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Work towards keyring encryption/decryption.

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gardners 2012-04-11 06:50:57 +09:30
parent f52db7f406
commit f10e9c15ca
1 changed files with 78 additions and 1 deletions
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79
keyring.c
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@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
*/
#include "serval.h"
#include "nacl.h"
static int urandomfd = -1;
@ -301,5 +302,81 @@ int keyring_enter_keyringpin(keyring_file *k,char *pin)
return 0;
}
/* Enter an identity pin and search for matching records */
/* Enter an identity pin and search for matching records.
This involves going through the bitmap for each slab, and
then trying each keyring pin and identity pin with each
record marked as allocated.
We might find more than one matching identity, and that's okay;
we just load them all.
*/
int keyring_enter_identitypin(keyring_file *k,char *pin)
{
if (!k) return WHY("k is null");
WHY("Not implemented");
}
/* Read the slot, and try to decrypt it.
Decryption is symmetric with encryption, so the same function is used
for munging the slot before making use of it, whichever way we are going.
Once munged, we then need to verify that the slot is valid, and if so
unpack the details of the identity.
*/
int keyring_decrypt_pkr(keyring_file *k,keyring_context *c,int slot)
{
return WHY("Not implemented");
}
/*
En/Decrypting a block requires use of the first 32 bytes of the block to provide
salt. The next 64 bytes constitute a message authentication code (MAC) that is
used to verify the validity of the block. The verification occurs in a higher
level function, and all we need to know here is that we shouldn't decrypt the
first 96 bytes of the block.
*/
int keyring_munge_block(unsigned char *block,int len /* includes the first 96 bytes */,
unsigned char *KeyRingSalt,int KeyRingSaltLen,
char *KeyRingPin,char *PKRPin)
{
int exit_code=1;
unsigned char hashKey[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES];
unsigned char hashNonce[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES];
unsigned char work[65536];
int ofs;
if (len<96) return WHY("block too short");
unsigned char *PKRSalt=&block[0];
int PKRSaltLen=32;
/* Generate key and nonce hashes from the various inputs */
#define APPEND(b,l) if (ofs+(l)>=65536) { WHY("Input too long"); goto kmb_safeexit; } bcopy((b),&work[ofs],(l)); ofs+=(l)
/* Form key as hash of various concatenated inputs.
The ordering and repetition of the inputs is designed to make rainbow tables
infeasible */
ofs=0;
APPEND(PKRSalt,PKRSaltLen);
APPEND(PKRPin,strlen(PKRPin));
APPEND(PKRSalt,PKRSaltLen);
APPEND(KeyRingPin,strlen(KeyRingPin));
crypto_hash_sha512(hashKey,work,ofs);
/* Form the nonce as hash of various other concatenated inputs */
ofs=0;
APPEND(KeyRingPin,strlen(KeyRingPin));
APPEND(KeyRingSalt,KeyRingSaltLen);
APPEND(KeyRingPin,strlen(KeyRingPin));
APPEND(PKRPin,strlen(PKRPin));
crypto_hash_sha512(hashNonce,work,ofs);
WHY("Not implemented");
kmb_safeexit:
/* Wipe out all sensitive structures before returning */
bzero(&work[0],65536);
bzero(&hashKey[0],crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES);
bzero(&hashNonce[0],crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES);
return exit_code;
}