|
if (!id->keypairs[i])
|
|
return -1;
|
|
id->keypairs[i]->type=KEYTYPE_DID;
|
|
unsigned char *packedDid = emalloc_zero(32);
|
|
if (!packedDid)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
unsigned char *packedName = emalloc_zero(64);
|
|
if (!packedName)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
id->keypairs[i]->private_key=packedDid;
|
|
id->keypairs[i]->private_key_len=32;
|
|
id->keypairs[i]->public_key=packedName;
|
|
id->keypairs[i]->public_key_len=64;
|
|
id->keypair_count++;
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUG("Created DID record for identity");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Store DID unpacked for ease of searching */
|
|
int len=strlen(did); if (len>31) len=31;
|
|
bcopy(did,&id->keypairs[i]->private_key[0],len);
|
|
bzero(&id->keypairs[i]->private_key[len],32-len);
|
|
len=strlen(name); if (len>63) len=63;
|
|
bcopy(name,&id->keypairs[i]->public_key[0],len);
|
|
bzero(&id->keypairs[i]->public_key[len],64-len);
|
|
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring){
|
|
dump("storing did",&id->keypairs[i]->private_key[0],32);
|
|
dump("storing name",&id->keypairs[i]->public_key[0],64);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int keyring_find_did(const keyring_file *k,int *cn,int *in,int *kp,char *did)
|
|
{
|
|
for (; keyring_sanitise_position(k,cn,in,kp) == 0; ++*kp) {
|
|
if (k->contexts[*cn]->identities[*in]->keypairs[*kp]->type==KEYTYPE_DID) {
|
|
/* Compare DIDs */
|
|
if ((!did[0])
|
|
||(did[0]=='*'&&did[1]==0)
|
|
||(!strcasecmp(did,(char *)k->contexts[*cn]->identities[*in]
|
|
->keypairs[*kp]->private_key))
|
|
) {
|
|
return 1; // match
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int keyring_identity_find_keytype(const keyring_file *k, int cn, int in, int keytype)
|
|
{
|
|
int kp;
|
|
for (kp = 0; kp < keyring->contexts[cn]->identities[in]->keypair_count; ++kp)
|
|
if (keyring->contexts[cn]->identities[in]->keypairs[kp]->type == keytype)
|
|
return kp;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int keyring_next_keytype(const keyring_file *k, int *cn, int *in, int *kp, int keytype)
|
|
{
|
|
for (; keyring_sanitise_position(k, cn, in, kp) == 0; ++*kp)
|
|
if (k->contexts[*cn]->identities[*in]->keypairs[*kp]->type == keytype)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int keyring_next_identity(const keyring_file *k, int *cn, int *in, int *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
return keyring_next_keytype(k, cn, in, kp, KEYTYPE_CRYPTOBOX);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int keyring_sanitise_position(const keyring_file *k,int *cn,int *in,int *kp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!k) return 1;
|
|
/* Sanity check passed in position */
|
|
if ((*cn)>=k->context_count) return 1;
|
|
if ((*in)>=k->contexts[*cn]->identity_count)
|
|
{
|
|
(*in)=0; (*cn)++;
|
|
if ((*cn)>=k->context_count) return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((*kp)>=k->contexts[*cn]->identities[*in]->keypair_count)
|
|
{
|
|
*kp=0; (*in)++;
|
|
if ((*in)>=k->contexts[*cn]->identity_count)
|
|
{
|
|
(*in)=0; (*cn)++;
|
|
if ((*cn)>=k->context_count) return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *keyring_find_sas_private(keyring_file *k,unsigned char *sid,
|
|
unsigned char **sas_public_out)
|
|
{
|
|
IN();
|
|
int cn=0,in=0,kp=0;
|
|
|
|
if (!keyring_find_sid(k,&cn,&in,&kp,sid)) {
|
|
RETURNNULL(WHYNULL("Could not find SID in keyring, so can't find SAS"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for(kp=0;kp<k->contexts[cn]->identities[in]->keypair_count;kp++)
|
|
if (k->contexts[cn]->identities[in]->keypairs[kp]->type==KEYTYPE_CRYPTOSIGN)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *sas_private=
|
|
k->contexts[cn]->identities[in]->keypairs[kp]->private_key;
|
|
unsigned char *sas_public=
|
|
k->contexts[cn]->identities[in]->keypairs[kp]->public_key;
|
|
if (rhizome_verify_bundle_privatekey(NULL,sas_private,sas_public))
|
|
{
|
|
/* SAS key is invalid (perhaps because it was a pre 0.90 format one),
|
|
so replace it */
|
|
WARN("SAS key is invalid -- regenerating.");
|
|
crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch_keypair(sas_public, sas_private);
|
|
keyring_commit(k);
|
|
}
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("Found SAS entry for %s*", alloca_tohex(sid, 7));
|
|
if (sas_public_out) *sas_public_out=sas_public;
|
|
RETURN(sas_private);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RETURNNULL(WHYNULL("Identity lacks SAS"));
|
|
OUT();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int keyring_store_sas(overlay_mdp_frame *req){
|
|
struct subscriber *subscriber = find_subscriber(req->in.src.sid,SID_SIZE,1);
|
|
|
|
if (subscriber->sas_valid){
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("Ignoring SID:SAS mapping for %s, already have one", alloca_tohex_sid(req->in.src.sid));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("Received SID:SAS mapping, %d bytes", req->out.payload_length);
|
|
|
|
unsigned keytype = req->out.payload[0];
|
|
|
|
if (keytype!=KEYTYPE_CRYPTOSIGN)
|
|
return WHYF("Ignoring SID:SAS mapping with unsupported key type %u", keytype);
|
|
|
|
if (req->out.payload_length < 1 + SAS_SIZE)
|
|
return WHY("Truncated key mapping announcement?");
|
|
|
|
unsigned char plain[req->out.payload_length];
|
|
unsigned long long plain_len=0;
|
|
unsigned char *sas_public=&req->out.payload[1];
|
|
unsigned char *compactsignature = &req->out.payload[1+SAS_SIZE];
|
|
int siglen=SID_SIZE+crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch_BYTES;
|
|
unsigned char signature[siglen];
|
|
|
|
/* reconstitute signed SID for verification */
|
|
bcopy(&compactsignature[0],&signature[0],64);
|
|
bcopy(&req->out.src.sid[0],&signature[64],SID_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
int r=crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch_open(plain,&plain_len,
|
|
signature,siglen,
|
|
sas_public);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
return WHY("SID:SAS mapping verification signature does not verify");
|
|
/* These next two tests should never be able to fail, but let's just check anyway. */
|
|
if (plain_len != SID_SIZE)
|
|
return WHY("SID:SAS mapping signed block is wrong length");
|
|
if (memcmp(plain, req->out.src.sid, SID_SIZE) != 0)
|
|
return WHY("SID:SAS mapping signed block is for wrong SID");
|
|
|
|
/* now store it */
|
|
bcopy(sas_public, subscriber->sas_public, SAS_SIZE);
|
|
subscriber->sas_valid=1;
|
|
subscriber->sas_last_request=-1;
|
|
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("Stored SID:SAS mapping, SID=%s to SAS=%s",
|
|
alloca_tohex_sid(req->out.src.sid),
|
|
alloca_tohex_sas(subscriber->sas_public)
|
|
);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int keyring_mapping_request(keyring_file *k, overlay_mdp_frame *req)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!k) return WHY("keyring is null");
|
|
if (!req) return WHY("req is null");
|
|
|
|
/* The authcryption of the MDP frame proves that the SAS key is owned by the
|
|
owner of the SID, and so is absolutely compulsory. */
|
|
if (req->packetTypeAndFlags&(MDP_NOCRYPT|MDP_NOSIGN))
|
|
return WHY("mapping requests must be performed under authcryption");
|
|
|
|
if (req->out.payload_length==1) {
|
|
/* It's a request, so find the SAS for the SID the request was addressed to,
|
|
use that to sign that SID, and then return it in an authcrypted frame. */
|
|
unsigned char *sas_public=NULL;
|
|
unsigned char *sas_priv =keyring_find_sas_private(keyring,req->out.dst.sid,&sas_public);
|
|
|
|
if ((!sas_priv)||(!sas_public)) return WHY("I don't have that SAS key");
|
|
unsigned long long slen;
|
|
/* type of key being verified */
|
|
req->out.payload[0]=KEYTYPE_CRYPTOSIGN;
|
|
/* the public key itself */
|
|
bcopy(sas_public,&req->out.payload[1], SAS_SIZE);
|
|
/* and a signature of the SID using the SAS key, to prove possession of
|
|
the key. Possession of the SID has already been established by the
|
|
decrypting of the surrounding MDP packet.
|
|
XXX - We could chop the SID out of the middle of the signed block here,
|
|
just as we do for signed MDP packets to save 32 bytes. We won't worry
|
|
about doing this, however, as the mapping process is only once per session,
|
|
not once per packet. Unless I get excited enough to do it, that is.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch
|
|
(&req->out.payload[1+SAS_SIZE],&slen,req->out.dst.sid,SID_SIZE,sas_priv))
|
|
return WHY("crypto_sign() failed");
|
|
/* chop the SID from the end of the signature, since it can be reinserted on reception */
|
|
slen-=SID_SIZE;
|
|
/* and record the full length of this */
|
|
req->out.payload_length = 1 + SAS_SIZE + slen;
|
|
overlay_mdp_swap_src_dst(req);
|
|
req->out.ttl=0;
|
|
req->packetTypeAndFlags=MDP_TX; /* crypt and sign */
|
|
req->out.queue=OQ_MESH_MANAGEMENT;
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("Sending SID:SAS mapping, %d bytes, %s:0x%X -> %s:0x%X",
|
|
req->out.payload_length,
|
|
alloca_tohex_sid(req->out.src.sid), req->out.src.port,
|
|
alloca_tohex_sid(req->out.dst.sid), req->out.dst.port
|
|
);
|
|
return overlay_mdp_dispatch(req,0,NULL,0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
return keyring_store_sas(req);
|
|
}
|
|
return WHY("Not implemented");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int keyring_send_sas_request(struct subscriber *subscriber){
|
|
if (subscriber->sas_valid)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
time_ms_t now = gettime_ms();
|
|
|
|
if (now < subscriber->sas_last_request + 100){
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
INFO("Too soon to ask for SAS mapping again");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!my_subscriber)
|
|
return WHY("couldn't request SAS (I don't know who I am)");
|
|
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("Requesting SAS mapping for SID=%s", alloca_tohex_sid(subscriber->sid));
|
|
|
|
/* request mapping (send request auth-crypted). */
|
|
overlay_mdp_frame mdp;
|
|
memset(&mdp,0,sizeof(overlay_mdp_frame));
|
|
|
|
mdp.packetTypeAndFlags=MDP_TX;
|
|
mdp.out.queue=OQ_MESH_MANAGEMENT;
|
|
bcopy(subscriber->sid,mdp.out.dst.sid,SID_SIZE);
|
|
mdp.out.dst.port=MDP_PORT_KEYMAPREQUEST;
|
|
mdp.out.src.port=MDP_PORT_KEYMAPREQUEST;
|
|
bcopy(my_subscriber->sid,mdp.out.src.sid,SID_SIZE);
|
|
mdp.out.payload_length=1;
|
|
mdp.out.payload[0]=KEYTYPE_CRYPTOSIGN;
|
|
|
|
if (overlay_mdp_dispatch(&mdp, 0 /* system generated */, NULL, 0))
|
|
return WHY("Failed to send SAS resolution request");
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("Dispatched SAS resolution request");
|
|
|
|
subscriber->sas_last_request=now;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int keyring_find_sid(const keyring_file *k, int *cn, int *in, int *kp, const unsigned char *sid)
|
|
{
|
|
for (; keyring_sanitise_position(k, cn, in, kp) == 0; ++*kp)
|
|
if (k->contexts[*cn]->identities[*in]->keypairs[*kp]->type == KEYTYPE_CRYPTOBOX
|
|
&& memcmp(sid, k->contexts[*cn]->identities[*in]->keypairs[*kp]->public_key, SID_SIZE) == 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void keyring_identity_extract(const keyring_identity *id, const unsigned char **sidp, const char **didp, const char **namep)
|
|
{
|
|
int todo = (sidp ? 1 : 0) | (didp ? 2 : 0) | (namep ? 4 : 0);
|
|
int kpn;
|
|
for (kpn = 0; todo && kpn < id->keypair_count; ++kpn) {
|
|
keypair *kp = id->keypairs[kpn];
|
|
switch (kp->type) {
|
|
case KEYTYPE_CRYPTOBOX:
|
|
if (sidp)
|
|
*sidp = kp->public_key;
|
|
todo &= ~1;
|
|
break;
|
|
case KEYTYPE_DID:
|
|
if (didp)
|
|
*didp = (const char *) kp->private_key;
|
|
if (namep)
|
|
*namep = (const char *) kp->public_key;
|
|
todo &= ~6;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
keyring_file *keyring_open_instance()
|
|
{
|
|
keyring_file *k = NULL;
|
|
IN();
|
|
if (create_serval_instance_dir() == -1)
|
|
RETURN(NULL);
|
|
// Work out the absolute path to the keyring file.
|
|
const char *keyringpath = getenv("SERVAL_KEYRING_PATH");
|
|
char keyringFile[1024];
|
|
if (!keyringpath) {
|
|
if (!FORM_SERVAL_INSTANCE_PATH(keyringFile, "serval.keyring"))
|
|
RETURN(NULL);
|
|
keyringpath = keyringFile;
|
|
}
|
|
// Work out if the keyring file is writeable.
|
|
int writeable = 0;
|
|
const char *readonly_env = getenv("SERVAL_KEYRING_READONLY");
|
|
bool_t readonly_b;
|
|
if (readonly_env == NULL || cf_opt_boolean(&readonly_b, readonly_env) != CFOK || !readonly_b)
|
|
writeable = 1;
|
|
if ((k = keyring_open(keyringpath, writeable)) == NULL)
|
|
RETURN(NULL);
|
|
RETURN(k);
|
|
OUT();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
keyring_file *keyring_open_instance_cli(const struct cli_parsed *parsed)
|
|
{
|
|
IN();
|
|
keyring_file *k = keyring_open_instance();
|
|
if (k == NULL)
|
|
RETURN(NULL);
|
|
const char *kpin = NULL;
|
|
cli_arg(parsed, "--keyring-pin", &kpin, NULL, "");
|
|
keyring_enter_keyringpin(k, kpin);
|
|
// Always open all PIN-less entries.
|
|
keyring_enter_pin(k, "");
|
|
// Open all entries for which an entry PIN has been given.
|
|
unsigned i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < parsed->labelc; ++i)
|
|
if (strn_str_cmp(parsed->labelv[i].label, parsed->labelv[i].len, "--entry-pin") == 0)
|
|
keyring_enter_pin(k, parsed->labelv[i].text);
|
|
RETURN(k);
|
|
OUT();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If no identities, create an initial identity with a phone number.
|
|
This identity will not be pin protected (initially). */
|
|
int keyring_seed(keyring_file *k)
|
|
{
|
|
if (config.debug.keyring)
|
|
DEBUGF("k=%p", k);
|
|
if (!k) return WHY("keyring is null");
|
|
|
|
/* nothing to do if there is already an identity */
|
|
if (k->contexts[0]->identity_count)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
int i;
|
|
char did[65];
|
|
/* Securely generate random telephone number */
|
|
urandombytes((unsigned char *)did, 11);
|
|
/* Make DID start with 2 through 9, as 1 is special in many number spaces,
|
|
and 0 is commonly used for escaping to national or international dialling. */
|
|
did[0]='2'+(((unsigned char)did[0])%8);
|
|
/* Then add 10 more digits, which is what we do in the mobile phone software */
|
|
for(i=1;i<11;i++) did[i]='0'+(((unsigned char)did[i])%10); did[11]=0;
|
|
keyring_identity *id=keyring_create_identity(k,k->contexts[0],"");
|
|
if (!id) return WHY("Could not create new identity");
|
|
if (keyring_set_did(id, did, "")) return WHY("Could not set DID of new identity");
|
|
if (keyring_commit(k)) return WHY("Could not commit new identity to keyring file");
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *sid_binary = NULL;
|
|
const char *did = NULL;
|
|
const char *name = NULL;
|
|
keyring_identity_extract(id, &sid_binary, &did, &name);
|
|
INFOF("Seeded keyring with identity: did=%s name=%s sid=%s",
|
|
did ? did : "(null)",
|
|
alloca_str_toprint(name),
|
|
sid_binary ? alloca_tohex_sid(sid_binary) : "(null)"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
The CryptoBox function of NaCl involves a scalar mult operation between the
|
|
public key of the recipient and the private key of the sender (or vice versa).
|
|
This can take about 1 cpu second on a phone, which is rather bad.
|
|
Fortunately, NaCl allows the caching of the result of this computation, which can
|
|
then be fed into the process to make it much, much faster.
|
|
Thus we need a mechanism for caching the various scalarmult results so that they
|
|
can indeed be reused.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* XXX We need a more efficient implementation than a linear list, but it will
|
|
do for now. */
|
|
struct nm_record {
|
|
/* 96 bytes per record */
|
|
unsigned char known_key[crypto_box_curve25519xsalsa20poly1305_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
|
|
unsigned char unknown_key[crypto_box_curve25519xsalsa20poly1305_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
|
|
unsigned char nm_bytes[crypto_box_curve25519xsalsa20poly1305_BEFORENMBYTES];
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int nm_slots_used=0;
|
|
/* 512 x 96 bytes = 48KB, not too big */
|
|
#define NM_CACHE_SLOTS 512
|
|
struct nm_record nm_cache[NM_CACHE_SLOTS];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *keyring_get_nm_bytes(unsigned char *known_sid, unsigned char *unknown_sid)
|
|
{
|
|
IN();
|
|
if (!known_sid) { RETURNNULL(WHYNULL("known pub key is null")); }
|
|
if (!unknown_sid) { RETURNNULL(WHYNULL("unknown pub key is null")); }
|
|
if (!keyring) { RETURNNULL(WHYNULL("keyring is null")); }
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
/* See if we have it cached already */
|
|
for(i=0;i<nm_slots_used;i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (memcmp(nm_cache[i].known_key,known_sid,SID_SIZE)) continue;
|
|
if (memcmp(nm_cache[i].unknown_key,unknown_sid,SID_SIZE)) continue;
|
|
RETURN(nm_cache[i].nm_bytes);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Not in the cache, so prepare to cache it (or return failure if known is not
|
|
in fact a known key */
|
|
int cn=0,in=0,kp=0;
|
|
if (!keyring_find_sid(keyring,&cn,&in,&kp,known_sid))
|
|
{ RETURNNULL(WHYNULL("known key is not in fact known.")); }
|
|
|
|
/* work out where to store it */
|
|
if (nm_slots_used<NM_CACHE_SLOTS) {
|
|
i=nm_slots_used; nm_slots_used++;
|
|
} else {
|
|
i=random()%NM_CACHE_SLOTS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* calculate and store */
|
|
bcopy(known_sid,nm_cache[i].known_key,SID_SIZE);
|
|
bcopy(unknown_sid,nm_cache[i].unknown_key,SID_SIZE);
|
|
crypto_box_curve25519xsalsa20poly1305_beforenm(nm_cache[i].nm_bytes,
|
|
unknown_sid,
|
|
keyring
|
|
->contexts[cn]
|
|
->identities[in]
|
|
->keypairs[kp]->private_key);
|
|
RETURN(nm_cache[i].nm_bytes);
|
|
OUT();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int cmp_identity_ptrs(const keyring_identity *const *a, const keyring_identity *const *b)
|
|
{
|
|
int c;
|
|
unsigned i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < (*a)->keypair_count && i < (*b)->keypair_count; ++i)
|
|
if ((c = cmp_keypair((*a)->keypairs[i], (*b)->keypairs[i])))
|
|
return c;
|
|
return i == (*a)->keypair_count ? -1 : 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int keyring_dump(keyring_file *k, XPRINTF xpf, int include_secret)
|
|
{
|
|
int cn, in, kp;
|
|
unsigned nids = 0;
|
|
for (cn = in = kp = 0; keyring_sanitise_position(k, &cn, &in, &kp) == 0; ++in)
|
|
++nids;
|
|
const keyring_identity *idx[nids];
|
|
unsigned i = 0;
|
|
for (cn = in = kp = 0; keyring_sanitise_position(k, &cn, &in, &kp) == 0; ++in) {
|
|
assert(i < nids);
|
|
idx[i++] = k->contexts[cn]->identities[in];
|
|
}
|
|
assert(i == nids);
|
|
qsort(idx, nids, sizeof(idx[0]), (int(*)(const void *, const void *)) cmp_identity_ptrs);
|
|
for (i = 0; i != nids; ++i) {
|
|
const keyring_identity *id = idx[i];
|
|
for (kp = 0; kp < id->keypair_count; ++kp) {
|
|
keypair *keyp = id->keypairs[kp];
|
|
xprintf(xpf, "%u: type=%u", i, keyp->type);
|
|
const char *kts = keytype_str(keyp->type);
|
|
if (kts && kts[0])
|
|
xprintf(xpf, "(%s)", kts);
|
|
assert(keyp->type != 0);
|
|
assert(keyp->type < NELS(keytypes));
|
|
xprintf(xpf, " ");
|
|
if (keytypes[keyp->type].dumper)
|
|
keytypes[keyp->type].dumper(keyp, xpf, include_secret);
|
|
else
|
|
dump_raw_hex(keyp, xpf, include_secret);
|
|
xprintf(xpf, "\n");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|