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SAE side-channel attacks Published: April 10, 2019 Identifiers: - VU#871675 - CVE-2019-9494 (cache attack against SAE) Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/ Vulnerability Number of potential side channel attacks were discovered in the SAE implementations used by both hostapd (AP) and wpa_supplicant (infrastructure BSS station/mesh station). SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals) is also known as WPA3-Personal. The discovered side channel attacks may be able to leak information about the used password based on observable timing differences and cache access patterns. This might result in full password recovery when combined with an offline dictionary attack and if the password is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. Cache attack A novel cache-based attack against SAE handshake was discovered. This attack targets SAE with ECC groups. ECC group 19 being the mandatory group to support and the most likely used group for SAE today, so this attack applies to the most common SAE use case. Even though the PWE derivation iteration in SAE has protections against timing attacks, this new cache-based attack enables an attacker to determine which code branch is taken in the iteration if the attacker is able to run unprivileged code on the victim machine (e.g., an app installed on a smart phone or potentially a JavaScript code on a web site loaded by a web browser). This depends on the used CPU not providing sufficient protection to prevent unprivileged applications from observing memory access patterns through the shared cache (which is the most likely case with today's designs). The attacker can use information about the selected branch to learn information about the password and combine this information from number of handshake instances with an offline dictionary attack. With sufficient number of handshakes and sufficiently weak password, this might result in full discovery of the used password. This attack requires the attacker to be able to run a program on the target device. This is not commonly the case on access points, so the most likely target for this would be a client device using SAE in an infrastructure BSS or mesh BSS. The commits listed in the end of this advisory change the SAE implementation shared by hostapd and wpa_supplicant to perform the PWE derivation loop using operations that use constant time and memory access pattern to minimize the externally observable differences from operations that depend on the password even for the case where the attacker might be able to run unprivileged code on the same device. Timing attack The timing attack applies to the MODP groups 22, 23, and 24 where the PWE generation algorithm defined for SAE can have sufficient timing differences for an attacker to be able to determine how many rounds were needed to find the PWE based on the used password and MAC addresses. When the attack is repeated with multiple times, the attacker may be able to gather enough information about the password to be able to recover it fully using an offline dictionary attack if the password is not strong enough to protect against dictionary attacks. This attack could be performed by an attacker in radio range of an access point or a station enabling the specific MODP groups. This timing attack requires the applicable MODP groups to be enabled explicitly in hostapd/wpa_supplicant configuration (sae_groups parameter). All versions of hostapd/wpa_supplicant have disabled these groups by default. While this security advisory lists couple of commits introducing additional protection for MODP groups in SAE, it should be noted that the groups 22, 23, and 24 are not considered strong enough to meet the current expectation for a secure system. As such, their use is discouraged even if the additional protection mechanisms in the implementation are included. Vulnerable versions/configurations All wpa_supplicant and hostapd versions with SAE support (CONFIG_SAE=y in the build configuration and SAE being enabled in the runtime configuration). Acknowledgments Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef (New York University Abu Dhabi) and Eyal Ronen (Tel Aviv University) for discovering the issues and for discussions on how to address them. Possible mitigation steps - Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant/hostapd and rebuild: OpenSSL: Use constant time operations for private bignums Add helper functions for constant time operations OpenSSL: Use constant time selection for crypto_bignum_legendre() SAE: Minimize timing differences in PWE derivation SAE: Avoid branches in is_quadratic_residue_blind() SAE: Mask timing of MODP groups 22, 23, 24 SAE: Use const_time selection for PWE in FFC SAE: Use constant time operations in sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc() These patches are available from https://w1.fi/security/2019-1/ - Update to wpa_supplicant/hostapd v2.8 or newer, once available - In addition to either of the above alternatives, disable MODP groups 1, 2, 5, 22, 23, and 24 by removing them from hostapd/wpa_supplicant sae_groups runtime configuration parameter, if they were explicitly enabled since those groups are not considered strong enough to meet current security expectations. The groups 22, 23, and 24 are related to the discovered side channel (timing) attack. The other groups in the list are consider too weak to provide sufficient security. Note that all these groups have been disabled by default in all hostapd/wpa_supplicant versions and these would be used only if explicitly enabled in the configuration. - Use strong passwords to prevent dictionary attacks Signed-off-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.l-h@gmx.de> [bump PKG_RELEASE] Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
213 lines
6.4 KiB
Diff
213 lines
6.4 KiB
Diff
From 6e34f618d37ddbb5854c42e2ad4fca83492fa7b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
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Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 18:38:30 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 02/14] Add helper functions for constant time operations
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These functions can be used to help implement constant time operations
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for various cryptographic operations that must minimize externally
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observable differences in processing (both in timing and also in
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internal cache use, etc.).
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This is related to CVE-2019-9494 and CVE-2019-9495.
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
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---
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src/utils/const_time.h | 191 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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1 file changed, 191 insertions(+)
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create mode 100644 src/utils/const_time.h
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--- /dev/null
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+++ b/src/utils/const_time.h
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@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
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+/*
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+ * Helper functions for constant time operations
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+ * Copyright (c) 2019, The Linux Foundation
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+ *
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+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
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+ * See README for more details.
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+ *
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+ * These helper functions can be used to implement logic that needs to minimize
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+ * externally visible differences in execution path by avoiding use of branches,
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+ * avoiding early termination or other time differences, and forcing same memory
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+ * access pattern regardless of values.
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+ */
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+
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+#ifndef CONST_TIME_H
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+#define CONST_TIME_H
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+
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+
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+#if defined(__clang__)
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+#define NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW \
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+ __attribute__((no_sanitize("unsigned-integer-overflow")))
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+#else
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+#define NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW
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+#endif
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+
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+
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+/**
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+ * const_time_fill_msb - Fill all bits with MSB value
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+ * @val: Input value
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+ * Returns: Value with all the bits set to the MSB of the input val
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+ */
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+static inline unsigned int const_time_fill_msb(unsigned int val)
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+{
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+ /* Move the MSB to LSB and multiple by -1 to fill in all bits. */
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+ return (val >> (sizeof(val) * 8 - 1)) * ~0U;
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+}
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+
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+
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+/* Returns: -1 if val is zero; 0 if val is not zero */
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+static inline unsigned int const_time_is_zero(unsigned int val)
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+ NO_UBSAN_UINT_OVERFLOW
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+{
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+ /* Set MSB to 1 for 0 and fill rest of bits with the MSB value */
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+ return const_time_fill_msb(~val & (val - 1));
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+}
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+
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+
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+/* Returns: -1 if a == b; 0 if a != b */
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+static inline unsigned int const_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
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+{
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+ return const_time_is_zero(a ^ b);
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+}
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+
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+
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+/* Returns: -1 if a == b; 0 if a != b */
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+static inline u8 const_time_eq_u8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
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+{
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+ return (u8) const_time_eq(a, b);
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+}
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+
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+
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+/**
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+ * const_time_eq_bin - Constant time memory comparison
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+ * @a: First buffer to compare
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+ * @b: Second buffer to compare
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+ * @len: Number of octets to compare
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+ * Returns: -1 if buffers are equal, 0 if not
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+ *
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+ * This function is meant for comparing passwords or hash values where
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+ * difference in execution time or memory access pattern could provide external
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+ * observer information about the location of the difference in the memory
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+ * buffers. The return value does not behave like memcmp(), i.e.,
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+ * const_time_eq_bin() cannot be used to sort items into a defined order. Unlike
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+ * memcmp(), the execution time of const_time_eq_bin() does not depend on the
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+ * contents of the compared memory buffers, but only on the total compared
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+ * length.
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+ */
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+static inline unsigned int const_time_eq_bin(const void *a, const void *b,
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+ size_t len)
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+{
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+ const u8 *aa = a;
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+ const u8 *bb = b;
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+ size_t i;
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+ u8 res = 0;
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+
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+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
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+ res |= aa[i] ^ bb[i];
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+
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+ return const_time_is_zero(res);
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+}
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+
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+
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+/**
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+ * const_time_select - Constant time unsigned int selection
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+ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
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+ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case
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+ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case
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+ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
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+ */
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+static inline unsigned int const_time_select(unsigned int mask,
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+ unsigned int true_val,
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+ unsigned int false_val)
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+{
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+ return (mask & true_val) | (~mask & false_val);
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+}
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+
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+
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+/**
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+ * const_time_select_int - Constant time int selection
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+ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
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+ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case
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+ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case
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+ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
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+ */
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+static inline int const_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int true_val,
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+ int false_val)
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+{
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+ return (int) const_time_select(mask, (unsigned int) true_val,
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+ (unsigned int) false_val);
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+}
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+
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+
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+/**
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+ * const_time_select_u8 - Constant time u8 selection
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+ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
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+ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case
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+ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case
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+ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
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+ */
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+static inline u8 const_time_select_u8(u8 mask, u8 true_val, u8 false_val)
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+{
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+ return (u8) const_time_select(mask, true_val, false_val);
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+}
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+
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+
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+/**
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+ * const_time_select_s8 - Constant time s8 selection
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+ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to select
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+ * @true_val: Value to select for the true case
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+ * @false_val: Value to select for the false case
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+ * Returns: true_val if mask == -1, false_val if mask == 0
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+ */
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+static inline s8 const_time_select_s8(u8 mask, s8 true_val, s8 false_val)
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+{
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+ return (s8) const_time_select(mask, (unsigned int) true_val,
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+ (unsigned int) false_val);
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+}
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+
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+
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+/**
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+ * const_time_select_bin - Constant time binary buffer selection copy
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+ * @mask: 0 (false) or -1 (true) to identify which value to copy
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+ * @true_val: Buffer to copy for the true case
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+ * @false_val: Buffer to copy for the false case
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+ * @len: Number of octets to copy
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+ * @dst: Destination buffer for the copy
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+ *
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+ * This function copies the specified buffer into the destination buffer using
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+ * operations with identical memory access pattern regardless of which buffer
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+ * is being copied.
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+ */
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+static inline void const_time_select_bin(u8 mask, const u8 *true_val,
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+ const u8 *false_val, size_t len,
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+ u8 *dst)
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+{
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+ size_t i;
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+
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+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
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+ dst[i] = const_time_select_u8(mask, true_val[i], false_val[i]);
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+}
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+
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+
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+static inline int const_time_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len)
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+{
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+ const u8 *aa = a;
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+ const u8 *bb = b;
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+ int diff, res = 0;
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+ unsigned int mask;
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+
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+ if (len == 0)
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+ return 0;
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+ do {
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+ len--;
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+ diff = (int) aa[len] - (int) bb[len];
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+ mask = const_time_is_zero((unsigned int) diff);
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+ res = const_time_select_int(mask, res, diff);
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+ } while (len);
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+
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+ return res;
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+}
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+
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+#endif /* CONST_TIME_H */
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