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bbda81ce30
Fixes: - CERT case ID: VU#228519 - CVE-2017-13077 - CVE-2017-13078 - CVE-2017-13079 - CVE-2017-13080 - CVE-2017-13081 - CVE-2017-13082 - CVE-2017-13086 - CVE-2017-13087 - CVE-2017-13088 For more information see: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
125 lines
3.8 KiB
Diff
125 lines
3.8 KiB
Diff
From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
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Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
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been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
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related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
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for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
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that behavior does not get modified.
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For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
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followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
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the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
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ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
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and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
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As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
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the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
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+++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
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@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
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u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
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} tpk;
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int tpk_set;
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+ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
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int tpk_success;
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int tpk_in_progress;
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@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_s
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u8 rsc[6];
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enum wpa_alg alg;
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+ if (peer->tk_set) {
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+ /*
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+ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
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+ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
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+ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
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+ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
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+ * not allow that to happen.
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+ */
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
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+ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
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+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
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switch (peer->cipher) {
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@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_s
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return -1;
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}
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
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+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
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if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
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rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
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"driver");
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return -1;
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}
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+ peer->tk_set = 1;
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -695,7 +713,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct w
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peer->cipher = 0;
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peer->qos_info = 0;
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peer->wmm_capable = 0;
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- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
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+ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
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peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
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os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
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os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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@@ -1158,6 +1176,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
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wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
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return -1;
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}
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+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
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wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
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peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct w
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}
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+static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
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+{
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+ int i;
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+
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+ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
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+ if (nonce[i])
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+ return 1;
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+ }
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+
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+
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static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
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const u8 *buf, size_t len)
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{
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@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn:
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peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
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peer->cipher = cipher;
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- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
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+ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
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+ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
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/*
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* There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
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* TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
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@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn:
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"TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
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goto error;
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}
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+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
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}
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#if 0
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