Andrew Bettison 39fc4ce6de Issue #30, remove periodic Rhizome fetch alarm
Replace the main-loop scheduled periodic alarm with an "activate" alarm that is
scheduled whenever a fetch candidate is added to any queue, unless the alarm is
already scheduled.

Replace the "rhizome.fetch_interval_ms" config item with
"rhizome.fetch_delay_ms" [default 50], which is the number of milliseconds
between adding a fetch candidate and firing the "activate" alarm.  This allows
time for a few more Rhizome advertisment packets to arrive after the first one,
before deciding which fetches to start first.

Add new `is_scheduled()` alarm primitive.
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When we were looking at implementing secure calls for OpenBTS it was suggested
that we configure Asterisk to use SIPS/ZRTP. This would have been relatively
easy to setup, however there are a few problems.

Number one is that when Asterisk checks the certificates it will either
validate the certificate (checking the chain of trust and so on) and then
check that the common name attribute on the certificate matches the hostname
of the peer, or it will do none of these checks. This code is in main/tcptls.c
line 206 (in version 1.8.14.1).

This is undesirable in a setup where there is limited or no infrastructure as
there is not likely to be a DNS server setup, or even rigid IP assignments
that would allow a static hosts file based setup. This situation would force
the administrator to disable the checks completely which would allow a trivial
man in the middle attack.

It would be possible to modify Asterisk to have a third way where it validates
the certificate and checks the chain of trust but does not look at the common
name. We decided against this approach as the VOMP channel driver was written
in time to avoid it.

Description
The Serval Project's core daemon that implements Distributed Numbering Architecture (DNA), MDP, VoMP, Rhizome, MeshMS, etc.
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