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d540725871
Without this patch, the chacha block counter is not incremented on neon rounds, resulting in incorrect calculations and corrupt packets. This also switches to using `--no-numbered --zero-commit` so that future diffs are smaller. Reported-by: Hans Geiblinger <cybrnook2002@yahoo.com> Reviewed-by: Ilya Lipnitskiy <ilya.lipnitskiy@gmail.com> Cc: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net> Cc: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
41 lines
1.5 KiB
Diff
41 lines
1.5 KiB
Diff
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2020 12:42:01 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - prevent integer overflow on large
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input
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commit c9cc0517bba9f0213f1e55172feceb99e5512daf upstream.
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This code assigns src_len (size_t) to sl (int), which causes problems
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when src_len is very large. Probably nobody in the kernel should be
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passing this much data to chacha20poly1305 all in one go anyway, so I
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don't think we need to change the algorithm or introduce larger types
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or anything. But we should at least error out early in this case and
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print a warning so that we get reports if this does happen and can look
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into why anybody is possibly passing it that much data or if they're
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accidently passing -1 or similar.
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Fixes: d95312a3ccc0 ("crypto: lib/chacha20poly1305 - reimplement crypt_from_sg() routine")
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Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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---
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lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 3 +++
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
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--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
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+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
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@@ -235,6 +235,9 @@ bool chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace(s
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__le64 lens[2];
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} b __aligned(16);
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+ if (WARN_ON(src_len > INT_MAX))
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+ return false;
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+
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chacha_load_key(b.k, key);
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b.iv[0] = 0;
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