openwrt/target/linux/generic/backport-5.4/080-wireguard-0091-wireguard-queueing-account-for-skb-protocol-0.patch
Jason A. Donenfeld c0cb86e1d5 kernel: 5.4: import wireguard backport
Rather than using the clunky, old, slower wireguard-linux-compat out of
tree module, this commit does a patch-by-patch backport of upstream's
wireguard to 5.4. This specific backport is in widespread use, being
part of SUSE's enterprise kernel, Oracle's enterprise kernel, Google's
Android kernel, Gentoo's distro kernel, and probably more I've forgotten
about. It's definately the "more proper" way of adding wireguard to a
kernel than the ugly compat.h hell of the wireguard-linux-compat repo.
And most importantly for OpenWRT, it allows using the same module
configuration code for 5.10 as for 5.4, with no need for bifurcation.

These patches are from the backport tree which is maintained in the
open here: https://git.zx2c4.com/wireguard-linux/log/?h=backport-5.4.y
I'll be sending PRs to update this as needed.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3888fa7880)
(cherry picked from commit d540725871)
(cherry picked from commit 196f3d586f)
(cherry picked from commit 3500fd7938)
(cherry picked from commit 23b801d3ba)
(cherry picked from commit 0c0cb97da7)
(cherry picked from commit 2a27f6f90a)
Signed-off-by: Ilya Lipnitskiy <ilya.lipnitskiy@gmail.com>
2021-04-10 14:21:32 +02:00

101 lines
4.0 KiB
Diff

From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 18:30:45 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] wireguard: queueing: account for skb->protocol==0
commit a5588604af448664e796daf3c1d5a4523c60667b upstream.
We carry out checks to the effect of:
if (skb->protocol != wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb))
goto err;
By having wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr return 0 on failure, this
means that the check above still passes in the case where skb->protocol
is zero, which is possible to hit with AF_PACKET:
struct sockaddr_pkt saddr = { .spkt_device = "wg0" };
unsigned char buffer[5] = { 0 };
sendto(socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_PACKET, /* skb->protocol = */ 0),
buffer, sizeof(buffer), 0, (const struct sockaddr *)&saddr, sizeof(saddr));
Additional checks mean that this isn't actually a problem in the code
base, but I could imagine it becoming a problem later if the function is
used more liberally.
I would prefer to fix this by having wg_examine_packet_protocol return a
32-bit ~0 value on failure, which will never match any value of
skb->protocol, which would simply change the generated code from a mov
to a movzx. However, sparse complains, and adding __force casts doesn't
seem like a good idea, so instead we just add a simple helper function
to check for the zero return value. Since wg_examine_packet_protocol
itself gets inlined, this winds up not adding an additional branch to
the generated code, since the 0 return value already happens in a
mergable branch.
Reported-by: Fabian Freyer <fabianfreyer@radicallyopensecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
drivers/net/wireguard/device.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h | 8 +++++++-
drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/device.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t wg_xmit(struct sk_buf
u32 mtu;
int ret;
- if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol)) {
+ if (unlikely(!wg_check_packet_protocol(skb))) {
ret = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: Invalid IP packet\n", dev->name);
goto err;
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/queueing.h
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct packet_cb {
#define PACKET_PEER(skb) (PACKET_CB(skb)->keypair->entry.peer)
/* Returns either the correct skb->protocol value, or 0 if invalid. */
-static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static inline __be16 wg_examine_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (skb_network_header(skb) >= skb->head &&
(skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr)) <=
@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ static inline __be16 wg_skb_examine_untr
return 0;
}
+static inline bool wg_check_packet_protocol(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ __be16 real_protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb);
+ return real_protocol && skb->protocol == real_protocol;
+}
+
static inline void wg_reset_packet(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
skb_scrub_packet(skb, true);
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static int prepare_skb_header(struct sk_
size_t data_offset, data_len, header_len;
struct udphdr *udp;
- if (unlikely(wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb) != skb->protocol ||
+ if (unlikely(!wg_check_packet_protocol(skb) ||
skb_transport_header(skb) < skb->head ||
(skb_transport_header(skb) + sizeof(struct udphdr)) >
skb_tail_pointer(skb)))
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static void wg_packet_consume_data_done(
*/
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
skb->csum_level = ~0; /* All levels */
- skb->protocol = wg_skb_examine_untrusted_ip_hdr(skb);
+ skb->protocol = wg_examine_packet_protocol(skb);
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
len = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->tot_len);
if (unlikely(len < sizeof(struct iphdr)))