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d540725871
Without this patch, the chacha block counter is not incremented on neon rounds, resulting in incorrect calculations and corrupt packets. This also switches to using `--no-numbered --zero-commit` so that future diffs are smaller. Reported-by: Hans Geiblinger <cybrnook2002@yahoo.com> Reviewed-by: Ilya Lipnitskiy <ilya.lipnitskiy@gmail.com> Cc: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net> Cc: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
84 lines
2.9 KiB
Diff
84 lines
2.9 KiB
Diff
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Date: Sun, 17 Nov 2019 23:22:16 -0800
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Subject: [PATCH] crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - use chacha20_crypt()
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commit 413808b71e6204b0cc1eeaa77960f7c3cd381d33 upstream.
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Use chacha20_crypt() instead of chacha_crypt(), since it's not really
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appropriate for users of the ChaCha library API to be passing the number
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of rounds as an argument.
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Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
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Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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---
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lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 16 ++++++++--------
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1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
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--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
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+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
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@@ -66,14 +66,14 @@ __chacha20poly1305_encrypt(u8 *dst, cons
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__le64 lens[2];
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} b;
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- chacha_crypt(chacha_state, b.block0, pad0, sizeof(b.block0), 20);
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+ chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, b.block0, pad0, sizeof(b.block0));
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poly1305_init(&poly1305_state, b.block0);
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poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, ad, ad_len);
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if (ad_len & 0xf)
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poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, pad0, 0x10 - (ad_len & 0xf));
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- chacha_crypt(chacha_state, dst, src, src_len, 20);
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+ chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, dst, src, src_len);
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poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, dst, src_len);
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if (src_len & 0xf)
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@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 *dst, cons
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if (unlikely(src_len < POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE))
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return false;
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- chacha_crypt(chacha_state, b.block0, pad0, sizeof(b.block0), 20);
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+ chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, b.block0, pad0, sizeof(b.block0));
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poly1305_init(&poly1305_state, b.block0);
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poly1305_update(&poly1305_state, ad, ad_len);
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@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 *dst, cons
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ret = crypto_memneq(b.mac, src + dst_len, POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE);
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if (likely(!ret))
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- chacha_crypt(chacha_state, dst, src, dst_len, 20);
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+ chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, dst, src, dst_len);
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memzero_explicit(&b, sizeof(b));
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@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ bool chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace(s
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b.iv[1] = cpu_to_le64(nonce);
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chacha_init(chacha_state, b.k, (u8 *)b.iv);
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- chacha_crypt(chacha_state, b.block0, pad0, sizeof(b.block0), 20);
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+ chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, b.block0, pad0, sizeof(b.block0));
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poly1305_init(&poly1305_state, b.block0);
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if (unlikely(ad_len)) {
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@@ -278,14 +278,14 @@ bool chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace(s
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if (unlikely(length < sl))
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l &= ~(CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
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- chacha_crypt(chacha_state, addr, addr, l, 20);
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+ chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, addr, addr, l);
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addr += l;
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length -= l;
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}
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if (unlikely(length > 0)) {
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- chacha_crypt(chacha_state, b.chacha_stream, pad0,
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- CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, 20);
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+ chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, b.chacha_stream, pad0,
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+ CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
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crypto_xor(addr, b.chacha_stream, length);
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partial = length;
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}
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