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Refactor rhizome_crypt_xor_block() and add debug

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This commit is contained in:
Andrew Bettison 2013-12-30 15:59:59 +10:30
parent dd5048bd43
commit aa3497df4f
1 changed files with 29 additions and 18 deletions
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39
rhizome_crypto.c
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@ -552,8 +552,8 @@ static void add_nonce(unsigned char *nonce, uint64_t value)
}
}
/* crypt a block of a stream, allowing for offsets that don't align perfectly to block boundaries
* for efficiency the caller should use a buffer size of (n*RHIZOME_CRYPT_PAGE_SIZE)
/* Encrypt a block of a stream in-place, allowing for offsets that don't align perfectly to block
* boundaries for efficiency the caller should use a buffer size of (n*RHIZOME_CRYPT_PAGE_SIZE).
*/
int rhizome_crypt_xor_block(unsigned char *buffer, size_t buffer_size, uint64_t stream_offset,
const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *nonce)
@ -601,6 +601,7 @@ int rhizome_derive_payload_key(rhizome_manifest *m)
{
// don't do anything if the manifest isn't flagged as being encrypted
assert(m->payloadEncryption == PAYLOAD_ENCRYPTED);
unsigned char hash[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES];
if (m->has_sender && m->has_recipient) {
unsigned char *nm_bytes=NULL;
unsigned cn=0, in=0, kp=0;
@ -613,41 +614,51 @@ int rhizome_derive_payload_key(rhizome_manifest *m)
return 0;
}
nm_bytes = keyring_get_nm_bytes(&m->recipient, &m->sender);
if (config.debug.rhizome)
DEBUGF("derived payload key from recipient=%s* to sender=%s*",
alloca_tohex_sid_t_trunc(m->recipient, 7),
alloca_tohex_sid_t_trunc(m->sender, 7)
);
}else{
nm_bytes = keyring_get_nm_bytes(&m->sender, &m->recipient);
if (config.debug.rhizome)
DEBUGF("derived payload key from sender=%s* to recipient=%s*",
alloca_tohex_sid_t_trunc(m->sender, 7),
alloca_tohex_sid_t_trunc(m->recipient, 7)
);
}
assert(nm_bytes != NULL);
unsigned char hash[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES];
crypto_hash_sha512(hash, nm_bytes, crypto_box_curve25519xsalsa20poly1305_BEFORENMBYTES);
bcopy(hash, m->payloadKey, RHIZOME_CRYPT_KEY_BYTES);
}else{
if (!m->haveSecret) {
WHY("Cannot derive payload key because bundle secret is unknown");
return 0;
}
if (config.debug.rhizome)
DEBUGF("derived payload key from bundle secret bsk=%s", alloca_tohex(m->cryptoSignSecret, sizeof m->cryptoSignSecret));
unsigned char raw_key[9+crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch_SECRETKEYBYTES]="sasquatch";
bcopy(m->cryptoSignSecret, &raw_key[9], crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch_SECRETKEYBYTES);
unsigned char hash[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES];
crypto_hash_sha512(hash, raw_key, sizeof(raw_key));
bcopy(hash, m->payloadKey, RHIZOME_CRYPT_KEY_BYTES);
}
bcopy(hash, m->payloadKey, RHIZOME_CRYPT_KEY_BYTES);
if (config.debug.rhizome_manifest)
DEBUGF("SET manifest[%d].payloadKey = %s", m->manifest_record_number, alloca_tohex(m->payloadKey, sizeof m->payloadKey));
// journal bundles must always have the same nonce, regardless of version.
// otherwise, generate nonce from version#bundle id#version;
unsigned char raw_nonce[8 + 8 + sizeof m->cryptoSignPublic.binary];
write_uint64(&raw_nonce[0], m->is_journal ? 0 : m->version);
uint64_t nonce_version = m->is_journal ? 0 : m->version;
write_uint64(&raw_nonce[0], nonce_version);
bcopy(m->cryptoSignPublic.binary, &raw_nonce[8], sizeof m->cryptoSignPublic.binary);
write_uint64(&raw_nonce[8 + sizeof m->cryptoSignPublic.binary], m->is_journal ? 0 : m->version);
unsigned char hash[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES];
write_uint64(&raw_nonce[8 + sizeof m->cryptoSignPublic.binary], nonce_version);
if (config.debug.rhizome)
DEBUGF("derived payload nonce from bid=%s version=%"PRIu64, alloca_tohex_sid_t(m->cryptoSignPublic), nonce_version);
crypto_hash_sha512(hash, raw_nonce, sizeof(raw_nonce));
bcopy(hash, m->payloadNonce, sizeof(m->payloadNonce));
if (config.debug.rhizome_manifest)
DEBUGF("SET manifest[%d].payloadNonce = %s", m->manifest_record_number, alloca_tohex(m->payloadNonce, sizeof m->payloadNonce));
return 1;
}