serval-dna/crypto.c

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3.9 KiB
C
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#include "crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch.h"
#include "nacl/src/crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch_ref/ge.h"
#include "serval.h"
#include "overlay_address.h"
#include "crypto.h"
// verify a signature against a public sas key.
int crypto_verify_signature(unsigned char *sas_key,
unsigned char *content, int content_len,
unsigned char *signature_block, int signature_len)
{
IN();
if (signature_len!=SIGNATURE_BYTES)
RETURN(WHY("Invalid signature length"));
/* reconstitute signed message by putting hash at end of signature */
unsigned char reassembled[signature_len + content_len];
bcopy(signature_block, reassembled, signature_len);
bcopy(content, &reassembled[signature_len], content_len);
/* verify signature.
Note that crypto_sign_open requires m to be as large as signature, even
though it will not need the whole length eventually -- it does use the
full length and will overwrite the end of a short buffer. */
unsigned char message[sizeof(reassembled)+64];
unsigned long long mlen=0;
int result
=crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch_open(message,&mlen,
reassembled,sizeof(reassembled),
sas_key);
if (result)
RETURN(WHY("Signature verification failed"));
RETURN(0);
}
// verify the signature at the end of a message, on return message_len will be reduced by the length of the signature.
int crypto_verify_message(struct subscriber *subscriber, unsigned char *message, int *message_len)
{
if (!subscriber->sas_valid){
keyring_send_sas_request(subscriber);
return WHY("SAS key not currently on record, cannot verify");
}
if (*message_len < SIGNATURE_BYTES)
return WHY("Message is too short to include a signature");
*message_len -= SIGNATURE_BYTES;
unsigned char hash[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES];
crypto_hash_sha512(hash,message,*message_len);
return crypto_verify_signature(subscriber->sas_public, hash,
crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES, &message[*message_len], SIGNATURE_BYTES);
}
// generate a signature for this raw content, copy the signature to the address requested.
int crypto_create_signature(unsigned char *key,
unsigned char *content, int content_len,
unsigned char *signature, int *sig_length)
{
IN();
if (*sig_length < SIGNATURE_BYTES)
RETURN(WHY("Not enough space to store signature"));
unsigned char sig[content_len + SIGNATURE_BYTES];
/* Why does this primitive copy the whole input message? We don't want that message format, it just seems like a waste of effor to me. */
unsigned long long int length = 0;
crypto_sign_edwards25519sha512batch(sig,&length,
content,content_len,
key);
if (length != sizeof(sig))
RETURN(WHYF("Signing seems to have failed (%d, expected %d)",(int)length,(int)sizeof(sig)));
bcopy(sig, signature, SIGNATURE_BYTES);
*sig_length=SIGNATURE_BYTES;
OUT();
return 0;
}
// sign the hash of a message, adding the signature to the end of the message buffer.
int crypto_sign_message(struct subscriber *source, unsigned char *content, int buffer_len, int *content_len)
{
if (*content_len + SIGNATURE_BYTES > buffer_len)
return WHYF("Insufficient space in message buffer to add signature. %d, need %d",buffer_len, *content_len + SIGNATURE_BYTES);
unsigned char *key=keyring_find_sas_private(keyring, &source->sid, NULL);
if (!key)
return WHY("Could not find signing key");
unsigned char hash[crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES];
crypto_hash_sha512(hash, content, *content_len);
int sig_length = SIGNATURE_BYTES;
int ret=crypto_create_signature(key, hash, crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES, &content[*content_len], &sig_length);
*content_len+=sig_length;
return ret;
}
int crypto_sign_compute_public_key(const unsigned char *skin, unsigned char *pk)
{
IN();
unsigned char h[64];
ge_p3 A;
crypto_hash_sha512(h,skin,32);
h[0] &= 248;
h[31] &= 63;
h[31] |= 64;
ge_scalarmult_base(&A,h);
ge_p3_tobytes(pk,&A);
RETURN(0);
OUT();
}