openwrt/package/libs/openssl/patches/140-allow-prefer-chacha20.patch
Ivan Pavlov aa762ada80 openssl: update to 3.0.13
Major changes between OpenSSL 3.0.12 and OpenSSL 3.0.13 [30 Jan 2024]

  * Fixed PKCS12 Decoding crashes
    ([CVE-2024-0727])
  * Fixed Excessive time spent checking invalid RSA public keys
    ([CVE-2023-6237])
  * Fixed POLY1305 MAC implementation corrupting vector registers on PowerPC
    CPUs which support PowerISA 2.07
    ([CVE-2023-6129])
  * Fix excessive time spent in DH check / generation with large Q parameter
    value ([CVE-2023-5678])

Signed-off-by: Ivan Pavlov <AuthorReflex@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 44cd90c49a)
2024-02-04 19:18:17 +01:00

93 lines
3.8 KiB
Diff

From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2018 08:44:39 -0300
Subject: Add OPENSSL_PREFER_CHACHA_OVER_GCM option
This enables a compile-time option to prefer ChaCha20-Poly1305 over
AES-GCM in the openssl default ciphersuite, which is useful in systems
without AES specific CPU instructions.
OPENSSL_PREFER_CHACHA_OVER_GCM must be defined to enable it.
Note that this does not have the same effect as the
SL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA option, which prioritizes ChaCha20-Poly1305 only
when the client has it on top of its ciphersuite preference.
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
--- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -1506,11 +1506,29 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head,
&tail);
+ /*
+ * If OPENSSL_PREFER_CHACHA_OVER_GCM is defined, ChaCha20_Poly1305
+ * will be placed before AES-256. Otherwise, the default behavior of
+ * preferring GCM over CHACHA is used.
+ * This is useful for systems that do not have AES-specific CPU
+ * instructions, where ChaCha20-Poly1305 is 3 times faster than AES.
+ * Note that this does not have the same effect as the SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA
+ * option, which prioritizes ChaCha20-Poly1305 only when the client has it on top
+ * of its ciphersuite preference.
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_PREFER_CHACHA_OVER_GCM
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+ &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+ &head, &tail);
+#else
/* Within each strength group, we prefer GCM over CHACHA... */
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
&head, &tail);
ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
&head, &tail);
+#endif
/*
* ...and generally, our preferred cipher is AES.
@@ -1565,7 +1583,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_
* Within each group, ciphers remain sorted by strength and previous
* preference, i.e.,
* 1) ECDHE > DHE
- * 2) GCM > CHACHA
+ * 2) GCM > CHACHA, reversed if OPENSSL_PREFER_CHACHA_OVER_GCM is defined
* 3) AES > rest
* 4) TLS 1.2 > legacy
*
@@ -2236,7 +2254,13 @@ const char *OSSL_default_cipher_list(voi
*/
const char *OSSL_default_ciphersuites(void)
{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_PREFER_CHACHA_OVER_GCM
+ return "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:"
+ "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:"
+ "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+#else
return "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:"
"TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:"
"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+#endif
}
--- a/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
+++ b/include/openssl/ssl.h.in
@@ -195,9 +195,15 @@ extern "C" {
* DEPRECATED IN 3.0.0, in favor of OSSL_default_ciphersuites()
* Update both macro and function simultaneously
*/
-# define TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:" \
- "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:" \
- "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"
+# ifdef OPENSSL_PREFER_CHACHA_OVER_GCM
+# define TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:" \
+ "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:" \
+ "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"
+# else
+# define TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:" \
+ "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:" \
+ "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256"
+# endif
# endif
/*
* As of OpenSSL 1.0.0, ssl_create_cipher_list() in ssl/ssl_ciph.c always