Jo-Philipp Wich 4e8c6f3407 dropbear: security update to 2016.74 ... - Security: Message printout was vulnerable to format string injection. If specific usernames including "%" symbols can be created on a system (validated by getpwnam()) then an attacker could run arbitrary code as root when connecting to Dropbear server. A dbclient user who can control username or host arguments could potentially run arbitrary code as the dbclient user. This could be a problem if scripts or webpages pass untrusted input to the dbclient program. - Security: dropbearconvert import of OpenSSH keys could run arbitrary code as the local dropbearconvert user when parsing malicious key files - Security: dbclient could run arbitrary code as the local dbclient user if particular -m or -c arguments are provided. This could be an issue where dbclient is used in scripts. - Security: dbclient or dropbear server could expose process memory to the running user if compiled with DEBUG_TRACE and running with -v The security issues were reported by an anonymous researcher working with Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure www.beyondsecurity.com/ssd.html Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>		2016-08-12 11:45:47 +02:00
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files	dropbear: remove procd_open_trigger/procd_close_trigger calls	2016-07-29 16:41:08 +02:00
patches	dropbear: update to 2016.73	2016-05-13 10:23:52 +02:00
Config.in	dropbear: Make utmp and putuline support configurable via seperate config options	2016-04-28 13:47:48 +02:00
Makefile	dropbear: security update to 2016.74	2016-08-12 11:45:47 +02:00