openwrt/package/libs/wolfssl/patches/200-ecc-rng.patch
Petr Štetiar 31bb27f35b wolfssl: bump to 5.1.1-stable
This is amalgamation of backported changes since 4.7.0-stable release:

 Sergey V. Lobanov (2):

  5b13b0b02c70 wolfssl: update to 5.1.1-stable
  7d376e6e528f libs/wolfssl: add SAN (Subject Alternative Name) support

 Andre Heider (3):

  3f8adcb215ed wolfssl: remove --enable-sha512 configure switch
  249478ec4850 wolfssl: always build with --enable-reproducible-build
  4b212b1306a9 wolfssl: build with WOLFSSL_ALT_CERT_CHAINS

 Ivan Pavlov (1):

  16414718f9ae wolfssl: update to 4.8.1-stable

 David Bauer (1):

  f6d8c0cf2b47 wolfssl: always export wc_ecc_set_rng

 Christian Lamparter (1):

  86801bd3d806 wolfssl: fix Ed25519 typo in config prompt

The diff of security related changes we would need to backport would be
so huge, that there would be a high probability of introducing new
vulnerabilities, so it was decided, that bumping to latest stable
release is the prefered way for fixing following security issues:

 * OCSP request/response verification issue. (fixed in 4.8.0)
 * Incorrectly skips OCSP verification in certain situations CVE-2021-38597 (fixed in 4.8.1)
 * Issue with incorrectly validating a certificate (fixed in 5.0.0)
 * Hang with DSA signature creation when a specific q value is used (fixed in 5.0.0)
 * Client side session resumption issue (fixed in 5.1.0)
 * Potential for DoS attack on a wolfSSL client CVE-2021-44718 (fixed in 5.1.0)
 * Non-random IV values in certain situations CVE-2022-23408 (fixed in 5.1.1)

Cc: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Cc: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz>
Acked-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
Acked-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cotequeiroz@gmail.com>
2022-02-21 07:37:57 +01:00

51 lines
1.2 KiB
Diff

Since commit 6467de5a8840 ("Randomize z ordinates in scalar
mult when timing resistant") wolfssl requires a RNG for an EC
key when the hardened built option is selected.
wc_ecc_set_rng is only available when built hardened, so there
is no safe way to install the RNG to the key regardless whether
or not wolfssl is compiled hardened.
Always export wc_ecc_set_rng so tools such as hostapd can install
RNG regardless of the built settings for wolfssl.
--- a/wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c
+++ b/wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c
@@ -11647,21 +11647,21 @@ void wc_ecc_fp_free(void)
#endif /* FP_ECC */
-#ifdef ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT
int wc_ecc_set_rng(ecc_key* key, WC_RNG* rng)
{
int err = 0;
+#ifdef ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT
if (key == NULL) {
err = BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}
else {
key->rng = rng;
}
+#endif
return err;
}
-#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ECC_ENCRYPT
--- a/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/ecc.h
+++ b/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/ecc.h
@@ -647,10 +647,8 @@ WOLFSSL_API
void wc_ecc_fp_free(void);
WOLFSSL_LOCAL
void wc_ecc_fp_init(void);
-#ifdef ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT
WOLFSSL_API
int wc_ecc_set_rng(ecc_key* key, WC_RNG* rng);
-#endif
WOLFSSL_API
int wc_ecc_set_curve(ecc_key* key, int keysize, int curve_id);