openwrt/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0059-crypto-x86-chacha-sse3-use-unaligned-loads-for-state.patch
Jason A. Donenfeld c0cb86e1d5 kernel: 5.4: import wireguard backport
Rather than using the clunky, old, slower wireguard-linux-compat out of
tree module, this commit does a patch-by-patch backport of upstream's
wireguard to 5.4. This specific backport is in widespread use, being
part of SUSE's enterprise kernel, Oracle's enterprise kernel, Google's
Android kernel, Gentoo's distro kernel, and probably more I've forgotten
about. It's definately the "more proper" way of adding wireguard to a
kernel than the ugly compat.h hell of the wireguard-linux-compat repo.
And most importantly for OpenWRT, it allows using the same module
configuration code for 5.10 as for 5.4, with no need for bifurcation.

These patches are from the backport tree which is maintained in the
open here: https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/log/?h=backport-5.4.y
I'll be sending PRs to update this as needed.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3888fa7880)
(cherry picked from commit d540725871)
(cherry picked from commit 196f3d586f)
(cherry picked from commit 3500fd7938)
(cherry picked from commit 23b801d3ba)
(cherry picked from commit 0c0cb97da7)
(cherry picked from commit 2a27f6f90a)
Signed-off-by: Ilya Lipnitskiy <ilya.lipnitskiy@gmail.com>
2021-04-10 14:21:32 +02:00

148 lines
4.9 KiB
Diff

From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 12:11:18 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: x86/chacha-sse3 - use unaligned loads for state array
commit e79a31715193686e92dadb4caedfbb1f5de3659c upstream.
Due to the fact that the x86 port does not support allocating objects
on the stack with an alignment that exceeds 8 bytes, we have a rather
ugly hack in the x86 code for ChaCha to ensure that the state array is
aligned to 16 bytes, allowing the SSE3 implementation of the algorithm
to use aligned loads.
Given that the performance benefit of using of aligned loads appears to
be limited (~0.25% for 1k blocks using tcrypt on a Corei7-8650U), and
the fact that this hack has leaked into generic ChaCha code, let's just
remove it.
Cc: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S | 16 ++++++++--------
arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c | 17 ++---------------
include/crypto/chacha.h | 4 ----
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha-ssse3-x86_64.S
@@ -120,10 +120,10 @@ ENTRY(chacha_block_xor_ssse3)
FRAME_BEGIN
# x0..3 = s0..3
- movdqa 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0
- movdqa 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1
- movdqa 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2
- movdqa 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3
+ movdqu 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0
+ movdqu 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1
+ movdqu 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2
+ movdqu 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm8
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm9
movdqa %xmm2,%xmm10
@@ -205,10 +205,10 @@ ENTRY(hchacha_block_ssse3)
# %edx: nrounds
FRAME_BEGIN
- movdqa 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0
- movdqa 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1
- movdqa 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2
- movdqa 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3
+ movdqu 0x00(%rdi),%xmm0
+ movdqu 0x10(%rdi),%xmm1
+ movdqu 0x20(%rdi),%xmm2
+ movdqu 0x30(%rdi),%xmm3
mov %edx,%r8d
call chacha_permute
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <asm/simd.h>
-#define CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN 16
-
asmlinkage void chacha_block_xor_ssse3(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
unsigned int len, int nrounds);
asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_ssse3(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
@@ -125,8 +123,6 @@ static void chacha_dosimd(u32 *state, u8
void hchacha_block_arch(const u32 *state, u32 *stream, int nrounds)
{
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
-
if (!static_branch_likely(&chacha_use_simd) || !crypto_simd_usable()) {
hchacha_block_generic(state, stream, nrounds);
} else {
@@ -139,8 +135,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block_arch);
void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv)
{
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
-
chacha_init_generic(state, key, iv);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_init_arch);
@@ -148,8 +142,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_init_arch);
void chacha_crypt_arch(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes,
int nrounds)
{
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
-
if (!static_branch_likely(&chacha_use_simd) || !crypto_simd_usable() ||
bytes <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE)
return chacha_crypt_generic(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
@@ -171,15 +163,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_crypt_arch);
static int chacha_simd_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req,
const struct chacha_ctx *ctx, const u8 *iv)
{
- u32 *state, state_buf[16 + 2] __aligned(8);
+ u32 state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS] __aligned(8);
struct skcipher_walk walk;
int err;
err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN != 16);
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state_buf + 0, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
-
chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, iv);
while (walk.nbytes > 0) {
@@ -218,12 +207,10 @@ static int xchacha_simd(struct skcipher_
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct chacha_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
- u32 *state, state_buf[16 + 2] __aligned(8);
+ u32 state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS] __aligned(8);
struct chacha_ctx subctx;
u8 real_iv[16];
- BUILD_BUG_ON(CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN != 16);
- state = PTR_ALIGN(state_buf + 0, CHACHA_STATE_ALIGN);
chacha_init_generic(state, ctx->key, req->iv);
if (req->cryptlen > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE && crypto_simd_usable()) {
--- a/include/crypto/chacha.h
+++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h
@@ -25,11 +25,7 @@
#define CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE 64
#define CHACHAPOLY_IV_SIZE 12
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-#define CHACHA_STATE_WORDS ((CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE + 12) / sizeof(u32))
-#else
#define CHACHA_STATE_WORDS (CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32))
-#endif
/* 192-bit nonce, then 64-bit stream position */
#define XCHACHA_IV_SIZE 32